Author: Bruce G. Blair
Publication: New York Times
Date: October 22, 2001
Bioterrorism, like the anthrax threats
currently rattling America, is horrific. But perhaps the ultimate horror
in our newly uncertain world is the prospect of terrorists with nuclear
weapons. There is no evidence that any terrorist has nuclear materials
now, but the possibility is serious enough so that the government should
be heightening security at home by monitoring foreign nations' weapons
more closely and planning for military raids, if necessary, to keep weapons
out of the wrong hands.
Sophisticated terrorists would be
able to make an atomic bomb if they could get the necessary fissile materials
- highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Huge quantities exist around the
world. Detonated in Manhattan, a relatively small bomb - say 15 kilotons
in yield, equivalent to the one used on Hiroshima - could immediately kill
100,000 and cause another 100,000 deaths in the lingering aftermath.
A terrorist wouldn't even need nuclear
bomb materials to wreak nuclear havoc on a smaller scale: lethal radioactivity
could spew out from a bomb made of nuclear waste and dynamite or from a
nuclear power plant attacked by a hijacked plane or a truckload of explosives.
Our first line of defense against
nuclear terrorism is at home. Security measures around nuclear power plants,
like restrictions on how close planes may fly to them, are already being
reviewed, and they should be strengthened as much as possible. But we should
also immediately impose better inspection and security regimes at American
seaports. Tens of thousands of cargo containers on ships arrive at American
ports every day, and given the terrorist networks' extensive business ties
around the world, the potential that one of those containers might carry
a nuclear device is decidedly too high.
America's actual nuclear arsenal
and its fissile materials are heavily guarded, but it's important to make
sure security is just as tight abroad. There has been concern for years
about the vulnerability of Russian bombs and bomb materials. More than
1,000 tons of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium remain in the former Soviet
Union, half stored in its raw form and half inside 20,000 bombs. The United
States is already working with Russia in a limited way to secure its nuclear
materials and facilities by installing fences and surveillance sensors,
but only half of the needed security improvements have been completed.
Congress has been balking at continuing to finance this program with $1
billion a year, while it actually should be spending more. Last year, Russia's
top security officials urgently sought American help in shoring up security
at nuclear weapons sites, but bureaucratic squabbling between the Defense
and Energy Departments delayed and diluted the American response. In the
end, the Russians got little of the help they had sought.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Central Intelligence Agency and other American security agencies should
be working with Russian law enforcement not only against terrorists, but
to help Russia eliminate organized crime, which could make big profits
selling nuclear materials to willing buyers.
Even more pressing, given the American
military campaign in Afghanistan and the angry protests by some Pakistanis
against their country's cooperation, is ensuring the security of Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal. Pakistan is estimated to have between 30 and 50 partially
disassembled atomic weapons, from 1 to 15 kilotons in yield, stored at
several locations 50 to 250 miles from Afghanistan. If the regime were
destabilized or toppled, nuclear security would weaken. Moreover, there
are radicals within the Pakistani government and military forces, and it
is possible that insiders might collude to steal bombs and add them to
the arsenal of Osama bin Laden or some other extremist. Pakistani weapons
are believed to lack sophisticated locks that would prevent their unauthorized
use.
Besides urging Pakistan to strengthen
security where its weapons are stored and/or to disable its nuclear devices,
the United States should be offering to help out by providing security
equipment and guards. And regardless of the degree of cooperation between
the two countries, American surveillance and intelligence efforts should
be aimed at independently keeping track of the Pakistani arsenal. To guard
against the worst possibility - Pakistani weapons in the hands of our enemies
- America should have plans ready to provide security without Pakistan's
permission, if emergency circumstances dictate, and even to take Pakistan's
weapons out of the country if the need arises. Special operations forces
in the region should be kept on high alert for quick, covert incursions
to disable or even relocate the weapons to prevent their capture by unauthorized
people. Nuclear emergency search teams, which are trained in bomb detection
and dismantling, should be ready to accompany such military operations.
The teams, some from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, know the basic design
of Pakistani weapons from defectors' reports and could devise disabling
procedures on the spot.
An even better idea might be to
get American and Russian military-civilian bomb response teams together
to conduct search and disable missions in Central Asia - and perhaps in
Russia itself in an emergency. The mutual benefits would be considerable,
and joint operations to protect everyone against nuclear terror could have
lasting positive effects on future United States- Russian cooperation.
Obviously, the elimination of nuclear weapons would not eliminate terrorism.
But just as obviously, the need for nuclear safety and security has never
been clearer.
Bruce G. Blair is president of the
Center for Defense Information.