Author: Lt. Gen. Vinay Shankar
(Retd)
Publication: The Asian Age
Date: October 5, 2001
Introspection and reflection of
the responses that follow a crisis are inevitable. Gleaning through the
reams of reaction to the visitation of horror on the US on September 11,
we are assailed by the disturbing realisation that in the display of dignity,
wisdom, maturity and self-assurance we have not really measured up.
It would appear that our display would not earn credits akin to those reserved
for the seasoned big league performers like the US, European Union leaders,
China, Japan and Russia. If in intellect and industry we can claim to be
able to compete with the best then the underlying cause for below par performance
must be addressed.
One diagnosis suggests that we have
got our syllabus wrong. The aim of the course, or the expectations from
the end product must be clearly defined. This requires vision and also
perhaps good astrological skills. In our case it would appear that we have
sub-consciously remained tethered to a worldview of the Sixties.
A close scrutiny of our reactions
should confirm this observation. Otherwise how does one explain this obsession
with Pakistan as witnessed in the past fortnight and distressingly highlighted
by our pathetic bleating with parent America on why sibling Pakistan is
being favoured now when all along in the recent past we have been better
behaved?
India's gathering of momentum in
transiting from the underdeveloped to the developing and the developed
world became discernible to the world and us in the early Seventies. As
we entered the Eighties the world had begun to recognise us as the emerging
economic military and technological power of the 21st century. There were
very sound reasons for such projections.
The country's geography, its enormous
reservoir of skilled manpower and its language (English) advantage and
the stability of its democracy, conferred an awesome potential to the nation.
The period from 1990 to 1995 gave us some glimmer of hope on the economic
and diplomatic front only to heighten disappointment and frustration as
we regressed to our old ways of functioning designed to maintain the status
quo.
In a few sectors fortunately for
us having tasted success the creative and productive energies unleashed
are refusing to be reined in. And they are signalling, albeit, feebly to
the others that we can do it.
Therefore what is needed now is
for the nation and its elite to recognise that we are on the threshold
of accelerating our pace of progress and to achieving prosperity and power
in the next 20 odd years of the order that equates us to the mightiest
and the richest. We have to firmly and unwaveringly believe in this capability
of ours; for then only can we realise our dreams and our destiny.
The first portal on our path to
progress is within. Admittedly, the challenges are daunting but by adopting
the new tools of technology the primary responsibility of providing a basic
level of education, health and security to all our people can be discharged
in a telescoped timeframe.
Simultaneously, we have to focus
on forging greater nationalism, a national will that motivates us to subordinate
our personal, caste and communal interests in a situation of conflict to
the greater national imperatives. Intelligently exploited the marvel of
the electronic media has a phenomenal capacity to be the ideal medium to
motivate.
We have witnessed its potential
briefly during the Kargil war and more recently after the terrorist attacks
on the US. In this context we will do well to remember that with the exception
of Doordarshan all other media companies that played a role were not state
enterprises.
In our evolution as a nation our
biggest failing has been our inability to absorb the people of some of
our border states into the national mainstream. This problem must be addressed
with the utmost urgency. The removal of the causes of alienation should
be a collective national responsibility.
Time lines have to be defined to
eradicate violence and insurgencies in the affected states. And then specific
strategies are drawn up, benchmarks identified - to tackle problems, as
they exist. Given the prevailing situations it would not be unreasonable
to suggest 2005 for the Northeast and 2007 for Kashmir. Now let us give
it what it takes.
People's aspirations are inextricably
and intimately linked to economic prosperity. Better management and more
dynamic policies have enabled many nations to forge ahead in creating wealth.
In the last decade we seemed to be breaking the stranglehold of what is
defined as "the Hindu rate of growth" but since, have not succeeded in
really taking off. Instead the nation is offered explanations.
Like Japan and Germany grew due
to the massive post war reconstruction aid; South Korea benefited similarly;
the South East Asian tigers were small countries or "city states" and China?
That country's figures are not to be trusted. With rapidly rising awareness
levels, economic deprivation has the potential for severe political and
social upheaval.
