archive: No Sena like Veyu Sena (Question and Answer with Air Chief
No Sena like Veyu Sena (Question and Answer with Air Chief
Posted by Ashok Chowgule (ashokvc@giasbm01.vsnl.net.in)
The Times of India
July 16, 1999
Title: No Sena like Veyu Sena (Question and Answer with Air Chief
Marshal A Y Tipnis)
Author:
Publication: The Times of India
Date: July 16, 1999
Introduction: For a combat aircraft flying 30,000 feet-plus above,
targeting an enemy that is itself located at 17,000 feet, well
entrenched and armed with surface-to-air missiles is a unique
experience. "Operation Vijay " in Kargil enacted an unprecedented
warfare by the Indian Air Force never witnessed anywhere in the
world. Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis spoke to Mahendra Ved
about Kargil and the role of the Air Force.
Q: Why were air operations in Kargil delayed?
A: I had told the Chiefs of Staff Committee that political clearance
was a must for any air operation. The reasons were quite obvious. An
air action even on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) would
have a different connotation. The "optics" for the adversary, public
at home and for the international community, would be complex. It
could lead to escalation that need not progress step-by-step in that
or any other sector. We had to speculate on what the Pakistan Air
Force (PAF) reaction could be. I had wanted an advance notice of no
more than 12 to 24 hours to take precautionary measures against a
pre-emptive PAF attack, not only on my bases, but also key industrial
establishments. I had also to assess mine, and the adversary's
ability to escalate. I was confident that given one-to-one strength,
the IAF is superior and the PAF knew it. I am not using the
hyperbole; it is a statement of fact. The task assigned to the IAF
was to use air power, not as an extended artillery but only in
assistance to the Army. The need was to maintain operations as close
and restricted as possible - and be within our territory at all
costs. So we were not using air power in the classical sense of
crossing into enemy territory to engage him in dogfights, while
defending our positions and installations.
Q: There is a perception that advance photo reconnaissance had not
been conducted in Kargil.
A: We did know the terrain. Photo reccee is done not of the
mountains, but of specific targets or positions. There were no known
positions till intrusion was detected. The need was for locating the
intruders, and their supply lines, which we did once the task was
given. After going into action on May 27, we built a phenomenal data
bank of the terrain over the next two weeks. This helped us, as you
can see, when we hit 22 to 25 targets, some of them major - Munto
Dhalo, Tharu, Padmago, Kokarthang, Tololing and Tiger Hill and Point
4388 in Batalik. It is no boasting, but even we were taken aback by
the rapid advances we made, in eliminating the intruders' positions
and in hitting their supply lines. In Drass, it was most critical to
stop them from coming anywhere near the (Srinagar-Kargil) road.
Actions at Jubar and Kaksar proved decisive.
What would have been the scenario without the IAF?
God forbid, it would have taken weeks and months. Not even by
December, which was the estimate in some quarters. There were doubts
even whether we would able to push them back completely. The use of
air power ensured that the action by the Army was decisive, incurring
fewer losses and within a short time. It may be a pure guesstimate,
but air strikes killed close to 500 intruders.
Q: Have you studied the initial losses? Could they have been avoided?
A: Your second question first: The loss of aircraft, and a pilot... I
would say no loss is acceptable loss. But in any action, one has to
be prepared for attrition. The loss of MiG 27 on May 27 was due, I
would say, to in-adequate precaution. I would not call it
carelessness. We were operating in rarified atmosphere, poor
visibility and attacking from 30,000 feet. One is not trying to find
an excuse, but restrictions placed by the target, probably ready with
a Stinger, were not taken into consideration. Nachiketa went for his
task a second time. He did not have the height in his favour and had
to eject. The MiG 21 which went looking for him spent 20 minutes on
that spot. He must have descended and was shot down. I must say, at
no time our confidence was shaken. On the contrary, after the initial
losses, we built on.
Q: With the PAF not in action, you had total air superiority.
A: We had the air superiority. But don't think the PAF was doing
nothing. Indicators on our airborne radars were that the PAF aircraft
were flying constantly north of the LoC. They were F-16s operating
probably from Skardu, Kamra or one of the other airbases. The beauty
of the situation was that the PAF never thought the IAF would be
used. They had thought it would at best be for air defence. One of
the significant things that happened during in the last week of
operations was that the PAF alleged that we had intruded. Actually we
had not. We always assumed that each time we went up, the other side
would know that we were air borne and might react. On two occasions,
we located them 20 to 30 KM on their side of the LoC. They were the
F-16s.
Q: How did the Mirage 2000 perform compared to the MiG series? Was
its use delayed?
A: Look, the Mirage is a more sophisticated aircraft compared to the
MiGs. Bomb-for-bomb, it was more effective than the MiGs, but the MiG
boys put in far more effort. The two cannot be compared. As for the
delay, the Mirage had many tasks. We had to en-sure that there was no
co-lateral damage to our own troops or positions. Mirage's nav-attack
system is far superior and in a direct attack, many more bombs could
go. We used Mirage the best way
Q: Are you happy with the IAFs role in Kargil?
A: All through, I was confident, quite clear about what I needed to
do. We used adequate fire power to beat the enemy down and help our
troops. We were told to confine action to helicopters, but we said
leave this to us. A helicopter would be vulnerable, since we had hard
intelligence about shoulder-fired missiles with the intruders. The
first attack had to be by fighters, with rockets and cannons, to hold
the enemy's head down. We had little intelligence to begin with. But
now we have built up enough to carry on. We moved to bombs once we
knew our targets. Compare an air strike by a formation of fighters,
each carrying a number of one thousand pound bombs, compared to
artillery fire from a distance. This was what we could do for the
Army. I think it was a task well done. We could have taken a more
pro-active role, perhaps, of flying along the ridges and straffing the
enemy. But risk should be taken provided it is worth its while.
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