Hindu Vivek Kendra
A RESOURCE CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF HINDUTVA
   
 
 
«« Back
HVK Archives: Comments on Srikrishna Commission Report (Chapter 4/4)

Comments on Srikrishna Commission Report (Chapter 4/4) - (no publication)

Hindu Vivek Kendra ()
August 28, 1998

Title: Comments on Srikrishna Commission Report (Chapter 4/4)
Author: Hindu Vivek Kendra
Publication:
Date: August 28, 1998

Srikrishna Commission Report
Chapter IV

1.1 "The intelligence apparatus failed to gather crucial intelligence
about the closed door meetings held by Bombay Muslim Action Committee on
2nd December 1992 in Madanpura and by Shiv Sena at Sena Bhavan on 29th
December 1992. On several occasions police station concerned did not even
have persons knowing Urdu to interact with Muslims and feel the pulse of
Muslim community or even to read and understand Urdu writings. This also
led to their inability to keep themselves apprised of the communal Urdu
writings circulating in the city."

If the Muslim action was spontaneous, then why was there a need to keep a
watch on the Bombay Muslim Action Committee? According to our information,
this is a paper organisation, and the Dec 2 meeting was attended by
religious and secular leaders. It was also attended by criminals, and
those businessmen who operate at the edge of the law. At the meeting it
was stated that if the police remain a spectator, then the Muslims would
have no problem in attacking the Hindus. However, if the police do their
job, then it would be difficult to foment trouble. It is quite clear that
this organisation was prepared to create problem, and the myth of
spontaneous reaction has to remain a myth. This committee is no longer in
existence, since its utility of fomenting trouble is now over.

In his deposition to the Commission, Shri Shreekant Bapat, who was the
police commissioner of Mumbai at the time of the riots said, "During a
meeting at the Chief Minister's residence, (the then) Union Minister
Ghulam Nabi Azad had questioned why the police should interfere if the
Hindus and Muslims were fighting amongst each other. I politely told him
that the police are expected to maintain law and order and cannot remain
mute spectators." (The Times of India, March 20, 1997)

As far as the comments on Urdu writings, we are surprised that the
Commission has chosen to ignore them. It could have taken a suo moto
action to find out the extent of communal writings in the Urdu papers. The
fact that the Commission feels compelled to make the comment that some
police stations should have a Urdu reading person clearly indicates that
the Commission at least suspects that there was communal writings in this
section of the press. Even though the Shiv Sena lawyers asked the
Commission to call for the relevant Urdu publications of the time, this
request was denied. The Sena lawyers said that they have no knowledge of
Urdu, and hence it will be impossible for them to know what was written.
The Commission had asked for the writings in Saamna and Navakal to be made
available to the Commission.

The Commission should have said that the keeping a track of Urdu writings
should be the task of a central intelligence gathering machinery of the
government and so avoid duplication. Whatever is appropriate information,
the same could be passed on to the concerned police station.

1.2 "The Mahaartis were erroneously treated as purely religious activity
and given full freedom, despite evidence that they were being used for
political purposes......"

Whether the Mahaartis were for political purposes or religious is really
not the issue. As the Commission itself has noted (Vol I, Chapter II, para
1.7(iii), page 13) it was in response to the Namaz on the street and the
call of Azan on the loudspeakers from the mosques, which has disturbed the
people surrounding the mosques. The Commission has accepted that the
Mahaartis started from Dec 26, 1992, that is a good 20 days after the
start of the riots.

There were a total of 462 Mahaartis starting from Dec 26. Out of these, up
to Jan 5, the number was 52. Thus most of the Mahaartis happened in the
Hindu retaliation phase. Yet these Mahaartis have been construed as a
provocation by the media, certain politicians, and to an extent by the
Commission.

