Author: G Parthasarathy
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 22, 2001
Speaking on Pakistan's independence
day on August 14, General Pervez Musharraf proclaimed: "The Taliban are
the dominant reality in Afghanistan and the international community should
engage, rather than isolate them". There were good reasons why General
Musharraf could then smugly make this assertion. The mutually reinforcing
ISI-Taliban nexus was providing his Government the "strategic depth" to
promote "jihadi" violence by groups like the Harkat ul Mujahideen, the
Jaish e Mohammad and the Lashkar e Toiba. The Islamist elements in his
armed forces establishment fathered by the likes of General Hamid Gul were
delighted at their role in promoting terrorist activities worldwide in
the name of Islam-from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Chechnya to Algeria,
Egypt the Philippines and Indonesia. There was also good money for his
military establishment from narcotics grown in Afghanistan.
Things changed dramatically after
September 11. Faced with an American ultimatum that if he did not extend
unconditional support, his country would be made bankrupt and his nuclear
arsenal taken out, General Musharraf quickly fell in line and became the
darling of the western world. Rulers from President Bush to Tony Blair
and Chancellor Schroeder rushed to embrace him. The UN Secretary General
gave him a seat on the high table. Promises of huge economic assistance
were made. Pakistan was once again given the status of a "frontline state"
in promoting western strategic objectives. The hitherto isolated Musharraf
started believing that he was Pakistan's new Messiah, destined to lead
his country to prosperity and a leadership role in South and Southwest
Asia. All this was also so heady for the author and architect of Kargil,
that he even brashly asserted that India should "lay off" Afghanistan.
In the process he forgot that his predecessors like Field Marshal Ayub
Khan, General Yahya Khan and General Zia ul Haq had also traversed this
road and come to grief.
General Musharraf's calculation
was that American military power would quickly eliminate Osama bin Laden,
Mullah Omar and his close associates and the Al Qaida terrorist network.
He would then get the Americans to establish a Government headed by some
"moderate Taliban" leaders like Jalaludin Haqqani (the Taliban military
commander) and Foreign Minster Mutawakil. In the meantime, the ISI's continuing
contacts with the Taliban and the assistance of its jihadis to the Taliban
would ensure that the Northern Alliance (NA)would be kept in check and
independent-minded Pashtuns like Abdul Haq eliminated. What is surprising
is that despite his Kargil misadventure, Musharraf still remained a babe
in the woods in both his military and diplomatic assessments. It should
have been evident to Musharraf that the soft and reassuring words he heard
from Secretary of State Colin Powell alluding to American reservations
about the NA were meaningless once the Pentagon found that its military
objectives of degrading and destroying the Taliban and the Al Qaida could
not be achieved without the support of the NA. And this is precisely what
happened. Backed by the might of American air power, the NA cut through
the Taliban defenses and overran resistance in crucial centres like Mazaar
e Sharif, Kabul, Taloqan and Herat. Even in Pashtun dominated provinces
bordering Pakistan like Nangarhar, the Taliban has been driven out and
replaced not by Musharraf's nominees, but by local Pashtun commanders allied
in the past to the NA. Haji Qader, the brother of the betrayed and slain
Abdul Haq has been nominated as Governor of Nangarhar Province with Jalalabad
as its capital. The new Pashtun leadership in the Southern Provinces who
are taking on the Taliban comprises warlords who have deeply distrusted
each other in the past. All this has been accompanied by outpourings of
anti-Pakistani sentiments within Afghanistan being shown daily on global
television networks. Hundreds of Pakistani jihadis have been killed in
American air strikes and by the NA. Gruesome scenes of Afghans rejoicing
over the bodies of slain Pakistanis have been seen on TV by ordinary Pakistanis.
What must have been particularly shocking to them was that such contempt
and hatred for their countrymen was not being manifested by the much-reviled
Indians or Americans, but by fellow Muslims for whom they believed they
had made many sacrifices. The Punjabi dominated Pak army has massacred
Bangladeshis, Baluchis, Sindhis and Mohajirs in the past. But, Musharraf's
betrayal of his erstwhile Pashtun Taliban allies will raise misgivings
in the minds of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.
As the America-led military operations
intensify close to Pakistan's borders, fears have grown about the influx
of armed Taliban fighters and their Arab, Chechen and Pakistani associates
into the tribal areas of Pakistan's NWFP. Following a meeting with the
Governors and Corps Commanders of the NWFP and Baluchistan on November
16, General Musharraf has ordered the setting up of a stringent three-layered
security cover on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan to check illegal cross-border
movements. Formations of the Pakistan army have been moved to frontline
positions in the tribal areas, Chaman and in the Torkham belt near the
Khyber Pass. They will reinforce personnel of the Frontier Force and other
paramilitary formations. The military rulers in Rawalpindi are obviously
getting jittery about the prospects of the American war against terrorism
spreading to Pakistan. This is also evident from the manner in which Pakistan
has unilaterally withdrawn the facilities accorded traditionally to landlocked
Afghanistan for duty free imports.
While the rapid disintegration of
the Taliban has shocked the supporters of these so called brave "Islamic
Warriors" in Pakistan, what has been even more galling is the feeling that
in its desire to gain international strategic importance, Pakistan has
sold itself cheap yet again. The unkindest cut of all amidst all this has
been the growing international recognition that India has a constructive
role to play in the emerging events in Afghanistan. What Pakistan's military
establishment repeatedly fails to understand is that a country that cannot
govern itself in a civilised democratic manner and requires constant injections
of foreign economic assistance to avoid bankruptcy, cannot aspire to play
a role beyond its status. Despite pledges of foreign assistance, the Pakistan
economy is unlikely to grow at a rate significantly higher than the 2.6%
it achieved last year. Clarion calls for jihad and so called "freedom struggles"
are not exactly the tonics that will promote foreign and domestic investment.
The campaign against the Taliban
and the Al Qaida has yet some way to go before one can assert that Afghanistan
is no longer a breeding ground for international terrorism. The NA may
have established itself in Kabul, but has yet to prove that it can show
the requisite statesmanship for genuine political accommodation or for
effective governance. Pakistan and other players like Russia and Iran have
conflicting priorities and interests. Thus, even as we stabilise our links
with the NA, it is important for India to reach out to those who wield
influence amongst the Pashtuns. It would best serve our interests to adopt
a low-key and behind the scenes role in the efforts to establish a broad-based
government in Afghanistan. At the same time, it is imperative that mechanisms
are put in place to ensure that our economic and humanitarian assistance
to Afghanistan starts immediately. Moreover, it is imperative that medical
personnel, equipment and funds are provided to re-establish the Indira
Gandhi Hospital in Kabul as the premier medical centre in Afghanistan.
Similar assistance could be extended in centres like Jalalabad, Herat and
Mazaar e Sharif. Our interests are best served in Afghanistan when its
people feel we are a non-interfering, non-intrusive and helpful friend.
