Author: KPS Gill
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: October 6, 2001
Another blast in Kashmir, and this
time the Western world pays a little attention, finally yielding a reluctant
admission of the obvious-that terrorist outrages in India are no different
from those that find innocent victims in the affluent West, and that behind
all these excesses is a single, though loosely integrated, and vast network,
a terrorist Internationale, that now extends across the globe, and indeed,
often across all ideological affiliations as well.
Every western intelligence agency
has been fully aware of the details of the growth of this Internationale,
but these nations chose to ignore these developments in the absurd belief
that they would never become targets of its wrath. Indeed, these habits
of thought are still to be entirely wiped out, despite the enormity of
the September attacks in the US and the documented presence of terrorist
cells in Europe and America. Western perspectives have yet to come to terms
in full measure with what they have known for decades, and what they have
found to be politically or strategically expedient to deny.
The creeping shift in public postures
notwithstanding, actions and policies are still to fall in line with the
current "global war on terrorism" perspective, and the US-strongly supported
by the UK, and adequately supported by its other NATO allies-still chooses
as its "frontline" partner the state perhaps most active in sponsoring
and supporting terrorism: Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan's role in creating
and nurturing the forces of Islamist extremist terrorism is far more significant
than Afghanistan's, and the Taliban is little more than a child of Pakistan's
creation. There is little evidence, moreover, that Pakistan has, despite
apparent US pressure, chosen to alter the perverted course of its history,
and terrorist strikes in J&K have, in fact, seen a sudden spurt in
the post-September 11 phase.
The ethic of expediency, once again,
is said to guide the wisdom of the American choice of partners. Pakistan
and its ISI, with their deep and continuous involvement in Afghanistan
and with the Taliban, have, it is argued, the most 'reliable' intelligence
that could help locate America's most wanted man, Osama bin Laden and his
network of terrorist camps. Pakistan is, consequently, cast in the unlikely
role of a 'frontline state' in the war against terrorism. The fact that
Pakistan is on the frontline in this war may, of course, be conceded; the
moot question here is, on which side of the battle lines does it stand?
Any objective assessment of the
internal conditions and the long-term policies of the Pakistan state would
demonstrate a fundamental and irreducible opposition between what that
country's ruling elite perceives as its strategic interests, and those
of the emerging alliance against terrorism. This implies that the US reliance
on Pakistan could be one of the worst strategic blunders for a multiplicity
of reasons. Even as US Forces are massing for the imminent attack, there
is continuing evidence of some Pakistani military presence in Afghanistan,
as well as the ongoing mobilisation of Islamist fundamentalist forces from
J&K, PoK and within Pakistan, who are being actively, if unofficially,
encouraged to join forces with the Taliban. The much valued Pakistani 'intelligence'
moreover would, on the one hand, tend to vanish in the rapidly changing
scenario of any possible ground engagement in case Pakistan actually and
fully throws its lot in with the Americans; on the other, to the extent
that Pakistan continuous to play its current dual and duplicitous role,
it could lead American troops into high cost engagements over an extended
period of time, even the prize catch, bin Laden, continued to elude them.
The American engagement with Pakistan
appears, in some measure, to be based on the old adage, "set a thief to
catch a thief". This may be useful if a specific criminal is narrowly targeted.
If, however, it is crime itself that is to be countered and neutralised,
such collusive arrangements have, through history, proven to be uniquely
and overwhelmingly counterproductive. It is inescapable, now, that the
global community in general, and US in particular, concede the reality
that any fight against international terrorism must necessarily take into
account the relationship between Pakistan and the terrorist Internationale.
It would be useful for the West to examine very closely the activities
of Pakistani diplomats-especially those with roots in the ISI-in various
Western countries over the years, and they would find that the web of terror
intensely and imminently threatens many nations in Europe as well.
"Diplomatic" activity in Germany
is a good case in point. In the beginning of 1994, Lt Gen A Durrani was
appointed as the Pakistani ambassador to Germany. Earlier, as a military
attaché, he had coordinated the clandestine procurement of nuclear
equipment by Pakistan from then West Germany, Belgium and Switzerland.
During his tenure as Ambassador it was widely believed that his role was
to coordinate the clandestine procurement of nuclear material from Russia
and the breakaway states of the Soviet Union as well as the secret supply
of arms and ammunition to the Bosnian Muslims and units of the Harkat-ul-Ansar
and the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad operating in Bosnia. Lt Gen Hamid Gul,
the former head of the ISI, is known to have assisted Durrani in the task
of organising Islamist terrorist networks in and from Germany.
There is, of course, some evidence
of rethinking in the US strategic community regarding Pakistan's role and
significance even within the limited campaign against Afghanistan, and
it is now increasingly clear that the force of the attack, whenever it
may be executed, will come from the North-in coordination with the forces
of the Northern Alliance and from bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, even
as all alternative political avenues are explored to establish a viable
transitional regime to replace the Taliban. Simultaneously, a worldwide
intelligence based operation appears to have been initiated to attack the
financial base and to uncover operational and sleeper terrorist cells.
This is consistent with the more effective strategy of engagement that
targets the tentacles of the terrorist network and then work inwards, rather
than the present publicly held posture that uniquely targets bin Laden
and the shifting core of the terrorist network in Afghanistan. It must,
however, be understood that the global war against terror will have to
be fought in a scenario as complex, confused and murky as the intelligence
operations of the Second World War and the Cold War.
In India, emerging counter-terrorism
perspectives appear to be based on the mistaken notion that the problem
can be favourably resolved by throwing in our lot unreservedly with America
and its allies. This is dangerous, and entirely misunderstands the imperatives
that drive long-term US policy, which has a peculiar proclivity to shift
with that country's own perceived interests. More problematic is the fact
that this perspective is based on a projection that retains Kashmir at
the centre of the Indo-Pakistan imbroglio. It is, however, my firm conviction
that terrorism in Kashmir will decline gradually, even as terrorist activities
other parts of India, and particularly in Delhi and Bombay, increase. This
will enable Pakistan to deny involvement, and argue that Indian Muslims
have been pushed to a point of no return by the Government's "atrocities".
The rise in SIMI's activities and presence is at least one indication that
the groundwork for such a gameplan is already in place.