The Commission has failed to look into the issue of why the Mahaartis
stopped. In Feb 93, a meeting was convened by the government in which it
was decided that the Mahartis would stop, and simultaneously so would the
Namaz on the streets. While the first has happened, the second is still
continuing. Even when the Sena-BJP government came to power in March 95,
and the issue of additional FSI to the mosques was solved to the
satisfaction of the Muslim community, the Namaz on the streets still
continue. The Commission should have also gone into the issue of when the
Azan through loudspeakers commenced, and the reason for granting the
permissions for it. If the Commission had done its job, it would have come
across another example of Muslim vote-bank politics. The tragedy is that
the appeasement of the communal Muslim leadership seems to be accepted by
the community as well as those who go under the label of secularist.

In Chapter II, para 1.7(iii), pg 13, the Commission says that the issue of
Namaz on the streets and the Azan over the loudspeaker are `minor
irritants'. This establishes the bias of the Commission. For the last
over one year, there is a case going on in Calcutta on the issue of noise
pollution caused by the Azan over the loudspeakers, and using loudspeakers
in Hindu religious public functions. While the Calcutta High Court
restrictions have been applied on the Hindu functions, the mosque issue is
still open. It is understood that the Muslim religious leaders are egged
on to disobey the High Court orders by the so-called secular political
parties. In Mumbai, the High Court here had also asked the government
quite a long time ago to do something about the nuisance of the Namaz on
the streets. Why has the Commission ignored this?

The contention of the Commission is that because the Mahaartis obstructed
the traffic, it was a nuisance, and hence suitable action should have been
taken. Applying the same criteria, Namaz on the streets also obstructs
traffic. But for the Commission this is a minor irritant.

1.4 "The police were hopelessly outnumbered as the strength of the police
staff was inadequate by about 30% to 35% even to handle day to day
problems. A fortiori it was hopelessly inadequate to handle extraordinary
situations which arose during December 1992 and January 1993."

Even while the Commission accepts the undermaning of the police, it has
consistently not accepted this reason for not taking up follow up action
when it deals with the individual police station in Vol II. In particular,
after an incident of private firing, the Commission has refused to accept
the police version that they were unable to do a quick combing operation,
and hence not locate the weapons used, because of lack of manpower. See
para 1.10 below. Also this contradicts para 1.3 where the Commission says
that the police were not able to effectively implement the prohibitory
orders.

1.7 "The wireless communication equipment were not foolproof. This enabled
communally affected policemen to successfully break into and intrude upon
the police channel and transmit abusive, conflicting and confusing talk on
the police wireless channels during the height of the communal riots when
accurate communication on wireless channel was imperative."

This incident happened from one police station, only once and from a
remote police outpost which sees no communal disturbance. Listening to the
taped conversations, it is also clear that the control room was telling
that police station to get off the air. As soon as the identity of the
station was discovered, the necessary disciplinary action was taken. It is
because of the Commission's bias that it has not dealt with this angle of
the whole issue. As in many other cases, the Commission has come to
perverse conclusions on the basis of a single instance. However, where
the Muslims are in bad light the Commission has rationalised their
actions. It would have done credit to the Commission to have acknowledged
that the police did take disciplinary action once the source of mischief
was located.

1.9 This deals with the alleged ineffectiveness of the army.

The Commission has dealt with the issue of contradictions within the then
political leadership of the governing party. It is not that the army was
ineffective, but that they were not given clear cut instructions. Even at
the time, there have been news paper reports about the in-fighting in the
governing party due to which the army was not called out in time. Here is
an attempt by the Commission to underplay the role of some of the
politicians, who should have been held guilty of dereliction of their
duties.

1.10 "There was no serious combing operations carried out even in cases
where private firing was suspected. The excuse was that soon after the
occurrence of the suspected private firing the police personnel on hand
was small and by the time their strength had been augmented and combing
was carried out it was too late to apprehend miscreants or unearth
fire-arms. Consequently, though the police claim that there were so many
instances of private firing, some even from sophisticated fire arms, they
have not been able to seize any but one country made pistol."

