Author: C. Raja Mohan
Publication: The Hindu
Date: October 3, 2001
New Delhi, Oct. 2. As the Government
reacts strongly against the escalation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,
Indo-Pak. tensions pose an important test to the international coalition
against terror that the Bush Administration has assembled.
In proclaiming over the last two
days that ``India's patience is limited'', the Government is cautioning
the United States and Pakistan not to take its restraint for granted. India
is arguing that if the U.S. does not want to let Indo-Pak. tensions undermine
the efforts of the international community in flushing out terrorists from
Afghanistan, Washington needs to press Pakistan to turn off the tap of
terrorism against India.
Curbing the temptation of taking
advantage of Pakistan's difficult situation, India has chosen not to complicate
the political life of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. While India understands the
importance of Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. at this juncture, it
would not want Islamabad to assume that it has a free hand to intensify
cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
Sustaining the coalition is one
of the biggest challenges in the pursuit of any war. Restraining warring
members of a coalition is not entirely new to the U.S. During the Gulf
War against Iraq in 1990-91, it had to exercise enormous pressure on Israel
not to react against attacks from Baghdad, which tried to divide the coalition
by drawing the Jewish state into the war.
As it set about building an international
coalition against the Taliban regime following the September 11 attacks,
the U.S. came to an early conclusion that cooperation from Pakistan was
critical. The U.S. was grateful for the quick and unquestioning Indian
support, but only Pakistan could provide it the much- needed access to
Afghanistan and intelligence on the Taliban.
Washington was conscious of the
potential destabilising impact of Indo-Pak. differences on the coalition.
It hoped that India would not launch on a course that could provide an
excuse for Gen. Musharraf not to cooperate.
India publicly suggested that it
had no desire to complicate the life of Gen. Musharraf at this stage. Implied
was the suggestion that it would not endanger Pakistan's security at a
critical moment in its national life.
As it supported the U.S. war against
international terrorism, India came round to accepting that the immediate
American focus would be on draining the swamp in Afghanistan and eventually
terrorism in other parts of the world. But the attack on the Jammu and
Kashmir Assembly by the Jaish-e-Mohammed has shattered all expectations
of even a temporary quiet and raised questions about India's policy of
exercising restraint.
By all standards this is one of
the worst terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir. The symbolism of the
attack has not been lost on the Government.
India is also concerned that Pakistan,
as it seeks to comply with the international pressures on Afghanistan,
might want to step up terrorist activity in Kashmir as a way of mollifying
the extremists at home.
In his letter to the U.S. President,
Mr. George Bush, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, reiterated
India's reluctance to overburden American efforts at building an international
coalition. But at the same time, he said, India was not prepared to watch
Pakistan step-up terrorism in Kashmir. Any further escalation, he suggested,
might compel him to act in defence of India's ``supreme national interest''.
The ball, in other words, is in
the U.S. court. If it wants India to maintain restraint, it has to impress
upon Pakistan to play by the same rules.
