Author: Brahma Chellaney
Publication: The Times of India
Date: November 18, 2001
Introduction: Yes. Since Kashmir
is the only litmus test on patriotism available in Pakistan
The answer has to be an emphatic
yes, given Musharraf's phobic fixation on Kashmir. Musharraf's career,
with its record of combat in Siachin and commando operations elsewhere
in Kashmir, is testament to the need he has always felt to prove his credentials
in the Punjabi-dominated military establishment. As a Mohajir, Musharraf
has to show himself more Pakistani than the average Pakistani. And Kashmir
is the only litmus test on patriotism available in Pakistan.
Such is Musharrafs compulsion to
prove himself that no sooner he became Army chief than he began staging
the Kargil operation. And now as the dictator, he rarely lets go of any
public opportunity to rake up the Kashmir issue. His obsession with Kashmir
sabotaged the Agra summit from the word go. And even while being feted
in the West for turning against the Taliban, Musharraf was unable to hide
his one-track mind.
In addition to the chip on the shoulder
he carries as a mohajir, Musharraf is also the product of a military establishment
that equates Pakistan with the Army, and the Army with Kashmir. That makes
Musharraf doubly dangerous for India. Yet Vajpayee, in his delusional pursuit
of peace with Pakistan, stunned everyone by inviting Musharraf to India
and then cried foul when his guest talked nothing but Kashmir.
Kashmir, however, is not just Musharraf's
obsession but the collective obsession in Pakistan. Almost 55 years after
its creation, Pakistan remains, a state of four tribes and one rootless
clan (mohajirs) in search of a national identity. The only distinguishing
characteristic of the Pakistani state is its fixation on Kashmir an issue
that not only helps define Pakistan's identity but also serves as the glue
holding its fractious society together.
Add to that the Pakistan military's
own need to keep the Kashmir issue burning. Kashmir and the hostility with
India serve as the raison desire for the power and might of the Pakistan
military. Peace with India will greatly erode its domestic power base and
ability to corner a sizable chunk of national resources. Vajpayee, having
failed to make peace with the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif, naively
turned to that country's most powerful institution, the military, by inviting
Musharraf.
Despite Pakistan's neurotic fixation
on Kashmir, and its long history of sending in terrorists into the Indian-held
part, Kashmir serves as the symbol, not the cause, of its conflict with
India. If Kashmir were magically resolved tomorrow, or if India were to
hand over Kashmir on a platter, it will not remove the rivalry between
status quo India and irredentist Pakistan. No one has better articulated
this than Musharraf, who is on record as saying that Pakistan's low-intensity
conflict with India will continue even if a Kashmir settlement was found.
Today, Musharraf needs the Kashmir
issue more than ever. With Pakistan's Afghanistan policy in tatters and
public opinion against him, Musharraf has only the Kashmir issue to build
domestic support in his favour. That is why he could stir up more trouble
in Kashmir, encouraging some of the Taliban fighters taking refuge in Pakistani
tribal lands to move on to Kashmir.
Already, Musharrafs record of actual
terrorist and covert operations against India, from the time he trained
Naga, guerillas in East Pakistan, rivals Osama bin Laden's mythologies
terrorist exploits. Now with his political survival instincts fuelling
his Kashmir mania, Musharraf could incontrovertibly demonstrate himself
that he is to India what bin Laden is to America.
(Prof. Brahma Chellaney is a strategic
affairs expert with the Centre for Policy Research. He spoke to Sujata
Dutta Sachdeva)