Author: Harold A. Gould
Publication: The Hindu
Date: October 25, 2001
Introduction: There are signs that
the U.S. is succumbing to the Gulf War syndrome of limiting its goals to
political half-measures.
Descriptions of the Afghan operation
suggest that the United States may be on the brink of making the same mistakes
that doomed the war against Iraq to eventual failure. Let it be remembered
that the Iraq campaign failed in the end because it did not result in the
removal of Mr. Saddam Hussein. Tactical victory on the battlefield was
squandered when strategic wisdom did not follow in its wake. An alternative
government was not established which addressed the consensual needs of
the various ethnic communities - Sunnis, Shias, Kurds - encompassed by
the Iraqi state. The result was and is that Mr. Saddam Hussein's hijacking
of the Baathist Party remains in place and his capacity to threaten the
Middle East and mankind with war, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
continues. America's unwillingness to ``finish the job'' is the reason
why. Not with massive weaponry, mind you, but with sensible diplomacy that
proceeded on the assumption that a politically pluralised Iraq was a far
more desirable long-term regional solution than was the continuation of
a ruthless Saddam Hussein dictatorship.
The strongest indication that the
same scenario may be developing in Afghanistan emanates from the exasperation
being expressed by the leaders of the Northern Alliance (and privately
by Russia and other moderate Governments in the region) that nothing concrete
is being done to help their forces on the ground who, in the end, will
determine whether the Taliban and all they represent can be driven from
power. A Washington Post story (October 12) documented this growing frustration
and disillusionment in the ranks of the Northern Alliance. They complain
that no programme of close coordination has yet been developed between
Northern Alliance and American forces. So far there have been at the most
only token gestures in this direction. What is needed most now is the application
of American air power to their tactical requirements; that is, to attacking
the Taliban infantry formations facing them on the front lines. (The U.S.
has in the last couple of days started targeting Taliban troop positions.)Major
General Babajan, a NA commander, is quoted as saying, ``If there aren't
any (air) strikes on the front line, then the bombing will be in vain''.
Hitting Kabul and ``empty military buildings'' just will not do it.
If this were merely attributable
to ``growing pains'' during the early stages of a tactical deployment plan,
it could be understandable, even forgivable. Indeed, this is what one must
hope to be the case. But it appears to be much more ominous than this.
There are signs that the U.S. is succumbing to the Gulf War syndrome of
limiting its goals to political half-measures. The reasons being given
by Bush administration officials for not enabling the Northern Alliance
to go on the offensive are alleged fears of the political repercussions.
It is said that using air power and other assets to pave the way for a
rapid Northern Alliance advance into Kabul would result in a ``dangerous
political vacuum''. The U.S. purportedly wants the lineaments of a provisional
government, or at least a government-making body (a loya jirga), in place
before committing its ground and air forces to the fray at the grassroots.
Otherwise, they fear that the Northern Alliance, consisting of Afghanistan's
principal ethnic minorities (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras) will somehow gain
the political upper hand in the post-Taliban period and foment an ensuing
civil war between them and the majority Pashtuns.
The trouble with this thinking is
that it will prevent the only viable military force on the ground, the
Northern Alliance, to strike while the iron is hot, while the Taliban is
in disarray and uncertain of its ability to stem the tide of counterforce
now mounting against it, and when a whiff of American tactical air power
would stand the best chance of turning the tide. There are signs that this
propitious moment is already starting to melt away; that the Taliban forces
are beginning to recover from the initial shocks of the American assault
and are hunkering down in their hideaways to ride out the storm.
Another, and perhaps the most important,
problem with this thinking is that it exaggerates the socio-political homogeneity
of the Pashtuns. They are by no means a monolith. In fact, the evidence
is that the Taliban is now perceived by a large segment of Pashtun society
to be political hijackers (not unlike Mr. Saddam Hussein in Iraq) who would
welcome a real opportunity to opt out of the religio-cultural dungeon into
which these rustic, medieval-minded Islamist fanatics have incarcerated
them.
The final problem is that it perpetuates
the lingering colonialist presupposition that big-brother-global-superpower
knows best.
Much lip-service is paid by American
leaders to the principle of political self-determination as long as it
does not eventuate in genocide or other forms of abject destruction of
human rights. Here is a golden opportunity to put up or shut up. All the
ingredients are in place for the Afghan factions to work out a political
consensus on their own, provided the U.S. gives them the tools and the
space to carry out their own visions of nation- building. Presumably, ex-King
Muhammad Zahir Shah is willing to make himself the focal point of such
an endeavour. There are no credible indications that the Northern Alliance
factions or the politically sane segments of the Pashtun population would
refuse to participate in a nation- building enterprise under such auspices.
Mr. George W. Bush made U.S. refusal to engage in nation-building a cornerstone
of his promised administration should he be elected President. The present
crossroad in Afghan politics offers him a golden opportunity to carry out
his proclaimed mandate, provided American military power is employed to
tip the balance, which was not done in the Gulf to everyone's dismay.
The alternative threatens to be
a stalemate brought on by some kind of armistice, brokered by Pakistan,
based on a promised elimination of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, which allows
the Taliban either to remain in power, or participate in it, under the
tutelage of the bankrupt Pakistanis, and to go on destroying the lives
of the country's women and children, and ethno- religious minorities, in
the name of a perverted Islam that even Muhammad would not recognise.
The signs that the Pakistan hand
is behind such a sell-out of the Afghan people are becoming increasingly
evident. They originate with the price that Pakistan is demanding of the
U.S. for their participating in the anti-terrorist crusade, and which alarmingly
the U.S. seems increasingly inclined to pay for that support. The main
price tag is renewed military assistance to the Pakistan Army whose eventual
consequences would be, as was the case during the Cold War, when Pakistan
signed onto an American-led crusade, another round of war with India.
These are the lineaments of the
Gulf War Syndrome applied both to South and Inner Asia. The U.S. must decide
whether it wants to ineluctably sink back into a new version of the swamp
into which its past failed Pakistan policies wrought, while allegedly,
as it puts it, draining the Al-Qaeda/Taliban swamp, or whether it will
apply a thus far unapparent measure of fresh and imaginative thinking to
the new global threat which the disasters in New York and Washington revealed
in all its garish ugliness.
In this instance, the need is for
quick action unadulterated by the encumbrances which Gen. Musharraf and
the ISI are, for obvious reasons, attempting to place upon American diplomatic
vision.
(The writer is Visiting Scholar
of South Asian Studies, Center for South Asian Studies, University of Virginia.)
