Author: Prafull Goradia
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 25, 2001.
According to Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi
was a Hindu and an Indian, the greatest in many generations, and he was
proud of being a Hindu and an Indian. (He broadcast this on 14 February,
1948). What the Mahatma wrote, said and did is widely known. The track
record of Dr BR Ambedkar as a Hindu is not so well known. His popular image
is that of a Dalit leader and a constitutional guru. How much he felt,
thought and pleaded for the interests of the Hindus therefore deserves
recounting.
Babasaheb was one of the few Hindus,
if not the only one, who foresaw the consequences of not letting the Muslims
have their Dar-ul Islam. He therefore openly and in cold print favoured
a partition and in almost exact details by 1940. He did this almost on
the morrow of the resolution demanding Pakistan which was passed by the
Muslim League at its Lahore session on 26 March, 1940. He was clear in
his view that Partition without an exchange of population was worse than
Partition. His reasoning was interesting. To him dividing the subcontinent
was to solve its communal conflict. The Communal Award was given in 1930
when Ramsay MacDonald was the prime minister of Great Britain. The award
gave the Muslims what they had demanded at the Round Table Conference.
Their weightage as well as their separate electorates were retained and
in addition they were given the statutory majority of seats in the provinces.
In those provinces they were in majority in the population. The Hindus
were also awarded similar privileges. At the time there were five Muslim
majority provinces and nine Hindu majority provinces. Since the Hindus
had nothing comparable to the Muslim League to lead them, the Congress
represented every one including the Hindus. They did not believe in separate
electorates. In fact, they had continually insisted on joint electorates
for all communities and had strongly objected to any community being given
the majority of seats guaranteed by the Constitution. The privileges which
the Muslims celebrated had no meaning for the Congress and its followers.
In Dr Ambedkar's perception, in the provinces of Punjab, NWF, Sind, Bengal
and Baluchistan, the Muslim governments could treat Hindu minorities as
they wished knowing fully well that there was no fear of retaliation in
the other provinces because they would have the secular governments as
distinct from Hindu ministries, as quoted by Dr Ambedkar in his book, Thoughts
on Pakistan. The Hindu minorities in the Muslim provinces also insisted
on joint electorates although the Communal Award ignored their feelings.
It is interesting to recall what Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had to say as
president of the Muslim Session held in Calcutta during 1927. In that speech
the Maulana declared:
"That by the Lucknow Pact they had
sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the
door for the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Mussalmans
in India. The separate electorates granted by the Pact of 1916 only ensured
Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community
was the recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to
the creation of such a state of affairs as would guarantee to them in the
future of lndia a proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal
and the Punjab was only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave them
for the first time five provinces of which no less than three (Sind, the
Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim
majority. If the Muslims did not recognise this great step they were not
fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five Muslim
provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces
Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the five provinces.
Was not this a great gain? Was not a new weapon gained for the assertion
of Muslim rights?" (Quoted from Thoughts on Pakistan by BR Ambedkar, Thacker
& Company Ltd., Bombay, 1940)
Babasaheb felt that the Communal
Award meant that the Hindu Minorities would be hostages at the mercy of
the five Muslim majority provincial governments. This he felt was a strong
enough argument in favour of Partition. Incidentally, the Muslim League
at its Lahore Session on 16th March, 1940 passed a resolution which amounted
to the demand of a separate state called Pakistan. The scheme had been
conceived by one Mr Rehmat Ali in 1933 having advocated a partition. Dr
Ambedkar immediately noted that merely the formation of Pakistan would
not ensure safety for the Hindus in the Muslim majority areas. In fact
their condition may worsen because at the time the hostages could at least
appeal to the Central Government about their grievances whereas in Pakistan,
there would be no impartial Central Government to turn to. He recalled
that the Hindus in Pakistan could then be given into the position of the
Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews in Nazi Germany.
Babasaheb was perceptive enough
to realise that the evil was not Partition but the boundaries of the current
provinces which did not reflect or were not consistent with the profile
of the Hindu-Muslim population. The boundaries had to be altered; the Punjab
and Bengal had to be bifurcated. Even then some Hindus would get left behind
in Pakistan and many of the Muslims would be scattered across Hindustan.
All these would then have to be moved in a planned manner so that the Hindus
and Sikhs came away to Hindustan and the Muslims moved to Pakistan. This
was the gist of Dr Ambedkar's formula. Nevertheless it is useful to quote
him "that the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal
peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is no reason why Hindus and
Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe.
That, if small countries with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and
Bulgaria were capable of such an undertaking, there is no reason to suppose
that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population
involved is inconsiderable and it would be a height of folly to give up
a sure way to communal peace because some obstacles in it require to be
removed."
Babasaheb was convinced that the
secret of a happy and successful state lay in homogeneity. That was the
lesson taught also by the histories of Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. Many
a constituent of post-war era have given safeguard for the welfare of the
minorities. Their experience, however, showed that these did not save the
minorities. Even after safeguards the same old policy exterminating the
minorities continued. Hence an exchange of minorities was found to be about
the only solution. There was another factor which caused Dr Ambedkar a
great deal of anxiety. Basing his conclusions on the facts provided in
the Simon Commission Report, he found that more than half the soldiers
of the then Indian Army were from the North-West Frontier and West Punjab,
most of them being Muslim.
Although the British Indian Government
justified the profile of recruitment with their theory of marshal and non-marshal
classes, the fact was that during the rebellion of 1857, the people of
these areas remained loyal to the British whereas soldiers recruited by
the East India Company from the Indo-Gangetic plane were the ones that
actually revolted. This was the view of a Special Army Survey in 1879 which
observed that the distinction between marshal and non-marshal classes were
indistinct.
The khilafat committee, in its anxiety
to safeguard pan-Islamism, had enunciated the principle that the Indian
Army should not be used against a Muslim power. The Muslim League had endorsed
this principle. In the words of Dr Ambedkar: "Even Theodore Morrison, writing
in 1899, was of the opinion that 'the views held by the Mahomedans (certainly
the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient
to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government. Were
the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans,
instead of uniting with the Sikhs and Hindus to repel him, would be drawn
by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag'." The Hindus,
he continued, could find themselves between the devil and the deep sea
so far as the defence of India was concerned. If India remains as one whole,
what would happen? The issue might sound remote today but remember in 1919
the protagonists of the Khilafat movement had actually gone to the extent
of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India.
Even the cost benefit factor did
not escape Babasaheb although he was not a financial expert: "The Pakistan
area, which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian Army, contributes
very little to the central exchequer. The main contribution comes from
the provinces of Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the
provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of India to carry out
its activities in the Pakistan provinces. The Pakistan provinces are a
drain on the provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little
to the Central Government but they receive a great deal from the Central
Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs 121 crore.
Of this about Rs 52 crore are yearly spent on the army. In what area is
this amount spent? Who pays the bulk of this amount of Rs 52 crore? The
bulk of this amount of Rs 52 crore which is spent on the army is spent
over the Muslim army drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this
amount of Rs 52 crore is contributed by the Hindu provinces and is spent
on an army from which the Hindus, who pay for it, are excluded!! How many
Hindus are aware of this tragedy?"
