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HVK Archives: Officious behaviour

Officious behaviour - The Observer

Dina Nath Mishra ()
24 April 1997

Title : Officious behaviour
Author : Dina Nath Mishra
Publication : The Observer
Date : April 24, 1997

Prior to the 11th Lok Sabha, communist parties in the Lower House
have been static for more than a decade. Left Front, taken
together, accounted for 45 to 55 members. At best, they had the
role of a pressure group in Indian politics. Their area of
influence and electoral base remained more or less static. The
membership of the two parties has been stagnant for long. The CPM
and CPI have been planning to expand their bases in every plenary
session, but in vain. On the ideological front, their hollowness
was exposed with the collapse of USSR.

But, the results of May 1996 general elections made the communists
relevant, for it was a hung Lok Sabha with a complex political
composition. Not that CPM: and CPI increased their strength. It was
almost the same that they had earlier. Being a stable block in a
non-BJP, non-Congress formation, Left Front in general, and CPM in
particular, found themselves in a situation where they would not
only be relevant but could also dominate at the Centre. The CPM
had a pre-election resolution wherein it had identified Congress
and the BJP as political enemies.

The whole crisis of stability in the 11th Lok Sabha is born out of
the fact that the CPM set the agenda for government formation in
the given complex arithmetic in the Lower House in accordance with
its own resolution. The people's verdict was misinterpreted as a
verdict for secular government, ignoring fundamental
contradictions. All those who fought against one another with
different manifestoes were clubbed together.

It was quite convenient for the small parties to accept this
formulation, keeping in view the Muslim vote-bank. Thus, the BJP
was out. The second largest party, the Congress, was the foremost
enemy in the CPM resolution, as well as in the states where the
paltry mattered. But the UF government could not have come into
being without Congress support. The defeated and demoralised
Congress succumbed to the pressure of giving outside support when
UF leader Deve Gowda approached CPP chief P V Narasimha Rao. The
outside support of Congress was, in fact, the protection-pact.
Thus, the second largest party was out.

According to CMP (Common Minimum Programme) formulation, the power
went to a conglomerate of 14 parties. The Left in general, and CPM
in particular, played a dominant role throughout the first phase of
United Front government headed by Deve Gowda.

It displayed an air of superiority and acted like a big brother in
the UF government without taking any responsibility. During the
last ten months, both CPM general secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet
and home minister Indrajeet Gupta behaved in a manner as if they
were mandated by the people to rule UF, if not the country.

Surjeet used to advise Deve Gowda regularly, sometime even on an
hour-to-hour basis. The CPM and CPI delivered weekly sermons to UF
government, creating uncertainty in the minds of the people about
the fate of the government. The Left's balance energy was used for
periodic biffs to the Congress. It may be recalled that home
minister Indrajeet Gupta was the first leader to humiliate the
Congress right in the beginning. He provokingly said that Congress
had no other option but to support the UF government. He repeated
this a number of times. The Left lost no opportunity to lament the
alleged shortcomings of Gowda government.

The strategy of the CPM was four-pronged. First, to keep inflating
the balloon of secularism to strengthen anti-BJPism. In this
exercise, the contribution of the comrades was apparent when BJP
government of Gujarat was dismissed within 24 house of proving its
majority on the floor of the House. In UP, after the assembly
elections, a government was not allowed to be formed, hoping that
there may be some possibility of rigging up a non-BJP government.
Second, it worked towards fragmenting the Congress, for the Left
could dominate the non-BJP arena only if Congress got weaker.
Thirdly, to go on increasing the dominance of the CPM within the
United Front. And lastly, while doing so, it strived to keep its
image intact so that it could be unaccountable for the misdeeds of
the UF government.

During the last twenty-five days, the collapse of the secular
structure was evident. Communist leaders worked overtime to create
a scare of midterm poll that would result in better BJP prospects.
They came out with the theory of greater coordination between the
UF and the Congress before the confidence vote of April 11. But by
then, the Congress came out with the demand for change in the UF
leadership. Both the communist parties pronounced that in no case
would the leadership be changed. On the fateful day, April 11, the
communist leaders realised that they may not be able to dominate
the UF at this point as the regional parties agreed to change the
leadership. It was in this situation that the Left caved in and
became a party to the suggestion that before the trial of strength,
Deve Gowda should resign. However, Gowda did not oblige and went
to the House where debate was on.

Even after the defeat of the UF government, they set yet another
term that Congress should first withdraw its letter to the
President which stated its claim to form the government. The
Congress climbed down in two stages. At each stage, both the
communist parties made it clear that it was they who set the terms
and others had to fall in line. This happened at least on three
occasions recently. It was the Left which proposed coordination
between the Congress and the UF. But, both CPI and CPM ultimately
did not agree to sit with Congress in any coordination committee.
They argued that coordination between the government and Congress
is required and floor coordination in Parliament may be done. But,
the Left made Congress an untouchable. Other UF partners had to
agree. Congress too had to accept the humiliation.

Gujral was, in fact, Surjeet's choice. He had a tacit
understanding with Kesri. The Left Front forwarded Mulayam Singh's
candidature for leadership, knowing fully well that Laloo Prasad
and others would not accept him, and Gujral would be acceptable as
a compromise candidate. Thirdly, Moopanar's candidature was
scuttled mainly by Surjeet. Three sets of arguments were circulated
against Moopanar: That his rise to prime ministership would
ultimately strengthen Congress for he is a Congressman at heart.
Secondly, Leftists circulated that an Indian Bank seam-tainted
leader cannot be made Prime Minister. Thirdly, Surjeet introduced
the north-south argument saying that if BJP has to be fought, the
Prime Minister should be from the north.

The dominance of CPM has increased in the Gujral phase of UF
government, for Gujral was a card-holding communist. Moopanar would
have been a difficult man to be managed by Surjeet: Gujral is not.
A K Antony said that belligerence of the Left parties caused
political turmoil at the Centre.



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