Author: Henry Kissinger
Publication: Dawn, Karachi
Date: October 29, 2001
A new epoch in America's relations
with the world began at 8:41 a.m. on Sept. 11 when the first hijacked plane
crashed into the World Trade Center. By imposing on America a sense of
vulnerability, the attack also introduced the country to a new form of
warfare - without battle lines and specific demands and not resolvable,
as some wars are, by negotiation, only by victory.
The reaction has been defiant national
unity. Partisan debate on foreign policy has been suspended. No significant
disagreement exists on the strategy for defeating global terrorism put
forward eloquently by President George W. Bush.
For all its shadowy nature, the
new warfare permits a clear definition of what is needed to bring it under
control. The terrorist attacks - from the hostages in Lebanon of the 1980s,
to the bombed embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the crippled
American destroyer in Yemen in 2000 - took place far away and while the
United States was reluctant to put sustained pressure on the countries
harbouring terrorists.
In the new approach, the terrorists
will be viewed in the proper perspective. They are ruthless but not numerous.
They control no territory permanently. If their activities are harassed
by the security forces of all countries - if no country will harbour them
- they will become outlaws and increasingly obliged to devote efforts to
elemental survival. If they attempt to commandeer a part of a country,
as happened to some extent in Afghanistan and in Colombia, they can be
hunted down by military operations. The key to anti-terrorism strategy
is to eliminate safe havens.
These safe havens come about in
various ways. In some countries, domestic legislation or constitutional
restraints inhibit surveillance in the absence of demonstrated criminal
acts, or prevent the transmittal of ostensibly domestic intelligence to
other countries - as seems to be the case in Germany and, to some extent,
in the United States. Remedial measures with respect to these situations
are in train.
But the overwhelming majority of
safe havens occurs when a government closes its eyes because it agrees
with at least some of the objectives of the terrorists - as in Afghanistan,
to some extent in Iran and Syria and, until recently, Pakistan. Even ostensibly
friendly countries that have been cooperating with the United States on
general strategy, such as Saudi Arabia, sometimes make a tacit bargain
with terrorists so long as terrorist actions are not directed against the
host government.
A serious anti-terrorism campaign
must break this nexus. Many of the host governments know more than they
have been prepared to communicate before Sept. 11. Incentives must be created
for the sharing of intelligence. The anti-terrorism campaign must improve
security cooperation, interrupt the flow of funds, harass terrorist communications
and subject the countries that provide safe haven to pressures including,
in the extreme case, military pressure.
In the aftermath of the attack on
American soil, the Bush administration resisted arguments urging immediate
military action against known terrorist centres, especially those that
had supported previous terrorist attacks against Americans. The challenge
is to guard against the temptation to treat cooperation on Afghanistan
as meeting the challenge and to use it as an alibi for avoiding the necessary
succeeding phases.
This is why military operations
in Afghanistan should be limited to the shattering of the Taliban and the
disintegration of the bin Laden network. Using military forces for nation-building
would involve us in a quagmire comparable to what drained the Soviet Union.
The conventional wisdom of creating a broad-based coalition to govern Afghanistan
is desirable but not encouraged by the historical record.
The likely - perhaps optimum - outcome
is a central Kabul government of limited reach while tribal autonomy prevails
in the various regions. This essential enterprise should be put under the
aegis of the United Nations, with generous economic support from the United
States and other advanced industrial countries. A contact group could be
created composed of Afghanistan's neighbors (minus Iraq), India, the United
States and those NATO allies that participated in the military operations.
This would provide a mechanism to reintroduce Iran to the international
system, provided it genuinely abandons its support of terrorism.
The crucial phase of America's anti-terrorism
strategy will begin as the Afghanistan military campaign winds down, and
its focus will have to be outside Afghanistan. At that point, the coalition
will come under strain. So far, the issue of long-term goals has been avoided
by the formula that the members of the global coalition are free to choose
the degree of their involvement.
A la carte coalition management
worked well when membership required little more than affirming opposition
to terrorism in principle. Its continued usefulness will depend on how
coalition obligations are defined in the next phase. Should the convoy
move at the pace of the slowest ship or should some parts of it be able
to sail by themselves? If the former, the coalition effort will gradually
be defined by the least-common-denominator compromises that killed the
U.N. inspection system in Iraq and are on the verge of eliminating the
U.N. sanctions against that country. Alternatively, the coalition can be
conceived as a group united by common objectives but permitting autonomous
action by whatever consensus can be created - or, in the extreme case,
by the United States alone.
