Author: Our Political Bureau
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: October 3, 2001
Introduction: Once a trusted ally,
Islamabad is now a 'Forced Partner'
The US seems to have developed doubts
about Pakistan's ability and willingness to deliver on its 'promise' of
assistance in the fight against the Taliban in the light of Islamabad's
failure to pass on information about the ransacking of America's abandoned
mission in Kabul.
The US diplomatic corps in Islamabad
came to know of the incident a good three hours after the Taliban-inspired
mob had damaged the building that once housed the American mission in Kabul.
Though the damage to the abandoned premises was of little significance,
the US is feeling troubled by the fact that the information about the preparation
for the assault and its actual occurrence was not passed on in time by
Islamabad.
The US, according to sources, doesn't
consider it to be a case of intelligence failure. Given the deep links
that Pakistan has with the Taliban, best manifested by the continuing presence
of a large number of officers of its army and the ISI, the US is not ready
to believe that Islamabad wasn't aware of the happenings in Kabul on the
given day. The suspicion is that the information was withheld by Islamabad's
operatives on the ground.
This has reinforced the skepticism
which was already there among the US planners, given Pakistan's ideological
affinity with the Taliban, that Islamabad could really be an ally in the
battle against terrorism. As is widely known by now, General Pervez Musharraf's
"offer" was not voluntary but was extracted from him with the US holding
out a 'either you are with us or with the terrorist' threat. But with Pakistan
having already ruled out committing its troops for any joint offensive
against the Taliban regime, the American interest in having Pakistan aboard
primarily stems from the attraction of the huge mass of intelligence that
Islamabad has on Osama bin Laden and its other collaborators in the Taliban
regime. Pakistan is important in terms of logistics, too, but not to the
same extent now, given that the central Asian states have pledged to be
the springboard for an US assault.
However, the Kabul episode has cast
serious doubts on the quality of intelligence that the US may get from
Pakistan. US is well aware of the deep divisions within the Pakistan army,
a severely Islamicised outfit; the resentment among large sections of people;
and the build-up of anger among the Pathans, who make up 25 per cent of
the armed forces. All these will curtail General Musharraf's latitude as
and when the offensive is launched.