The Commission contradicts itself once again. In 1.4, the Commission
accepts that there is undermanning even in normal times. It is obvious
that the Commission has pre-judged the whole issue, and has gone about
collecting `facts' which would conform to this judgement. There is also a
need to recognise that the private firing has mostly taken place in Muslim
dominated areas, where the criminals operate. Also, it is well known that
these groups have sophisticated arms. However, in dealing with the
individual police stations, the Commission has mostly dismissed that
private firing took place. Hence, according to this conclusion of the
Commission, the results of the search would have not disclosed anything.

1.13 "Police officers and men, particularly at the junior level, appeared
to have an inbuilt bias against the Muslims which was evident in their
treatment of the suspected Muslims and Muslim victims of riots."

In Chapter II, para 1.5, page 12, the Commission says: "Considering it
from all aspects, the Commission is not inclined to give serious credence
to the theory that disproportionately large number of Muslim deaths in
December 1992 was necessarily indicative of an attempt on the part of the
police to target and liquidate Muslims because of bias."

There is thus a major contradiction here. If there was a police bias to
the extent that it affected their performance of their duty, then with the
Muslims out in the streets, it would have provide them with a good
opportunity to exhibit this bias. Even when the facts are given to them,
the Commission persists in sticking to its pre-conceived notions. The way
the police took action against Hindu rioters after Jan 10 (when clear
instructions to fire, with the necessary political support, were given) it
is clear that the police does not consider the religious identity of the
persons.

1.15 The Commission has consistently maintained that whenever the Muslims
came out on the streets the initial objective was peaceful. However, they
were always provoked into being violent.

In one case of the Kherwadi police station (Vol II, para 16.3, page 94),
the Commission says that the provocation was the sight of the police by
the Muslim mob. This is yet another example of bias and pre-conceived
notions. As a rule, the Commission has always said that the Muslim mobs
that came on the street had peaceful intentions, but became violent for no
fault of theirs.

1.16 "The adverse criticism of the police in handling the December 1992
phase of the rioting, which was aired in the media and from platforms by
political leaders caused considerable demoralization of the force. Apart
from demoralizing the force, it also induced a knee jerk reaction from the
government at the political level with the Chief Minister instructing the
police that his officers and men should `go slow'."

The Commission has not identified the names of the politicians, the
reporters or the publication which have made the adverse criticism. In
Chapter II, para 1.4, page 12, the Commission has accepted that these
criticisms were unwarranted. Given the bias of the Commission, it is not
surprising that the persons/institutions have not been identified. In
fact, the Commission has accepted the testimony of a journalist who was
one of the main person who made the adverse criticism.

1.16 "A specific broadcast message was issued on 8.12.1992 instructing the
men not to fire while dealing with communal mobs. This order was very much
in existence till countermanded by B.C. Message No. 457 on 10th January
1993. This order caused immense confusion amongst the police ranks since,
in the interregnum, the officers and men. were not sure how to handle the
mobs. Consequently, some of them continued to fire, but large number of
officers did not fire, resulting in prolongation of the violent
incidents."

The authenticity of this message has been challenged by the then Police
Commissioner for the city and the then Chief Minister of the state.
Whatever may be the case, there would appear to be some cause of confusion
in the minds of the police force. It is obvious that they were influenced
with the unjustified criticism by the media and some politicians of their
action in the first phase of the December riots. There is also a need to
understand the tactics that were used to target Hindus in the first phase
of the January riots. This was to indulge in individual stabbing, which
would have been very difficult for the police to handle, since the culprit
would have gone away as soon as the crime was committed. It would appear
that the Hindus had to take to self-defence, and hence the retaliation had
started. The order which erased the confusion in the minds of the police
came only after the Hindu retaliation had started. And during this phase
the Hindu casualties with respect to police firing was higher than the
Muslim.

There is an obvious inference that one can draw that if the confusing
order not to fire had not been given on Dec 8, the situation would have
been controlled much more quickly and caused much less damage to life and
property. It is due to the Commission's bias that it has not extended its
argument in this direction. It is also due to the Commission's bias that
it has not come out strongly against the media and the politicians who
have alleged that the police have specifically targeted the Muslims in
December, when in fact, even as per the Commission's own admission that
this is far from the truth.

