Author: Bobby Sharma
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: October 29, 2001
US Defence Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld,
in his press briefing on October 19, said: "Terrorism has to be dealt with
offensively, we must take the battle into terrorists' territory". International
law on terrorism recognises the military pursuit of terrorists to their
bases as legitimate. Pakistan, which created the Taliban and its government
in Afghanistan has already betrayed them-for money and "national interest".
The present circumstances just right for a realistic consideration of the
idea of "hot pursuit" acquires urgency, particularly since Pakistan is
embroiled in internal revolt.
Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in
J&K has claimed over 30,000 human lives since 1989. It may be recalled
that after the Shimla Agreement of 1972, relative peace prevailed along
the LoC, with local military commanders on both sides seeking to improve
their positions tactically without endangering the status-quo, or risking
escalation of conflict. Pakistan changed the rules from 1989 onwards when
it began to push infiltrators, camouflaged by artillery barrages. Pakistani
troops relocated themselves and changed their patrolling pattern to facilitate
infiltration. On the other side, we only created check-dams and anti-infiltration
grids. With a highly porous border, our efforts have not been successful.
Hot pursuit as a military option
has emerged as the national consensus. Many military thinkers, however,
argue against it on the following grounds: (a) We do not have an overwhelming
superiority of forces like US or Israel and hence are not capable of swift
reprisals, (b) we need additional troops for rear area protection and maintenance
of law and order. This will reduce our offensive capabilities; (c) the
terrain is formidable and favours Pakistan, (d) use of air power, combat
aircraft and helicopters will be inhibited due to the weather and strong
winds, (e) there is the possibility of escalation of conflict to an all
out war, (f) there may be a nuclear conflict, and (g) international intervention
and concomitant punitive action against us.
While there may be merit in some
of these arguments, they by no means foreclose India's options. We need
to get a few concepts right. 'Hot Pursuit' as an option does not demand
overriding superiority of forces in terms of ratios. What it needs is superiority
of force at the point of application, reinforced by the elements of surprise,
deception and capability to sustain holding operations elsewhere, mostly
in the defensive mode. Plans must be audacious and based on company groups.
Every military operation, regardless of its size and magnitude, factors
escalation of conflict into consideration. Kargil saw both the armies on
the alert even when the conflict remained localised despite the use of
airstrikes by us. Besides, escalation will not be our worry alone-Pakistan
too will have to contend with this. Another issue that appears to paralyse
our thinking is Pakistan's nuclear capability and its propensity to use
it at the slightest provocation. Pakistan's nuclear policy is not in accord
with ours which stipulates "no first use". Implicit in our policy is the
capability to absorb the first strike before going in for a devastating
retaliatory strike. We must dismiss such a possibility in the context of
hot pursuit.
The most import issue is the timing
of hot pursuit. It is essentially a political decision but it will be wise
to hear the views of service chiefs on the state of our preparedness. Military
prudence dictates that we strike the enemy when and where it is weak and
vulnerable. Pakistan has more than 120 militant camps in PoK and annihilation
of even a few of them will convey our national will. This must be followed
as a matter of declared policy to take insurgency back into Pakistan's
territory; our troops can carry 'chudiyans' as gifts to Pakistan while
they go about their business.
