archive: Top Pak Generals shared the secret
Top Pak Generals shared the secret
Statesman News Service
The Statesman
June 24, 1999.
Title: Top Pak Generals shared the secret
Author: Statesman News Service
Publication: The Statesman
Date: June 24, 1999.
NEW DELHI, June 23. - The Pakistan Army had meant to keep its plans
for the Kargil intrusions a secret shared by just a few top generals,
and with only an "in principle concurrence" obtained from the Prime
Minister, India said today.
Plans for the operation were probably made as early as September
1998, though it was executed only towards the end of April, a
government document has suggested.
The Generals who knew about the Army plan were: Pakistan's Chief of
Army Staff, Chief of General Staff, Director General Military
Operations, GOC 10 Corps and GOC Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA)
who was made overall in-charge of operations in the Kargil sector.
Even the Corps Commanders were not in the picture, which is
substantiated by the taped telephone conversations between Pakistan
Chief of Army Staff and his deputy.
The idea was to keep the plan closely under wraps, taking into
confidence as few people as possible, and avoid any activity opposite
Kargil that might alert India to the Pakistani Army's intentions. The
"in principle concurrence" to be obtained from Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif would not involve "any specifics".
A cover plan was to be kept in readiness to obfuscate the aggression,
and appear to defuse escalation within a short time.
The intrusion plan hinged on exploiting large gaps in defences in the
sector, on both sides of the LoC. The Pakistani Army also banked on
the usual Indian practice of opening Zoji La pass towards end-May or
beginning of June, which would make for a late Indian reaction.
As it happened, the pass was opened for troop induction in early May
and the Indian reaction was far swifter and more vigorous than
Pakistan had expected. "We do not think that Pakistan, while starting
on the venture, reckoned on the level of Indian resolve in their
calculations," the government has said.
The artillery which was inducted into the FCNA during the heavy
exchange of fire in July-September 1998 was not de-inducted, the
government has said. Fresh troops were not moved into the area since
that would draw India's attention.
No reserve formations or units were moved in until after the plan was
executed; after that, nearly a whole brigade was moved in to create
reserves.
The administrative bases were to be catered to from existing defences
and the logistic lines of communication were to be along the ridge
lines and the nullahs, well away from the tracks and positions of
Indian troops.
Four independent groups were created from four infantry battalions,
the 3,4,5 and 6 battalions of the Northern Light Infantry, and two
companies of Special Service Group were already in the area. For a
modicum of air defence capability, the groups were allotted shoulder
fired Air Defence Missiles of the Stinger variety, coupled with the
12.7 mm Air defence machine guns integral to the NLI battalions.
The Pakistani artillery - 20 batteries - was to provide fire support
to the intruding groups from across the LoC. Each intrusion had the
support of three-four batteries.
Observation post officers from the Pakistan Army were also grouped
along with line and radio communication. Soldiers from each battalion
and militants provided logistical support.
Members of Laskar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Afghan war veterans
were grouped with each battalion, to give the operation a facade of
jihad. Following the intrusions, 800 or more militants have been
moved to the Skardu area for reinforcements.
The plan was put into operation towards the end of April. The main
groups were broken into a number of sub-groups of 30 to 40 each to
carry out multiple intrusions along the ridge lines, and occupy
dominating heights with approximately 200 in Batalik, Dras and Mashkoh
Valley sectors and around 100 in Kaksar.
The intrusions, it was thought, if effective, would enable Pakistani
troops to secure heights from where the Srinagar-Leh highway could be
controlled at a number of points.
This would give Pakistan control over a substantial piece of ground
across LoC and enable it to negotiate from a position of strength,
alter the status of the LoC and internationalise the Kashmir issue.
Back
Top
|
