Author: KPS Gill
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: March 2, 2001
(Note from Hindu Vivek Kendra: This
article explains how the problems of Islamic fundamentalism that exists
in Pakistan is the creation of the country itself. It is, therefore, unrealistic
to expect that another country, particularly India (which is also a prime
the target of this fundamentalism), can be expected to 'understand' the
difficulties face by the leadership in Pakistan. It has also to be noted
that the intellectuals in Pakistan, who are asking for the 'understanding',
are doing precious little to fight the fundamentalism. Instead they attribute
the full blame to India and the Hindu organisations for the problems.)
In Pakistan, the execution of a
Sunni fanatic, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a Sipah-e-Sahaba activist who murdered
an Iranian (Shia) diplomat, Sadiq Ganji, in March 1990, sparked sectarian
violence in Hangu in the North West Frontier Province. Gun battles ensued
between Shia and Sunni groups soon after that, and at least eight persons
were killed.
This was only the most recent skirmish
in an unending fratricidal confrontation that, in just the last few months,
has seen the assassination of several sectarian leaders. On April 12, 2000
three hand grenades were lobbed at a gathering in a Shia mosque, killing
13 persons, among whom were five members of the family of Syed Sajid Naqvi,
chief of the militant Shia organisation, the Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP).
The grenade is said to have been thrown from an adjacent Sunni mosque.
Shortly thereafter, a TJP leader, Syed Farrukh Barjees was killed at Khanewal
near Multan on April 26. On May 15, a prominent Shia lawyer and member
of the Voice of Shia Federation was killed; on May 18, a renowned Sunni
religious scholar Maulana Mohammad Yousuf Ludhianvi was murdered at Karachi.
Then, on November 23 2000, Anwar Ali Akhunzada, the central general secretary
of TJP in Peshawar was assassinated by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
I have often noted that Pakistan
is condemned by the circumstances of its own creation to bloodshed and
an ideology of hate-but that was essentially an Indian perspective. As
the "lunatics of Allah" and their unending supply of guns become ubiquitous
throughout the country, however, those who follow events and writings in
Pakistan will now notice a growing sense of panic among commentators from
that country that reflects precisely this realisation. Ahmed Rashid notes
that, "over 80,000 Pakistani Islamic militants have trained and fought
with the Taliban since 1994 (sic). They form a hardcore of Islamic activists,
ever ready to carry out a similar Taliban-style Islamic revolution in Pakistan."
At the heart of the present crisis
is the network of increasingly powerful marakiz (centres) and madrassas
that has now established itself as the source, not only of international
"pan-Islamic" terrorism, but of an overwhelming proportion of internal
strife as well. Its roots can be traced back to General Zia-ul-Haq"s vigorous
use of Islam as a tool of regime legitimisation, a trend that was first
introduced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971, and that has been vigorously
reinforced by every successive regime. The growth of these madrassas is,
indeed, an accurate index of Pakistan's mounting difficulties. In 1947,
there were 137 madrassas in the entire country. By 1971, this number had
grown to 900. With Zia's policy of generously funding "madrassas of all
sectarian persuasions" there were 8,000 registered madrassas and 25,000
unregistered ones, educating over half a million students, by the end of
the Zia regime in 1988. These madrassas became the principal source of
"education", especially among the poor, as Pakistan's state-run educational
system steadily collapsed. By the middle of the year 2000, the number of
madrassas had grown to nearly 9,500, and some commentators in Pakistan
estimate the current number of unregistered madrassas at between 40,000
and 50,000. The mind-blunting curriculum in most of these entirely neglects
all branches of practical and secular instruction, and comprises 16 long
years of purely theological education, recitation of the Quran, Fiqah (interpretation
of the Sharia), and indoctrination for jihad. The inevitable consequence
of such an education has been the chronic "inability to produce reality-based
theories of change", extraordinarily narrow and exclusionary perspectives,
and deepening sectarian divisions that spill over into increasing violence.
