archive: The neighbourhood diplomacy
The neighbourhood diplomacy
K.K. Katyal
The Hindu
June 14, 1999
Title: The neighbourhood diplomacy
Author: K.K. Katyal
Publication: The Hindu
Date: June 14, 1999
Introduction: India's dealings with Pakistan will never be the same
again. New Delhi will have to take into account the betrayal of the
trust reposed in the leadership in Islamabad not along ago.
Sharply contrasting patterns are indicated by three major contacts
between India and its neighbours - the India-Pakistan talks on Kargil
last weekend, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's visit
to China and the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's presence
in Dhaka for the inauguration of a bus service between
India and Bangladesh this week. Highly significant, each case will go
a long way in moulding the next phase of the neighbourhood diplomacy,
In the case of Bangladesh, it will be a confirmation of the existing
close relationship and an important step towards strengthening it. In
the case of China, the first visit by an Indian External Affairs
Minister after eight years coincides with repairing the damage to
mutual ties wrought in the recent past. The Pakistan Foreign
Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz's discussions with Mr. Jaswant Singh - in a
crisis atmosphere overshadowed by disclosures of Islamabad's
complicity in the Kargil operations - reflected the new, intractable
complexities that had been evident since last month.
India's dealings with Pakistan will never be the same again. New
Delhi will have to take into account the betrayal of the trust reposed
in the leadership in Islamabad not long ago. The realisation that
Pakistan's armed forces were busy plotting against India when their
Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, was affixing his signature on the
Lahore Declaration and when the bus diplomacy appeared to promise a
reversal of the adversarial past has rudely jolted India, causing
incalculable harm to its psyche. No government here, present or
future, will accept Pakistan's professions at face value. Instead,
there will be an insistence on foolproof, firm guarantees to guard
against a mismatch between words and deeds.
Mr. Sartaj Aziz came and went back. He followed an agenda, carefully
scripted in advance, and made use of the brief stay to put across his
government's viewpoint to the media. India prevented his game plan to
diffuse the focus from the immediate problem in Kargil. He was not
left in doubt that what India wanted was not an open-ended dialogue
but a response to its suggestions - for vacating the aggression and
bringing to book those responsible for the torture of Indian soldiers
in Pakistan's custody. He had to convey the Indian stand to Mr.
Sharif and tell New Delhi about his response. To that extent, the
move to obfuscate the central issue was prevented. But there was
nothing to suggest that Pakistan would have second thoughts on the
maximal position adopted by it in the hope of getting something in the
bargain. However, even the minimum will be unacceptable to New
Delhi. Major challenges are ahead of India, both in the military and
diplomatic fields.
Mr. Jaswant Singh's trip to Beijing is doubly important - as the
culmination of one phase of bilateral relationship and the beginning
of another. The steady improvement in ties, that had begun in
December 1988 with the visit to China by the then Prime Minister,
Rajiv Gandhi, was thwarted last year, first by the interpretations put
on the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes' statements and later by
Beijing's strong reaction to India's nuclear tests. The resulting
tensions have now been tackled and the way has been paved for resuming
the interrupted process. The Chinese officials, think-tanks and
non-officials took the Minister's comments in their stride but they
could not reconcile themselves to India's nuclear reality. During a
two-week trip to China in April last year - days before the Pokhran
tests - I heard sharp references to Mr. Fernandes' remarks. But after
expressing themselves, at times strongly, the interlocutors moved on
to other aspects of the bilateral relationship. On the whole, theirs
was a constructive approach as they discussed ways to upgrade ties.
They were receptive to suggestions with one exception - they rejected
the Indian view on China's supply of military hardware and nuclear
technology to Pakistan.
It was a different story after the nuclear tests. Beijing was highly
perturbed (be-cause it lost its nuclear monopoly in Asia, apart from
other reasons); it took strong exception to the rationale provided by
Mr. Vajpayee, in a letter to the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton; it
regards the tests as China-specific.
In that bitter mood, evident in the tough line taken by it at the
meetings of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5)
and of the Council, China called upon India to reverse its nuclear
programme, not to proceed with missile development and to adhere to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (rejected by India as a
discriminatory regime). Early this year, when the U.S. seemed to have
reconciled itself to India's nuclear doctrine of a minimum, credible
deterrence and was inclined to accommodate New Delhi's viewpoint, as
part of a mutually reinforcing process, China stuck to its hard
posture. Mr. Singh's talks with his counterpart, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan,
may not lead to China coming to terms with India's nuclear status but
Beijing will not let the shadow of Pokhran-II fall on its future
dealings with India. Even on the nuclear issue, it may prefer
engagement to confrontation.
Despite the strains last year, peace on the Sino-Indian border was not
disturbed, and the confidence-building measures not only remained
intact but also worked effectively. This was a welcome sign of
stability which helped the two sides get over the crisis period. It
is not unrealistic to hope for an improvement in the bilateral field,
focus of the current contacts. Also in evidence is their increased
like-mindedness on global is-sues. China and India took an identical
line on Kosovo and NATO's action, even while taking care not to give
the impression of ganging up on any other power. Sino-U.S. relations
have of late been subjected to pressures, what with the NATO hits on
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Cox report blaming China for
espionage in sensitive technological areas, the U.S. security
arrangements with Japan and Washington's Taiwan policy. All these may
have weighed with China in stepping up contacts with India but the
basic equation between Beijing and Washington remains unchanged.
In the regional context, the special relationship between China and
Pakistan will remain a factor to be reckoned with and may manifest
itself in different forms. However, Beijing keeps an equidistance
between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, calling on the two sides to
resolve their problems through dialogue and peaceful means and in the
spirit of the Lahore Declaration. This does not mean total comfort to
Islamabad.
Because of the disenchantment with the bus diplomacy in relation to
Pakistan, there may be a natural tendency to curb any euphoria over
the start of the Calcutta-Dhaka bus service. But India's ties with
Bangladesh have not been plagued by the problems of the type that
disturbed its equation with Pakistan. It is, therefore, in order to
be optimistic about the meaning of the new service for the growth of
amity between New Delhi and Dhaka. Because of their asymmetry,
anti-India sentiments come in handy for whoever is in the Op-position
in Bangladesh but the many commonalties and shared interests out-weigh
the negative factors. This is evident from the increased political
understanding and closer economic ties, both in the bilateral and
regional contexts. The Tin Bigha enclave controversy and the
pro-longed stalemate in the talks on the sharing of Ganga waters are
things of the past.
As regards trade, the two sides have expanded the concessional tariff
regime bilaterally, apart from the mechanisms under the auspices of
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The improved
ties between India and Bangladesh have helped the two sides deal with
the activities of extremists who used the Bangladesh soil as either a
springboard for anti-India activities or as a safe haven. The
political-level understanding has stood the two in good stead.
The three cases thus add up to a composite scenario, with mixed
signals - two positive, one highly jarring.
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