Author: Jon B. Wolfsthal
Publication: Los Angeles Times
Date: October 16, 2001
URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-101601wolfthal.story
There is growing concern, and evidence
for concern, that the instability in Afghanistan could quickly spread to
neighboring Pakistan and undermine the security of that country's nuclear
arsenal. Of all of the negative consequences this turn of events might
bring, none would be more dangerous and catastrophic than nuclear weapons
falling into the hands of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.
Until Sept. 11, the Pakistani regime
and the Taliban were very close, and there have been reports out of Pakistan
that military officers assisted the Taliban in preparing for U.S. airstrikes-counter
to direct orders from Pakistan's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Top military
officers, including the head of Pakistan's intelligence services, recently
have been sacked, reportedly for their pro-Taliban views.
Violence in the streets, while not
widespread beyond the border area with Afghanistan, speaks to the tensions
inside Pakistan. A Newsweek poll this week found that 83% of Pakistanis
polled sympathized with the Taliban in the current conflict. It is possible,
therefore, that Pakistani forces assigned to protect Pakistan's nuclear
forces could be compromised.
This is surely the nightmare scenario,
and immediate steps should be taken to prevent such a turn of events from
coming to pass.
Pakistan possesses enough nuclear
material for close to 40 nuclear weapons, if not more. The U.S., however,
knows very little about how this material is stored, what security measures
are applied to its protection, how personnel with access to nuclear weapons
and materials are screened and where the material is located.
Pakistan has a responsibility to
ensure that its assets are adequately protected and to convince other countries
that this responsibility is taken seriously. Other countries and organizations
have a responsibility to help Pakistan keep these materials secure, without
in any way assisting that country in modernizing or deploying its nuclear
capability.
The International Atomic Energy
Agency, or IAEA, a U.N.-affiliated organization, has decades of experience
in developing and verifying security measures associated with nuclear weapons-usable
materials. The agency routinely assists countries in ensuring that their
peaceful nuclear programs are adequately protected. Despite its lack of
membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan could receive
advice and assistance from the IAEA.
In addition, the U.S. and other
IAEA members have extensive experience-publicly available-on how to protect
nuclear materials and on how to ensure that weapons-usable uranium or plutonium
cannot be diverted without being detected. States could make equipment
available to Pakistan that did not directly assist in its development or
control of nuclear weapons, such as alarm systems and polygraph equipment
for personnel screening. In addition, corporations and nongovernmental
organizations with significant expertise in nuclear matters could provide
Pakistan with assistance on security.
Pakistan has resisted any outside
attempts to help secure its nuclear materials. There is the risk that receiving
assistance for its nuclear program from outside powers might further destabilize
the current situation. Yet Pakistan has already made its strategic decision
to throw in with the West against terrorism. Taking this additional step,
while difficult, may be part of the price it pays to reestablish itself
as a responsible global partner.
If Pakistan does not agree to these
types of programs, the U.S. should begin to work immediately on contingency
plans should the Islamabad regime lose control over its nuclear arsenal.
These plans should include the ability to rapidly deploy forces to Pakistan
to find and regain control of any lost nuclear materials and, only as a
last option in a crisis, remove them from Pakistan to a secure location.
These steps might seem extreme.
Yet when faced with the real possibility of losing control of nuclear weapons
to the types of organizations capable of the destruction seen Sept. 11,
they could be considered realistic and even prudent. The consequences of
not being prepared to act are too great for us to imagine, even with our
new ability to imagine the horrible.
(Jon B. Wolfsthal is an associate
in the Carnegie Endowment's nonproliferation program and a former nonproliferation
policy advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy.)