Those who argue for priority for
the widest possible coalition - in other words, for a coalition veto -
often cite the experience of the Gulf War. But the differences are significant.
The Gulf War was triggered by a clear case of aggression that threatened
Saudi Arabia, whose security had been deemed crucial by a bipartisan succession
of American presidents.
The United States decided to undo
Saddam's adventure in the few months available before the summer heat made
large-scale ground operations impossible. Several hundred thousand American
troops were dispatched before any attempt at coalition building was undertaken.
Since the United States would obviously act alone if necessary, participating
in the coalition became the most effective means for influencing events.
The direction of the current coalition
is more ambiguous. President Bush has frequently and forcefully emphasized
that he is determined to press the anti-terrorism campaign beyond Afghanistan.
In due course, he will supplement his policy pronouncements with specific
proposals. That will be the point at which the scope of the operational
coalition will become clear. There could be disagreement on what constitutes
a terrorist safe haven; what measures states should take to cut off the
flow of funds; what penalties there are for non-compliance; in what manner,
whether and by whom force should be used.
Just as in the Gulf War the pressures
for American unilateral action provided the cement to bring a coalition
together, so, in the anti-terrorism war, American determination and that
of allies of comparable views are needed. A firm strategy becomes all the
more important as biological weapons appear to have entered the arsenals
of terrorism. Preventive action is becoming imperative. States known to
possess such facilities and to have previously used them must be obliged
to open themselves to strict, conclusive international inspections with
obligatory enforcement mechanisms. This applies particularly to Iraq, with
its long history of threats to all its neighbours and the use of chemical
weapons, both against its neighbours and its own population.
The conditions of international
support for a firm policy exist. For the attack on the United States has
produced an extraordinary congruence of interests among the major powers.
None wants to be vulnerable to shadowy groups that have emerged from Southeast
Asia to the edge of Europe. Few have the means to resist alone. The NATO
allies have ended the debate about whether, after the end of the Cold War,
there is still a need for an Atlantic security structure.
Our Asian allies, Japan and Korea
being democratic and industrialized, share this conviction. India, profoundly
threatened by domestic Islamic fundamentalism, has much to lose by abandoning
a common course. Russia perceives a common interest due to its contiguous
Islamic southern regions. China shares a similar concern with respect to
its western regions and has an added incentive to bring an end to global
terrorism well before the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. Paradoxically, terrorism
has evoked a sense of world community that has eluded theoretical pleas
for world order.
In the Islamic world, attitudes
are more ambiguous. Many Islamic nations, though deeply concerned about
fundamentalism, are constrained by their public opinion from avowing public
support, and a few may sympathize with some aspects of the terrorist agenda.
An understanding American attitude toward traditional friends of America,
like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is appropriate.
Their leaders are quite well aware
that they have made compromises imposed on them by brutal domestic necessities.
The administration clearly should make every effort to help them overcome
these circumstances, to improve intelligence sharing and the control of
money flows. But it must not press to a point that undermines these governments
for, in the short term, any foreseeable alternative would be worse for
our interests and for the peoples involved.
Yet there are limits beyond which
a serious policy cannot go. There is no reason for treating as members
of the coalition countries whose state-supported media advocate and justify
terrorism, withhold intelligence vital to the security of potential victims
and permit terrorist groups to operate from their territory.
These considerations apply especially
to Iran. Geopolitics argues for improved U.S.-Iranian relations. To welcome
Iran into an anti-terrorism coalition has as a prerequisite the abandonment
of its current role as the leading supporter of global terrorism, as both
the State Department and the bipartisan Bremer Commission have reported.
An Iranian relationship with the West can prosper only when both sides
feel the need for it. Both sides - and not only the West - must make fundamental
choices. The same is true to a somewhat lesser degree of Syria.
The war on terrorism is not just
about hunting down terrorists. It, above all, is to protect the extraordinary
opportunity that has come about to recast the international system. The
North Atlantic nations, having understood their common dangers, can turn
to a new definition of common purposes. Relations with former adversaries
can go beyond liquidating the vestiges of the cold war and find a new role
for Russia in its post-imperial phase, and for China as it emerges into
great power status.
India is emerging as an important
global player. After measurable success in the anti-terrorism campaign,
when it does not appear as concession to the terrorists, the Middle East
peace process should be urgently resumed. These and other prospects must
not be allowed to vanish because those that have the ability to prevail
shrink from what their opportunities require.
-Los Angeles Times Syndicate International,
a division of Tribune Media Services.
