Author: Editorial
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: October 12, 2001
Predictably, as the United States'
attacks on the Taliban's military establishment and fighting formations
escalates, the Musharraf regime in Pakistan gears up to cope with its internal
problems arising out of his decision to support America's action.
The purge at the highest echelon
of Pakistan's Army, which saw two senior pro-Taliban generals sidelined,
has been followed by the sacking of Quetta's police chief, Haji Habibur
Rahman, for failing to control the violence in the city and, particularly,
for not arresting, despite directives from the federal government, 18 people
considered responsible for it. Also, Afghan refugees, who have been involved
in violent demonstrations against the US, have been bluntly told that they
should be sent home if they continued to participate in political agitations.
While the situation is undoubtedly volatile, President Musharraf has so
far been able to ride it. The violence in the streets is losing its intensity.
Though Wednesday's fire at the Pakistani Army's headquarters at Islamabad
must cause unease, the reshuffle of the Army's top brass has not led to
convulsion, to say nothing of a civil war. All this is not surprising.
Pakistan's fundamentalist Islamic parties which have been behind the street
demonstrations have always polled a small percentage of popular votes during
elections and have limited mass support. It is their organisational and
financial strength and arsenals of lethal weapons that explains the high
profiles they enjoy in Pakistan's life. As for the Army, the fundamentalist
generals know that an attempt to dislodge President Musharraf may trigger
a civil war which, in turn, would find them ranged against the US-led global
coalition against terrorism which will not only destroy the Pakistani Army,
a conventional force, but cause massive devastation in Pakistan. Since
they are people with families, used to orderly existence and not Mujahideens
used to the mountains, they are unlikely to rock the boat too much, however
much they may hate the US and President Musharraf.
Pakistan's President, therefore,
holds the advantage at the moment. He must now press forward and cash in
on it. He should follow up the purge at the level of generals with a careful
weeding out of fundamentalist and pro-Taliban elements at the levels of
Brigadiers and Colonels. The logic of the situation also demands a crackdown
on fundamentalist Islamic organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba.
They have close ties with the Al-Qaida and hate the US. They now also hate
President Musharraf intensely for siding with the latter. For his own survival,
Pakistan's President must deal with them. This brings one to New Delhi's
view-Pakistan cannot be a part of the coalition against terrorism and,
at the same time, persist with cross-border terrorism against India. The
question is: does President Musharraf realise this? The answer will become
clear from whether he clamps down on the terrorist militias. He may not
be able to do that tomorrow; also, he may have other priorities. But he
will have to do that sooner than latter. The main hurdle in the way of
a fruitful India-Pakistan dialogue will go if and when he does that and
curbs cross-border terrorism. And, when that happens, he will not find
India lacking in its response.
