Author: K P S Gill
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: October 19, 2001
September 11, 2001, was certainly
a defining moment in history, marking a catastrophe that, I had hoped,
would drive home the reality and scale of the peril of terrorism into even
the most obtuse and insular minds. This was an incident, I thought, through
which destiny was shaking up our political leadership to awaken them to
these dangers.
Unfortunately, I have yet to see
a single policy initiative or action or from the opposition parties, that
reflects an adequate understanding of the issue, or an articulation of
the framework of a coherent policy of response. It is a matter of shame
that, with a history that spans decades of a direct confrontation against
the scourge of terrorism, there is not a single political entity capable
of defining India's role and destiny in the global war against terrorism.
The visible focus of India's policy
appears to be fixed on drawing international, and primarily US, attention
to Pakistan's role in fomenting terrorism on Indian soil. A high level
of petulance has marked political and diplomatic pronouncements and actions
in this regard. The most brazen and unfortunate incident in this enterprise
was the reported artillery action in the Akhnoor and Mendhar sectors on
the eve of Colin Powell's visit to India, and, indeed, at a time when he
was present in Pakistan. It is probable that such a major action would
not have been initiated by the local commander, and must have been approved
at the highest political level.
We have still to learn the basic
lesson that brinkmanship is bad policy. Pakistan's present predicament
should have been lesson enough. India stands to gain the most by projecting
itself as a mature, stable democracy, deeply committed to the war against
terror, but not given to arbitrary and aimless acts of aggression.
Pakistan has been inclined to a
policy of adventurism for much of its existence - including the Kargil
Operation - in order to draw international attention to its "cause". Indeed,
despite the Kargil debacle, the Pakistan leadership continued to regard
this operation as a significant strategic gain because it had, in their
assessment, played on western insecurities by projecting Kashmir as a potential
nuclear flashpoint. But it is precisely such actions that have put the
entire Pakistan leadership on virtual trial today.
The basic defect of the Indian response
is that it reacts to transient, often peripheral, events without any clear
context of policy, institutional memory or strategic thought. India persists
in its failure to articulate a clearly defined counter-terrorism perspective,
leaving vast spaces open for destabilisation by those who benefit from
the confusion.
The problem, clearly, is not just
with the political leadership and the bureaucracy. The Supreme Court held
even that the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was not an act of terrorism,
but a simple act of murder. A former Chief Justice of India recently claimed
that the procedural guarantees of human rights could not be diluted even
in circumstances where the unity and integrity of the country is under
threat.
Within such a context of ambivalence
it is impossible for India to chart any consistent course, or to play a
useful role in the global war against terror, or even to defeat terrorism
on its own soil. These are not ends that can be secured by stratagems to
manipulate US and international opinion, or by tagging India's counter-terrorism
responses to the actions of other nations. I have repeated this ad nauseam,
but find it necessary to do so again: terrorism in India will have to be
defeated by India; and there are no short cuts or easy options in this
war.
(The writer is a former Director
General of Police)
