Author: Reuel Marc Gerecht
Publication: New York Times
Date: March 8, 2001
BRUSSELS â€" In Islamic
history, the time before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad is the jahiliyya,
the Age of Ignorance. For Muslim fundamentalists, like the Taliban of Afghanistan,
the jahiliyya didn't end in the seventh century. They see modern times
as a constant affront to the purist principles that God ordained. The tolerance
of traditional Islam, which in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent
even made its peace with polytheists and idol worshipers, is as foreign
to them as the secular principles of Western civilization.
The destruction of Afghanistan's
statues â€" including, it appears, the Great Buddhas of Bamiyan,
two huge and ancient sculptures â€" is of a kind with the extreme,
sometimes nihilistic, violence of militant Islamic movements in Algeria,
Egypt and Sudan.
The anti-idol declaration by Mullah
Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's chieftain, ought to be seen for what it is
above all else: a crystal-clear signal that Osama bin Laden, the Saudi
terrorist who has lived in Afghanistan since 1996, has found a true spiritual
brother in the Taliban movement. The Taliban's six-year war of conquest
â€" to which Mr. bin Laden contributes a small but not insignificant
Arab force â€" has developed into a brutal fight where no quarter
is given to Afghans who oppose Mullah Omar's prophet- like pretensions.
Indeed, in a country demarcated by land mines, burned-out tanks, and blown-up
roads, bridges, dams, schools and power grids, Mullah Omar and Mr. bin
Laden have become mythical figures. Among the front-line soldiers and prisoners
of war I have interviewed over the last two years, they are seen as prophets.
America has been very slow to appreciate
the international dimension to the Afghan mess. After the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan in 1989, we ran away from the country, abandoning the
people who, more than any other, had frayed the Soviet empire's will. After
the rise of the Taliban in 1994, the Clinton administration toyed with
the idea that the Taliban would be no worse than its Saudi backers, conservative
Muslims who tolerate America and fear and hate Iran. Moreover, the administration
became focused on other priorities. In 1996, it seemed possible that American-built
gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia could run through an Afghanistan
ruled by one leader. Cruelty to women aside, we did not condemn the Taliban
juggernaut rolling across the country.
Even after the arrival of Mr. bin
Laden, the Clinton administration held out hope that a modus vivendi could
be reached, with the assistance of the Saudis and Pakistanis. Mr. bin Laden
would be contained, perhaps even booted out of the country.
That hope is gone, but no sensible
policy has yet followed. To really put Mr. bin Laden out of business, America
must shut down his operations inside Afghanistan. Pretending that we have
a robust counterterrorist program picking apart Mr. bin Laden's organization
â€" while he and his followers nearly sink an American destroyer
in Yemen â€" is delusional and dangerous. The October strike
against the American destroyer Cole in the port of Aden will long be remembered
by Muslims who still believe that jihad is the sixth pillar of the faith.
Since America's counterterrorist
forces cannot unilaterally reach inside Afghanistan, we have only one option.
Play realpolitik the old-fashioned way. Taliban leaders truly fear only
one thing: the possibility that Afghanistan's many tribes will put aside
their differences and unite to topple them from power. They've launched
numerous offensives against Ahmed Shah Massoud, the strongest of the anti-
Soviet Afghan commanders. His troops are the only ones still seriously
contesting Taliban rule. As long as Mr. Massoud survives, he is a threat.
Mr. Massoud, a devout Muslim, is
unquestionably one of the greatest guerrilla commanders of our era. He
detests the Taliban's treatment of women; he has no truck with Mr. bin
Laden. A literate man, he is no doubt horrified by the most recent attack
on Afghanistan's Buddhist patrimony.
Yet, the Clinton administration
kept its distance from Mr. Massoud. Why? Pakistan has long loathed him
and supported the Taliban, ethnic and increasingly ideological cousins
of the Pathan, the dominant tribe of Pakistan's northwest frontier. The
administration, which was reluctant to re- engage in Afghan affairs or
to oppose Pakistan's preferences, advocated a "negotiated settlement between
all parties" â€" diplomatic shorthand for American abstention
and de facto neutrality. But no one can negotiate with Mullah Omar. Like
Mr. bin Laden, he seriously believes he has received his marching orders
from a non-negotiating authority.
It is too late to save Bamiyan's
treasures, but it is not too late for the United States to play hardball.
The Bush administration could give a small slice of the multibillion-dollar
counterterrorist budget to Mr. Massoud. That might bring Mullah Omar down
to earth. He and his supporters, particularly the Pakistanis, might reconsider
the unthinkable â€" shutting down Mr. bin Laden's operations
â€" if the alternative were the dissipation, and perhaps the
destruction, of Taliban rule.
Reuel Marc Gerecht, a fellow at
the Project for the New American Century, is a former Middle East specialist
in the Central Intelligence Agency.