With an estimated 60 per cent of
funding emanating from abroad, these schisms are magnified further by the
ideological and strategic contests of foreign funding agencies and states.
Afzaal Mahmood, notes that, "By allowing Iran and Saudi Arabia to fund,
influence and use some sectarian organisations of their liking, we have
virtually encouraged Teheran and Riyadh to fight a proxy war on the soil
of Pakistan, with serious consequences for sectarian harmony and law and
order in the country."
Funds have also come from Libya,
Iraq and several other Gulf countries, creating an intricately nuanced
web of conflict. Shia and Sunni madrassas have spawned rival terrorist
forces that visit gratuitous slaughter on sectarian rivals. There is also
a deep schism between Sunni Deobandi and Barelvi madrassas, and a large
number of Ahle Hadis madrassas have also emerged recently in Baluchistan,
Sindh and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Patterns of international
rivalry are also visible in some retaliatory killings. Thus, Sadiq Ganji's
assassination had followed the assassination of SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi
in March 1990. Similarly, the 1997 assassination of Jhangvi's successor,
Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi and 26 others in a bomb blast at the Lahore Sessions
Court, saw the alleged revenge killing of Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali
Rahimi and six others in an attack on the Iranian Cultural Centre at Multan.
Sectarian violence is, however,
a relatively minor consequence of the proliferation of madrassas. Their
primary output has been the export of international extremist Islamic terrorism,
and this has created enormous internal concentrations of armed, trained
and indoctrinated terrorist forces. These groupings no longer acknowledge
the power of the government to define their long-term goals and objectives.
Their allegiance is commanded by the various "spiritual leaders" who run
madrassas that have acquired extraordinary notoriety over the past years,
both as hotbeds of terrorism and as the spawning ground of the Afghani
Taliban. It is here that a "theology of rage" is taught, and the Talib
(student) exhorted to practice a "sacred violence" that is his greatest
duty in Islam.
There is now mounting evidence of
a loss of control as these autonomous religious groups challenge, not only
their Army and ISI handlers, but the Government itself. There has, moreover,
been increasing penetration by extremist Islamic elements into Pakistan's
Army, and elements of "Islamisation" have been introduced into the Army's
training programmes at various levels. In 1992, the then Prime Minister
appointed a well-known Tablighi (congregationist), Lieutenant General Javed
Nasir, as the Director General of the all-powerful ISI. General Musharraf's
military regime clearly lacks the capabilities and support to contain the
extremist elements and has, on more than one occasion, been forced to back
off on policies and reforms in the face of Islamist opposition. The cumulative
impact of nearly two and a half decades of "Islamisation" has now put in
doubt the Army's ability or will to suppress extremist Islamist forces
in case of a confrontation with the Government. Such a confrontation now
appears increasingly probable, if not inevitable. The madrassas and the
mujaheedin are entirely committed to the establishment of a "Taliban style"
Government for Pakistan, and some of the groups recently put General Pervez
Musharraf's military regime on notice to establish "Islamic rule" in the
country, or to face the consequences. Maulana Samiul Haq, the chief of
his own faction of the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), speaking at the Jamia
Ashrafia at Peshawar in January, declared that both democratic and martial
law regimes had failed to deliver, and that, consequently, only the Sharia
could "solve the problems faced by the masses". Maulana Jalil Jan, provincial
leader of the JUI (F) added that, if the Government failed to implement
it, "religious students will resort to the use of force".
Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, who
headed the ISI through critical periods of its campaign in Afghanistan,
shares the vision of the Islamist fundamentalists and argues that "Pakistan
will go through its own version of an Islamic revolution." The army is
the last hope. If it fails then people will realise they will have to do
it themselves. Because all else has failed in Pakistan, Islam will lead
the way. Unless current trends are radically reversed, Pakistan will be
sucked into the turmoil of Afghanistan-like anarchy.