There is a need to specifically point out that the order was rescinded, or
clarity on the action to be taken was restored, immediately after the
Hindu retaliation had started in January 93. And going by the Commission's
own findings it is clear that the situation was brought under control
quickly. If the police were not constrained, then the attacks on Hindus
in the first week of January 93 would not have taken place, and hence
there would have been no need to retaliate.

Here the Commission has contradicted itself with the paragraph immediately
prior to this, when it has said, "Though there were some marginal violence
like stone throwing, it should have been controlled by use of persuasion
and minimal force." There is a clear opinion that the Commission has
expressed that there was no need to fire on the rioters.

1.18 "The police, by their own conduct, appeared to have lost moral
authority over the citizens and appeared to evoke no fear even in the
minds of the criminal elements."

The moral authority was lost not because of the police action, but the way
the media and some politicians projected the police action in a bad light
for their own vested interests. As far as the criminal elements are
concerned, the Commission has accepted as valid that one of the reason for
the violence was the action taken by the police against criminals prior to
December 92. This action was projected by the communal leadership and the
so-called secularists as being targeted against the Muslims.

1.19 "The police firing was, on several occasions, ineffective and large
number of rounds are said to have been fired without producing any visible
effect. The police firing at least on two occasions appears to be
unjustified, excessive and resulted in killing innocent citizens, one in
the Suleman Bakery incident in Pydhonie jurisdiction and the other in the
Hilal (Hari) Masjid in RAK Marg jurisdiction. The ensuing deaths on these
two occasions were not justified at all."

This is really contradictory. On the one side, the Commission says that
firing was ineffective, and then says that there was an excessive use of
force. In case of the Suleman Bakery incident, while 9 were killed, 78
were taken as prisoners. If there was an excessive force, the numbers
killed would have been much higher. The Commission has refused to look at
the issue on the basis of a larger picture.

1.20 "Even after it became apparent that the leaders of Shiv Sena were
active in stoking the fires of communal riots, the police dragged their
feet on the facile and exaggerated assumption that if such leaders were
arrested the communal situation would further flare up, or to, put it in
the words of the then Chief Minister Naik, "Bombay would burn"; not that
Bombay did not burn even otherwise."

We have no comments to make on what is patently a political statement.

1.21 "Though the police did take action in some cases against newspapers
by registering offences. under section 153A of Indian Penal Code, such
cases were kept pending for inordinately long time for want of sanction by
the government. A large number of vituperative and communally inciting
writing in newspapers was ignored by police, emboldening the writers of
such material to greater heights of abuse, incitement and calumny."

Here it is pertinent to point out that two so-called concerned citizens of
the country residing in Mumbai. The High Court said that it did not agree
with the litigants that the writings broke any law of the land. In the
High Court judgement, an opinion was given that a proper reading of the
articles and editorial in Samnaa would clearly show that the objects of
ire were not Muslims in general, but those who were working against the
interest of the nation. It is indeed surprising that the Commission has
chosen to ignore this judgement, and expressed a contrary opinion. An
appeal was made to the Supreme Court, which did not even admit the same.
All this had happened before the Commission finished its hearing and
started to write the report. Moreover, the Commission is silent on what
was written in the Urdu papers. And so were the two `concerned' citizens.

1.22 "Despite knowledge of the fact that the force had been infected by
communal virus, no effective curative steps were taken over a large period
of time as a result of which communal violence became chronic and its
virulent symptoms showed up during the two riot periods."

The Commission should have pointed out that this so-called virus was bred
during the time when there was an allegedly secular government. Under the
circumstances the Commission should have specifically blamed the
governments that were in power before the Shiv Sena-BJP were elected in
March 1995. It should also have been the job of the Commission to have
investigated why the so-called effective curative steps were not taken.

The Commission also had the opportunity to inquire whether the communal
virus exists while the present government is in power. After all, the Shiv
Sena-BJP government claims that it has been able to maintain harmony and
that there was only one communal incident during its reign.

(Concluded)


Back                          Top

«« Back
 
 
 
  Search Articles
 
  Special Annoucements