Author: Inder Malhotra
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: March 7, 2001
ONE OF the persistent myths about
India's partition at the time of independence is that Pakistan's founder,
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, did not really want a separate country. His demand
for it, the argument runs, was really a 'bargaining counter' to get the
best possible deal for Muslims within a loose Indian confederation. In
other words, just as the British had added the brightest jewel to the crown
in a fit of absent-mindedness, so too had Jinnah got Pakistan, if not by
default, then because of the mistakes made by Congress leaders, principally
Jawaharlal Nehru.
Though gravely flawed, this theory
has gained much currency - even respectability - if only because Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, Nehru's most senior colleague and close friend, had first
propounded it in his book India Wins Freedom (Orient Longman, 1959). According
to him, the May 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan would have preserved unity of
sorts among three sets of Indian provinces groped together on the basis
of religion and geography. That was why the Congress had accepted it on
July 6, 1946 and Jinnah a little later - though "grudgingly" and "under
duress".
According to Azad, Nehru had then
made the "astonishing" statement that the Constituent Assembly, being "sovereign"
and "unfettered", could "change the Cabinet Mission's Plan as it thought
best". It was this that had enabled Jinnah to "sabotage" the Plan and "changed
the course of history".
Others have elaborately built upon
this theme. The most notable and dexterous of them is Ayesha Jalal, the
distinguished US-based Pakistani scholar. "It was Congress," she asserts
in her book on Jinnah, Sole Spokesman (Cambridge University Press, 1985),
"that insisted on Partition. It was Jinnah who was against Partition."
As many have pointed out, persuasively
enough, this is a superficial and simplistic view of a complex and arguably
inexorable process of history dating back to the acceptance of separate
electorates in British India. The furious debate between the contending
schools remains unresolved.
However, on two points there is
little scope for dispute. One, that after the Mahatma's Quit India movement
- countered by Jinnah's pledge of "complete loyalty" to the British of
the Muslim troops, then comprising 40 per cent of the Indian army - the
dominant British view had swung in favour of Jinnah's demand for Pakistan.
Two, by 1946, communal hatred across the land had risen to such a pitch
that to resist Partition had become well nigh impossible. Several authors
on the subject, including H.V. Hodson, in Great Divide (OUP 1969; 1985),
concede this.
Against this backdrop, to go on
arguing that Partition was brought about by Nehru's statement on the Cabinet
Mission Plan or his earlier refusal to give the Muslim League two ministerial
berths in Uttar Pradesh is like asserting that the French Revolution was
caused by a shortage of cake. Fresh evidence now coming to light buttresses
this point and confutes the contention of Azad, Jalal and others.
In an article in The Times of India
(March 17, 2000), Narendra Singh Sarila, a retired ambassador, cited top
secret British documents declassified only a few months earlier, to prove
that the Partition plan accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League
on June 3, 1947 was drawn up not by Mountbatten but by "Wavell at the end
of 1945" and "commended" to the Secretary of State in a top secret telegram
on February 6, 1946.
Wavell's argument was that Partition
would serve British strategic interests. But he had also recommended that
East Punjab should be excluded from West Pakistan, and West Bengal and
Assam from its eastern wing. What Jinnah was to later call "a truncated
Pakistan" was, in Wavell's view, "sufficient for British strategic purposes".
It "might also be more palatable to Congress leaders", he had added.
The British game plan was thus clear
enough long before Mountbatten replaced Wavell. About Jinnah's attitude,
clinching evidence just available from an unexpected but unquestionable
source underscores that he, far from being opposed to Partition, was hell-bent
on getting Pakistan.
The source is Humayun Mirza, the
only surviving son of Iskander Mirza, Pakistan's first president who, in
1958, had suspended his country's Constitution only to be overthrown and
exiled by General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan in 20 days flat. The
son, a former vice-president of the World Bank, has written his father's
biography From Plassey to Pakistan (University Press of America Inc). It
is a treasure-trove of information.
Plassey is its starting point because
the Mirzas are descendants of Mir Jafar who had betrayed Sirj-ud-Doula
in the famed battle that had delivered Bengal to Robert Clive.
Iskander Mirza was the first Indian
graduate from Sandhurst but had to join the Indian Political Service because
English officers in the Twenties did not want to serve under Indians. Having
served diligently at the North West Frontier Province for long years, he
became a joint secretary in the Defence Ministry in New Delhi where he
remained, before migrating to Pakistan as the new country's powerful defence
secretary. He, of course, respected Jinnah immensely.
In turn, Jinnah cultivated him (as
he did other faithful bureaucrats such as Ghulam Mohammed, Mohammed Ali
et al, who were to take over Pakistan after Jinnah's death and Liaquat
Ali Khan's assassination). And thereby hangs a most pertinent and startling
tale that needs to be told at some length.
"In February 1947", records the
son, admittedly on the basis of his father's testimony to him, "Jinnah
sent for Iskander Mirza and told him that the prospects of getting Pakistan
did not look good. He felt that the Muslim anger had to be properly demonstrated,
otherwise the British would hand the country over to the Congress. He declared
that if Pakistan could not be won by negotiation, it would have to be won
by the will of the Muslims."
Jinnah added that he had decided
that "should negotiations fail by the middle of May, a dramatic statement
must be made by the Muslims". Humayun Mirza continues: "He asked Iskander
Mirza to be prepared to resign from the Government of India, and return
to the tribal territory that he knew so well. There he was to start a jehad
(holy war) against the British. Jinnah reiterated his faith in Iskander
Mirza, urging him to take this extraordinary step to preserve the interests
of the Muslims of India."
As Humayun Mirza puts it, his father
was "stunned" by Jinnah's request. For it would strain his "respect for
the British" and his "friendship with many of his Hindu colleagues" and
lead to "bloodshed". "Yet," adds the author, "he (Iskander Mirza) could
not refuse Jinnah." But he told Jinnah that money would be needed to "undertake
this immense task, particularly if it involved (NWFP) tribesmen". He estimated
the requirement to be a crore of rupees, and also told Jinnah that before
he (Mirza) could "disappear into the tribal country, some cover story would
have to be prepared".
"Iskander Mirza," his son goes on
to write, "was given Rs 20,000 for immediate expenses and told that the
Nawab of Bhopal would provide the rest. As for the cover, he would be told
of it at the right time. Jinnah also gave Iskander Mirza his personal assurance
that if anything happened to him, he would take care of the latter's family".
(Emphasis added.)
Iskander Mirza, according to his
son's book, "started immediately to draw up a plan of action". But as he
prepared to present it to Jinnah, "the latter informed him that Pakistan
had been won and there was no longer any need for a jehad". In the words
of his son: "One can easily imagine Iskander Mirza's sense of relief."
Humayun Mirza comments that Jinnah
was "prepared to go to any length to achieve Pakistan... Once he made up
his mind, he would pursue a single objective with tenacious zeal". Nothing
more need be added.
