Author: Husain Haqqani
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: November 24, 2001
The turn of events in Afghanistan
over the past two weeks is being described as a strategic debacle for Pakistan.
After 20 years of involvement in Afghan affairs, Islamabad suddenly finds
itself without any significant friends across its Northwest frontier. The
Taliban, hitherto cultivated by Pakistan at the expense of friendly relations
with other nations, are bitter about General Pervez Musharraf's U-turn
against them. Pashtun warlords returning to their former bastions in eastern
and southern Afghanistan are seeking the patronage of the CIA instead of
the ISI. The Northern Alliance, now firmly in control of Kabul, continues
to breathe fire against Islamabad.
The US-led coalition has a military
presence in Afghanistan while Iran, Russia and India are rushing to establish
embassies in Kabul. But Pakistan has been reduced to issuing vacuous statements
about a broad-based government in Afghanistan. Once the unfortunate slaughter
of foreign volunteers fighting alongside the Taliban in Kunduz is over,
Pakistan will also be forced to count dead bodies of its citizens. Having
failed to prevent young men infused with the spirit of Jihad from crossing
over into Afghanistan, it must now deal with the failure in preventing
their massacre.
General Musharraf cannot be faulted
for joining the US-led coalition in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. But the question he must ask himself and his colleagues in the
army relates to their policies prior to US re-engagement (if military strikes
can be termed that) in Afghanistan.
General Musharraf has said repeatedly
since September 11 that he has saved ''Pakistan's core interests'' by aligning
with the United States. These core interests are defined as the country's
nuclear weapons programme and its focus on the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.
But if Afghanistan was not a core Pakistani interest, why did Islamabad
squander so much of its limited resources and good will over influencing
the course of events in that country?
Pakistan's extensive involvement
in Afghanistan was assumed that a Pashtun-led, Islamic-oriented government
in Kabul would be more favourably disposed to Islamabad than a regime comprising
secular Pashtuns or leaders from Afghanistan's ethnic minorities. Primarily,
the military leadership and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) undertook
policy making about Afghanistan, leaving little room for inputs from the
Foreign Office or civilian analysts. Had civilian opinion been taken into
consideration, there were enough voices calling for broadening the range
of Pakistan's contacts among Afghan leaders.
The single-dimension minds formulating
policy at the time failed to take into consideration the possibility of
international involvement in Afghanistan of the kind manifested in the
past two months. Pakistan could, at least, have been better prepared for
a stage when its ability to control events in Afghanistan would be limited
as it is now.
The decision to burn bridges with
all other Afghan groups for the sake of the Taliban is not the first occasion
in Pakistan's history that strategic decisions have been made without a
fallback position. In 1965, Field Marshal Ayub Khan led the country into
war with India assuming that the war would be limited to the Kashmir region
and that Indian forces will not cross the international boundary.
In 1971, General Yahya Khan assumed
that the United States and China would intervene militarily to protect
the integrity of Pakistan. In 1999, the Kargil adventure was undertaken
without providing for either international pressure or for India's resolve
to retake those heights even at great military cost.
On all these occasions, 'straightforward'
military decision-makers thought in simplistic military terms, ignoring
political complexities. On all these occasions, no post-mortem examination
was carried out to assess where and why Pakistan went wrong. In case of
the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission was
established but its findings were not made public for almost three decades.
It's time for Pakistan to break
with that tradition. A commission must immediately be established to conduct
accountability of those who led Pakistan into the delusory policies that
have left it with no friends and the prospect of incessant civil war in
a neighbouring country with tribes which straddle its borders. And unlike
the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, this commission's report should be made
public as soon as its open deliberations are completed.
The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report
offered us an insight into the core problems of decision making in Pakistan.
That the country's politicians are selfish individuals willing to risk
the country's future for personal gains is a fact known to most Pakistanis
for quite some time. But the army is no better, if the report is to be
believed. The reported shenanigans of General Yahya and his closest aides
led to critical questions about our nation's institution of last resort.
How could so many top generals be
as depraved as Yahya's coterie? Why was the then military leadership a
victim of delusions about its strength and the state of Pakistan's international
relations?
General Musharraf could learn a
few lessons from the experiences of Pakistan under General Yahya Khan,
who presided over the 1971 debacle. Like Pakistan's present ruler, General
Yahya had assumed power at a time of national crisis, with considerable
support from the people. He had attempted to reform the country and lay
the foundations of democracy guided by him and his uniformed associates.
Personal weaknesses relating to wine and women notwithstanding, he was
an able soldier and financially honest man.
His intentions were good but his
inability to understand political issues and to deal with them led to military
defeat as well as division of Pakistan. Yahya believed that he had been
assigned a mission by the Almighty to save Pakistan from politicians he
believed to be corrupt and unsuited to lead the nation. He did not waver
for one minute from the ''strategy'' that he and his fellow generals evolved,
ignoring public opinion and the voices of the intelligentsia.
The ''strategy'' turned out to be
a recipe for national disaster. The lesson is to acknowledge that the complex
problems of a nation such as Pakistan cannot be solved by the simple though
straightforward approach of a soldier with a sense of God-given mission.
As the consequence of Pakistan's
Afghan misadventure become apparent with each passing day, General Musharraf
would do well to take a deep breath and examine the record of other soldier-rulers
who either refused to heed civilian advice or chose the wrong political
course. A soldier is trained to be courageous and to ignore suggestions
that interfere with the brave prescription. A ruler, on the other hand,
needs to take into account many factors that may not fit the do-or-die
paradigm.
(Husain Haqqani has served as adviser
to prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and as Pakistan's ambassador
to Sri Lanka)
