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archive: Threat to Global Peace

Threat to Global Peace

K Subrahmanyam
The Times of India
June 21, 1999


    Title: Threat to Global Peace 
    Author: K Subrahmanyam
    Publication: The Times of India
    Date: June 21, 1999
    
    Introduction: Core Issue Pakistan, not Kashmir 
    
    THERE is a lot of justified speculation and concern in this country
    about the pressure on the Indian Army to cross the Line of Control,
    how long this border conflict will last and whether it will escalate.
    As is characteristic of the Indian political class and its mindset,
    the focus is on ourselves and what we will be doing. But this conflict
    was imposed on India by the deliberate aggression of Pakistan. If
    India were to behave like other countries which have been sovereign
    for much longer periods than we have, our attention should be on what
    Pakistan's next move will be.
    
    Plan that Failed
    
    Will it accept the international community's exhortations and wind
    down its aggression or will it escalate the conflict? What India
    should do and whether the conflict will be prolonged depend not on
    this country but on Pakistan. This inability and unwillingness of our
    political class to study, analyse and assess the other country's
    motivation, moves and aims are at the root of all our national
    security failures in the last 50 years.
    
    Pakistan's aim in initiating this aggression is obvious. It was
    intended to internationalise the Kashmir issue as per the Pakistani
    framework. It was carried out at a time when Pakistan thought the
    Indian leadership, preoccupied with the forthcoming elections, would
    be weak and indecisive. Presumably it thought that its massive
    intrusion would cut the Srinagar-Leh road and simultaneously the
    mercenaries it had already placed in different locations would strike,
    paralysing the Indian security forces and the Kashmir administration.
    
    Now Pakistan knows this plan has failed. The Indian response was both
    firm and restrained. The air strikes were launched, but both ground
    and air operations were confined to Indian territory except for
    retaliatory artillery fire. The most disappointing development for
    Pakistan was the recognition of leading nations that there was a
    definite aggression by Pakistan across the LoC and their consequent
    unwillingness to internationalise the Kashmir issue as per Pakistan's
    prescription.
    
    Therefore, our efforts should focus on assessing the alternative
    options open to Pakistan in the light of this situation. Pakistan may
    escalate the situation by sending in more intruders and supplies
    across the LoC. Pakistan may broaden and open new fronts. It can
    trigger a major sabotage and terrorist campaign in Kashmir and
    elsewhere in India. It can even initiate a limited conflict across the
    international border and use it to resort to nuclear blackmail. Last,
    if good sense prevails, Pakistan can quietly wind down its aggression
    and call it a day. The Indian response should be tailored to ensure
    that in any of these cases its action should contain Pakistan's
    aggression and prevent a possible escalation.
    
    Even if the Pakistan army and Mr Nawaz Sharif had been together in
    planning and unleashing the aggression in Kargil, their interests in
    respect of further escalation and their reactions to international
    pressures may not necessarily be the same. Pakistan has kept itself an
    exit route. Since it has not acknowledged that its own army is
    involved in the aggression, winding it up may not pose any problem in
    terms of loss of face. However, the launch of this aggression and its
    becoming counterproductive will have serious after-effects in the
    army-government relationship.
    
    While India may have legitimate reservations over internationalising
    the Kashmir issue in traditional terms, it cannot have any over
    internationalising the problem of a state like Pakistan posing a
    threat to international peace and security. According to Pakistan's
    own admission, its security forces cannot control the thousands of
    armed mercenaries who are causing domestic problems in that country
    besides indulging in international terrorism. Many of these terrorist
    groups are financed by the proceeds of narcotics traffic. Their
    extremism and fundamentalism are not only evident in the atrocities of
    the Taliban against Afghan women but also in the torture and
    mutilation of captured Indian Army personnel.
    
    Nuclear Status
    
    Therefore, this is the appropriate time for the Indian government to
    focus on the problems posed to international peace and stability by
    the state of Pakistan which is moving economically towards becoming a
    ``failed state''. It should be pointed out that Pakistan is
    poliitically unstable, involved i narcotics traffic, international
    terrorism and generates and harbours a large number of religious
    extremists. There is a strong assumption in India that the US-Pakistan
    bonds are unbreakable and, therefore, India raising the issue will
    lead to the US and its allies siding with Pakistan. That assumption
    gives too much credit to the sense of loyalty of both countries and
    their commitment to each other. In international politics, such
    commitments are rare. The anti-American feeling in Pakistan runs deep
    and the US has never been known to be loyal to any ally at the cost of
    its own interests.
    
    In India, there are still fixed ideas that the US-Pak, US-China and
    Pak-China relationships -- which were developed during the Cold War --
    are immutable. In international politics, few relationships remain
    unaltered over a period of time -- especially those which were
    developed out of highly opportunistic considerations. Pakistan no
    longer serves a useful purpose for the United States as it did during
    the Cold War era and during the period of intense US hostility towards
    Iran. Though elements in the Pentagon are still nostalgic about past
    links with the Pakistani military, there are increasing worries
    elsewhere in the US administration about the growing Islamisation of
    the Pakistani armed forces. The US was used to a docile Pakistan and
    yet Pakistan belied that assumption by becoming overtly nuclear. The
    aggression in Kargil is a symptom of further Pakistani defiance of the
    US and an assertion of its autonomous nuclear status. A defiant
    nuclear Pakistan involved in international terrorism, narcotics
    traffic, money laundering and Islamic terrorism has very little use
    for the US.
    
    Mutuality of Interests
    
    Similarly, Pakistan was a convenient tool for China to keep India
    countervailed within the subcontinent. The overt nuclearisation of the
    subcontinent and Pakistan's roguish behaviour which can pose similar
    threats to China in Xinjiang must make China reconsider seriously the
    utility of its relationship with Pakistan. What happens in Kargil
    today can be re-enacted across Mintaka and Kunjerab passes.
    
    It is high time India seriously re-evaluated its long-held assumptions
    on Pakistan's utility to the US and China. We must explore the
    possibilities of developing a better understanding on a mutuality of
    interests with the US and China, however limited their scope may be.
    



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