Author: Ashok K Mehta
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: February 27, 2002
When Arundhati Roy, the Goddess
of small novels, began pontificating on nuclear theology, an agitated Army
Colonel counselled her to stick to fiction. Similarly, it is time to wag
a finger at some retired Admirals, Generals and Ambassadors for either
writing off or picking holes in Operation Parakram-the country's biggest
ever military deployment which has elevated coercive diplomacy to new heights.
What is the criticism? That no previous
government deployed its military with the express intention of going to
war if India's demands (on the List of 20 wanted criminals and ending cross
border terrorism) were not met. This is not true. India has merely spelt
out its demands without specifying consequences for non-compliance. The
other critique is that military deployment is an old-fashioned and obsolescent
strategy in coercion. Instead, technology-dominant capabilities be injected
in hot pursuit and deep penetration operations to coerce Pervez Musharraf.
For example, laser designators, AWACS and other gadgetry be incorporated
in cross border missions: For assassinating the Hafiz Saiyyads and Masood
Azhars in Pakistan and blowing up terrorist bases and camps. Graphic illustrations
of precision-guided munitions taking out APC-carrying Taliban in Afghanistan
are provided in support. Further, the Indian Army has been faulted for
getting it all wrong and the US Navy commended for being the lead player
in winning the war in Afghanistan.
This is a load of rubbish and a
barrage of bizarre ideas aired by self-styled strategists who do not deserve
comment. Except that India is not the US, Pakistan is not Afghanistan and
Lashkar e Toiba and Jaish e Mohammad do not commute in APCs. They've vanished,
their training camps and bases dismantled. Where are the goddamned terrorist
targets? If they're not found in Pakistan, go for the ISI in Nepal is the
alternative offered. As Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh once suggested,
it is time the Indian Navy (and the Admiral in particular) is deployed
in Kashmir to understand the ground reality.
The other comparison being made
is with Israel. Look what hot pursuit has got them. The incursions into
Lebanon were an abject failure as finally they had to withdraw. One of
Sharon's Generals even refused to enter Beirut like the more recent refusal
by British General Michael Jackson to block the Pristina airstrip in Kosovo,
following an order from US General Wesley Clark. "I didn't want to start
a war with Russia", he said. Tit for tat does not work any more in this
day and age. Now Israeli reservists are refusing to fight the Intifada
on the West Bank and Gaza. The Hamas suicide bomber cannot be taken out
by a laser designator or a Merkava tank. And Israelis are not yet prepared
to do a Dhanu in the Palestinian quarters. It is deadly stalemate.
It is not that the Indian Army or
the armed forces do not have offensive plans. They require a clear mandate
from the government of the political objectives and then a free hand and
requisite resources to implement that directive. For the present, all they
have is orders to deploy and be prepared for any eventuality. Far back
in 1948, Nehru had ordered his British C-in-C, Gen Boucher, to prepare
the military to strike at the bases inside Pakistan which were supporting
tribal raiders and militia inside J&K. Boucher did nothing of the sort.
Instead a British-backed ceasefire was forced by the UN. The Army was confident
that given more time, it could have recovered most of what is PoK today.
In April 1965, Pakistan launched
a division in the Rann of Kutch which led India to mobilise and deploy
its armed forces in Operation ABLAZE. The British once again brokered a
ceasefire and no sooner had troops pulled back that Pakistan launched Operation
Gibraltar in August by sending infiltrators into J&K. This resulted
in redeployment and war -Operation Riddle. The Army captured the infiltration
launch pads in the Haji Pir and Kishanganga areas, as well as Point 13620
of Kargil fame. After Tashkent, these vital areas were returned to Pakistan.
So the infiltration continued.
The deployment in 1971 took eight
months and resulted in war. So did the deployment in 1999 end in the limited
Kargil conflict. Here military force was backed by diplomacy to vacate
aggression. Terminating terrorism, or at the very least, curbing cross
border infiltration, ought now to be achieved by diplomacy backed by Parakram.
So what is the overall politico-military strategy? To win this war without
fighting it, by a combination of Parakram and Parikrama. The latter is
the diplomatic offensive. For the time being it is driving this strategy.
The Indian threat to go to war at a time when US troops are deployed in
Pakistan and their war aims have not been realised has made US (along with
other Western powers) an ally in ensuring that an Indian-Pakistan war is
avoided at all costs. The one scenario the West dreads most is the nuclear
flashpoint becoming a reality. It is evident that the US is continuing
to play a key role in shaping Musharraf's behaviour and should be able
to persuade him to implement his reforms. Barring the Daniel Pearl killing,
Musharraf hasn't done too badly.
On its own, Parakram has achieved
quite a bit. Musharraf realises that the leverage of terrorism has to disconnect
before any de-escalation and dialogue can commence. He has denounced jihad
and renounced terrorism. He's banned two key terrorist organisations operating
in J&K, closed their offices, arrested their activists and frozen their
accounts. He has initiated an internal reforms package which will hopefully
include downsizing of ISI. The US has moderated its posturing on centrality
of Kashmir to resumption of direct talks on "all outstanding issues including
Kashmir" which is akin to India's own composite dialogue. By the end of
the month the deployment and war readiness will have cost India around
Rs 3,000 crore. For cash-strapped Pakistan, even half this amount is unaffordable.
A longish standoff in the trenches will hurt Pakistan much more than India.
The ground situation in J&K
is remarkably stable. The militants are confused, in disarray and lying
low. They've been asked not to claim responsibility for violence. After
Musharraf's historic January 12 speech, only one incident of infiltration
was detected on February 14 in the Rajouri sector. Nine terrorists with
considerable quantities of weapons, explosives, communication equipment
(after ISD and STD links were cut off) and cash were intercepted. Not a
single fidayeen attack has been reported for nearly two months. Casualties
among security forces have been lowest ever for comparable season. If this
trend continues, which according to the Army is unlikely, come May or June
the terrorist pipelines would have dried up and infiltration reduced to
a trickle.
Residual violence and terrorism
would then be the handiwork of indigenous militant groups and remnant foreign
terrorists. Such a cut and dry picture will of course never emerge, though
Musharraf's intention would become clear: Either he has ordered stoppage
of infiltration or it is jihad as usual.
In case it is the latter, the Government
will decide on the transition from coercive diplomacy to punitive military
action. For the Army to pull back in the face of re-vigoured infiltration
will be humiliating and unacceptable. Besides it will represent the failure
of coercive diplomacy, much like India's withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka.
India's newest strategic ally, the US, will avoid such a scenario being
played out. It would rather create conditions on both sides for deescalation
and dialogue. India's best bet is to continue building the groundswell
of international pressure and info-war against Pakistan, remain firm and
deployed while keeping the powder dry. The lesson of the past is not to
keep all eggs in Uncle Sam's basket.
