Author: Shishir Gupta
Publication: India Today
Date: February 25, 2002
The South Block officials are not
known to get overly excited about anything. But the telephone call at 11.30
a.m. on February 5 virtually set the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA
) on fire. The caller, Indian Ambassador to United Arab Emirates K.C. Singh,
informed Secretary (East) R.M. Abhyankar that the Kolkata shoot-out mastermind
Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Mallick had been detained in Dubai. General Sheikh
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, crown prince of Dubai and uae defence minister,
had told Singh that his Government was willing to deport him. The call
sent the ministry into a tizzy. Abhyankar rushed to inform External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh and Foreign Secretary Chokila Iyer about the breakthrough.
Union Home Secretary Kamal Pande convened a meeting, where mea officials
and CBI Director P.C. Sharma chalked out plans to bring him back. CBI Joint
Director Neeraj Kumar was selected to go to Dubai to complete the paperwork
and to make sure that Ansari was brought to Delhi under the name in which
the Interpol had issued the red-corner notice. Kumar, armed with evidence
and files related to the shoot-out at the US Information Service (USIS)
building in Kolkata on January 22, left for Dubai and spent the next three
days tying up the loose ends.
The last-minute glitches that Delhi
had encountered in its earlier attempts at extradition, notably that of
Dawood Ibrahim henchman Abu Salem from the UAE in October last year, made
the Government more cautious this time. A special plane was stationed at
Dubai airport and anxious officials had apparently filed two return flight
plans to facilitate a quiet return in case the deportation plans went awry.
But the glitches were manageable this time round. On February 9, at 9.45
a.m. (IST), Ansari was brought to the airport by the officials, but the
Sheikh insisted that Ansari be handed over to the Indian envoy and not
the CBI team. So after a delay of two hours, the special plane carrying
Ansari flew out of Dubai at 2.45 p.m. The Government was elated. This was
the first deportation from UAE after that of scamster Niranjan Shah in
1992. Jaswant drafted a letter lauding the efforts of the uae Government,
particularly the Sheikh, in bringing the criminal to book. The letter was
delivered personally to the Sheikh by K.C. Singh. By that time, Ansari
was back on Indian soil.
While on the surface the Ansari
deportation appears smooth, it was a diplomatic coup painstakingly planned
by Indian officials. Union Home Minister L.K. Advani had raised the issue
of terrorists and Mumbai blast case accused like Dawood Ibrahim finding
easy transit through the UAE during an official visit to the Emirates in
June last year. This despite the extradition or the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty signed on October 25, 1999.
But September 11 proved to be a
turning point. Soon after the WTC attack Advani wrote a letter to General
Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Amir of UAE, expressing India's concerns
over terrorists finding refuge in that country. With the world opinion
ranged against terrorism and the September 28 UN Security Council Resolution
1373 reinforcing this consensus, the UAE ambassador to India lost no time
in assuring the mea of his Government's cooperation on extradition. On
October 3, Abhyankar flew to the UAE to operationalise communication links
between the agencies of the two countries. Though the Abu Salem episode
on October 22 was an embarrassing lapse, the mea has since been able to
forge vital security links with Gulf states.
These links were tested in after
the Kolkata shoot-out, with Delhi sharing every bit of evidence with the
UAE and the US. FBI Director Robert Muller, who was on a visit to India,
was informed that Ansari's call, claiming responsibility for the USIS attack,
had been traced to Dubai. Muller's Dubai stop-over on his way back was
no coincidence. With Indians furnishing details of Ansari's villa in Dubai,
the UAE Government, nudged on by the US, placed the accused under surveillance
from January 23. The Sheikh chose to give credence to Ansari's Indian passport
and not the false passport issued to a Safeer Mohammed Rana by the Pakistani
authorities in Lahore. Ansari's game was up.
For the UAE Government, deporting
Ansari was an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the Emirates
was committed to fighting terrorism. Since September 11, the UAE had been
under pressure from the US to curb the hawala transactions. Terrorism had
also reflected in low tourist flows, a substantial portion sourced from
India, with seven-star luxury resorts running on 20 per cent occupancy.
The UAE action had repercussions
on other countries as well. Announcing Ansari's deportation at a press
conference, Abhyankar said, "The UAE Government has exercised its sovereign
right to deport unwanted aliens. Naturally, we expect the Pakistani Government
to behave likewise in the respect of the list of 20 terrorists we have
supplied to them." Islamabad chose to hit back. The same day, Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf, in an interview to The Washington Post,
alleged the involvement of Indian intelligence agencies in the Daniel Pearl
kidnapping case. It is another matter that the Pakistani authorities have
now arrested JeM's Omar Sheikh-the terrorist released during the Kandahar
hijacking and who met Ansari in Tihar Jail-on charges of kidnapping the
Wall Street Journal reporter.
Delhi stepped up its diplomatic
offensive by issuing a fresh demarche to Pakistan asking it to hand over
the 20 fugitives. Pakistan was asked to emulate the uae example and deport
these fugitives, 14 of whom carry Indian passports. A 1989 protocol on
handing over criminal elements to each other may now perhaps come useful.
