HVK Archives: The QRS triangle
The QRS triangle - The Economic Times
T V R Shenoy
()
19 February 1997
Title : The QRS triangle
Author : T V R Shenoy
Publication : The Economic Times
Date : February 19, 1997
Ottavio Quattrocchi has asked everyone to stop linking him with the
'B' word. So have Snamprogetti, his former employer.
Let us accept these disclaimers at face value. After all, the
letter 'B' is a long way off from the letters 'Q' and 'S' in the
alphabetic run. But both are very close to the letter 'R' as in
'Rajiv.'
Forget about Bofors. In the happy days of the Rajiv Gandhi regime,
there was much more that linked the PM of India and the
representative of the Italian multinational than a single
questionable deal.
How should one describe the relationship between the Gandhis and
the Quattrocchis? Mere acquaintances, bosom buddies, or business
partners?
The CBI may or not look into the details of those trips to
Lakshadweep, the Andamans, or Corbett Park, where the Congress
leader broke bread with the Italian. But any investigator worth
the name must probe the Rs 8,000-crore worth of contracts awarded
by the government of India to Quattrocchi's firm.
The two secretaries who presided over the award of the HBJ pipeline
project have retired long since. Happily, they are around to be
questioned. They can, if the CBI so chooses, supply details about
the Gandhi-Quattrocchi relationship.
What can the then finance secretary, for instance, tell us? He
could speak of the way the enterprising Italian approached him in
search of information.
When the finance secretary refused, Quattrocchi sneered, "Do you
want the PM to ask for this, Mr Secretary?"
The bureaucrat replied that communications between the PM of India
and the permanent head of the finance ministry were none of
Quattrocchi's business. But mark the sequel.
Late that night (or early morning) Rajiv Gandhi called from Amethi.
The PM echoed the Italian's queries almost verbatim!
The files on the HBJ pipeline reveal other such instances of
political pressure. Step by step the bureaucracy was forced to
give way. And ultimately Quattrocchi always seemed to have his
way.
The bureaucracy can take on foreigners. It can even, to an extent,
block a minister. But it is not equipped to fight a wilfully
stubborn PM. As I am sure Messrs Venkataramanan and Ganapathi,
amongst others, can testify.
They are not the only possible source. A neutral and unimpeachable
observer is around in the form of the World Bank.
A World Bank study shows India paid at least Rs 100 crore more for
a plant than Bangladesh did on a similar project. For the record,
the same firm was involved in both countries.
The Confederation of Indian Industry arrived at the same finding
independently. That study too is available if the CBI wishes to
consult it.
There was a simple reason for this gouging. The Rajiv Gandhi
government made it clear that it would not consider using any other
technology for the fertiliser industry. Snamprogetti had a
monopoly. Like monopolises down the ages, they made the best of
the situation.
(All this is still relevant. Higher prices at the production stage
has had a multiplier effect on fertiliser prices for the consumer.)
But it was not the economic ministries alone that buckled under.
Even the mighty Intelligence Bureau (IB) seemed to dance to
Quattrocchi's piping.
Representatives of rival firms still remember the way the IB would
start to probe them when they seemed to pose a threat. In the case
of the fertiliser deal, for instance, the American firm C F Braun
was raided.
Interestingly, the IB also 'exposed' the espionage ring in the
office of Dr P C Alexander, the principal secretary to the PM, at a
sensitive time. The members of the so called ring would have had a
voice in the Howitzer deal.
Up to that point it was early 1985 the French Sofma gun seemed to
have a clear over its Swedish rival. The IB's actions helped tilt
the balance. That at any rate was the victors' own assessment (as a
Swedish source told me.)
Following the path taken by the Bofors money leads to some very
interesting places. Was the 'Q' of the Ardbo diaries really Ottavio
Quattrocchi? Let me put it this way can you come up with any other
decent reason why Quattrocchi tried to block the probe in the Swiss
courts?
But I don't want to be tangled up in Bofors just now. I merely
wish to state that there is more than one Swiss account in the name
of 'Q.' And in each of these accounts, money has come in from more
than one source!
The implication is clear, Isn't it? The mysterious 'Q' was used as
a conduit for many deals. Bofors being just one of them.
If 'Q' is indeed the Gandhi family's well known friend, details of
these deposits should not be too hard to find. It may be that the
CBI already has testimony to that effect.
The terms of reference of the CBI investigation in the hawala case
were carefully drawn to avoid the Narasimha Rao years. But Surinder
Jain was free to speak of the Rajiv Gandhi period. He apparently
aid just that.
S K Jain confessed that he and Quattrocchi operated together in
seveal deals. (Most of these did not involve Snamprogetti, the
Italian's nominal employer.) For good measure, Jain has stated that
it was Quattrocchi who introduced him to Amirbhai, the hawala
kingpin.
What was it that made an unknown Italian a wheeler-dealer on such a
large scale? The answer stares us in the face.
Ottavio Quattrocchi was in India for several decades. For the
greater part of this time, he never enjoyed a hotline to the PMO.
The deals that brought him to public attention came up in the era
of Rajiv Gandhi's dominance. Can you imagine Quattrocchi
interrupting either Indira Gandhi or V P Singh the middle of a
cabinet meeting? Or threatening the finance secretary of the day?
Coincidence? Congressmen seem to love that word when it comes in
Quattrocchi!
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