With over 30 per cent of our population
subsisting in abject poverty, unless we accelerate our growth rates to
8-10 per cent annually on a sustained basis so that we provide urgent succour
to this segment the prospects of serious internal instability are likely
to remain high. In the pursuit of economic advancement the key today is
technology. Economic planning must therefore dovetail strategies that exploit
technology to give an impetus to growth. Imagined political compulsions
should not be permitted to derail sound economic principles.
Externally our strategic horizon
cannot begin and end with Pakistan. For the first two decades after Independence
our fixation with that country was understandable. But after 1971 equations
altered dramatically. The next 30 years for a variety of reasons to include
most importantly the end of the Cold War have further widened the gap between
us.
In all dimensions of national power
excepting military, Pakistan is less than about a fifth of what we are.
Militarily it has tried to match us at enormous cost to itself but there
again the balance is clearly in our favour.
Extrapolating projected growth rates
and related defence budgets the combat power gap (to include nuclear forces)
between us should widen to unbridgeable levels provided we do not ignore
the imperatives of national security as we did in the last 15 years or
as in the decade and a half after Independence.
We do have differences with Pakistan
over Kashmir and some other minor issues but they are in the nature of
problems of the backyard and nothing more. We have demonstrated remarkable
restraint in the face of unrelenting instigation and even though now that
push has come to shove and we are readying to use force (an assumption)
our preference would be for an amicable settlement of our bilateral problems.
Given our size and our power potential
we should never forget that our strategic canvas encompasses the whole
world and our security can be impacted upon by events happening far away
as it has happened recently. To be a global player we have to learn to
think globally. And the most elementary lesson about thinking globally
is that national interests always come first.
Humanitarian concerns, ethical and
moral issues, right versus wrong are espoused only to support national
aims or when they are unlikely to affect adversely the pursuit of national
policies. Had we understood this principle our conduct could have been
more mature and dignified in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and
Washington.
The other equally fundamental law
of international relations is that a nation only counts when it speaks
from a position of economic, military and technological strength backed
by a displayed resolve to use those strengths to further national interests.
As the nation's attention remains
riveted to the turmoil in Kashmir there is another outstanding dispute
perhaps of greater significance whose early settlement we should not neglect;
our border problem with China; a powerful neighbour - poised to be a major
global player.
Our diplomacy must accord primacy
to resolving this issue: a step that would be to our mutual advantage in
the changing equations that are now unfolding. China till now may have
had reasons to keep this issue on the boil but with some intense and calibrated
negotiations it should be possible to close this chapter. If we achieved
this soon we would have paved the way to creating a more favourable climate
for untangling the Kashmir knot.
The build-up of our defence capabilities
must revolve around various contingencies. In the short term we have to
look at enhancing combat potential to deal with threats, as they stand
defined today.
But as we progressively succeed
in our strategic goals of ridding insurgency from the Northeast, settling
the border problem with China and resolving the Kashmir issue our defence
capabilities will require a major reorientation. As a matter of fact we
should be looking at those changes now so that the transition is managed
smoothly and at least cost.
The defence of territory would no
longer be our principal responsibility nor would enormous number of troops
be tied down to combating insurgents.
Our strategic canvas would be global.
To extend our reach we would have to look at the seas and space to be augmented
by long reach high lethality precision weapons; space through satellites
would initially facilitate communications, surveillance, warhead guidance
and force positioning and later to serve as platforms for offensive and
defensive weapon systems.
Much greater emphasis has to be
accorded to "knowledge" enhancing technologies and to improving our intelligence
apparatus; these are overarching capabilities that are vital for all spectrums
of warfare, and hence require a much higher share of defence investment.
Simultaneously, we must, based on
our considerable experience, begin to create special forces that are organised,
equipped and trained to deal with unconventional or sub-conventional threats;
the demands for such forces are likely to increase in the future. The threats
from weapons of mass destruction or their use is not being dwelt on, as
that requires a more detailed and specific discussion.
A national consensus on our "Vision
for 2025" would facilitate focused planning and also ensure consistent
and coherent responses from all arms of the government to emerging situations.
The country can also then hope for greater internal synergy and coordination
in our reactions to unexpected crisis or in disaster management. The time
has arrived to begin the debate.
