Author: Pranwa Deshmukh
Publication:
Date:
It is a pity that Indian Media and
Politicians have allowed Pakistan the claim that it provides 'Moral Support'
to Kashmiris' Freedom Movement.
The UN Resolution of 13-Aug-1948
made allowance for an 'Independent J&K', but the later UN Resolution
of 5-January-1949 does *NOT*, and Pakistan engineered the removal of that
provision.
Furthermore, Pakistan's strategy
has been to demand plebiscite but *NOT* have it, till ten, twenty, thirty,
fifty years - till such time that it could alter the demography of the
region to suit the outcome in its favor.
The extract from B.L.Sharma's book
appended below discusses 'How Pakistan Avoided Plebiscite'
----
First, some information about the
author, B.L.Sharma:
To those conversant with the so-called
Kashmir Question, Mr. B. L. Sharma needs no introduction, for chiefly as
Officer on Special Duty for Kashmir Affairs in the Indian Foreign Office
he accompanied nine Indian delegations to the United nations between 1948
and 1965 in the capacity of Adviser. In 1952 he was again a member of the
Indian delegation for talks in Geneva, and he also attended the Tashkent
conference, in January 1966, as Adviser.
Mr. Sharma has thus been in close
touch with the Kashmir Question since its inception and his book reflects
the tremendous industry and insight he brought to bear on this difficult,
delicate, and complicated subject. Here, however, is much more than the
official mind at work. Mr. Sharma obviously knows all the minutiae of this
tangled controversy but he has also a clear, incisive mind and style which
present and interpret not only the facts but the nuances of the problem.
The book is critical in many aspects
of some of the attitudes adopted by the U. N. in dealing with the Kashmir
Question. Mr. Sharma supports his conclusions with a formidable array of
facts. The book is heavily documented and the author's ability to sustain
his arguments with citations from speeches, discussions, documents, and
records makes the end result useful and impressive.
---
How Pakistan Avoided Plebiscite-
II
-----------------------------------
Excerpts from the Book "The
Kashmir Story" by B. L. Sharma
-------------
Publishers: Asia Publishing House,
Copyright © B. L. Sharma, 1967
Reference:
http://meadev.nic.in/plebiscite2.htm
---------
PAKISTAN'S NEW TUNE
-----
Ten years after the first invasion
of the State from Pakistan, the attitude of Pakistan showed little change.
Speaking in the Security Council on 18 February 1957, the Foreign Minister
of Pakistan revealed that what Pakistan was after was not a peaceful plebiscite
but a religious holocaust. He said:
It would be perfectly legitimate
in the case of a plebiscite to draw attention to religious, cultural, linguistic,
economic, geographic, strategic, and other ties, affinities, and considerations
that might sway the choice ... whereas in an election it is the duty, of
a Government to see that it is free and no religious arguments are brought
in, in the matter of a plebiscite, wherever it is held, it is held because
of religious differences or of ethnic differences or of geographic, linguistic,
or other differences. Therefore, in a plebiscite it is quite legitimate
for people to appeal to the electorate for these reasons before they decide
whether to accede to one side or the other.
From this statement it was clear
that in spite of the tragic experience of the partition, the leaders of
Pakistan were determined to inflame religious and communal passions in
a plebiscite. This was another violation of an assurance which the U.N.
Commission had given to India. Nehru had exactly this type of danger in
mind when he asked the Commission on 21 December 1948 that India and United
Nations being secular in their policies, an appeal to religious fanaticism
in a plebiscite could not be regarded as legitimate political activity.
Lozano on behalf of the Commission agreed that any political activity which
might tend to disturb law and order could not be regarded as legitimate.
This assurance was made public in the Commission's second interim report.
In 1960, Pakistan changed its tune.
President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir began to refer to
methods other than plebiscite. On 26 September 1960, President Ayub Khan
said that any international agreement worth its name must be a compromise.
On 14 November 1960, he observed that only a sensible solution of Kashmir
would be acceptable to Pakistan. On 22 March 1961, he reiterated that Pakistan
would be prepared to consider an alternative to plebiscite. On the following
day, he said at Dacca: "Plebiscite is the only solution because Kashmir
belonged to the people of Kashmir. . . We have gone further to say if there
is any other reasonable solution so as to satisfy the legitimate aspirations
of the people of Kashmir, we should be prepared to listen." Similarly,
the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, stated on 26 March 1961 that
Pakistan was willing to consider fresh proposals for the solution of the
Kashmir problem. In spite of all these and many other similar statements,
Pakistan switched back to plebiscite when the joint talks between the two
countries began in December 1962, a posture which was abandoned during
the second round of talks, after which the delegations of two countries
devoted their time and energies to considering other forms of settlement.
Once again it was clear that Pakistan favoured plebiscite no more than
a hungry man worships his hunger.
Pakistan is fully aware that plebiscite
in any shape or form is no longer feasible or practicable. The elected
representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir framed and promulgated
a democratic constitution which might serve as a model for Pakistan. They
have had three general elections based on adult franchise and two five-year
plans under which the State has been keeping step with the other States
of the Indian Union in economic and social development. Besides, there
has been progressive extension of provisions of the Constitution of India
to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as required under Article 370 of that
Constitution. None of these developments is reversible. As Benegal Rau
pointed out in the Security Council, Pakistan believed in possession, not
plebiscite, President Ayub Khan left no one in any doubt about it. In December
1959, he said: "Kashmir is vital for Pakistan, not only politically but
militarily as well. Kashmir is a matter of life and death." Speaking at
the National Press Club, Washington, on 13 July 1961, he said: "You might
say, 'Why can't you give up Kashmir?' Well, we cannot give up that dispute
not because we are bloody-minded but ... for example, for the reason that
Kashmir is connected with our physical security. Thirty-two million acres
in Pakistan are irrigated from rivers that start in Kashmir." Again: "Kashmir
is important to us for our physical as well as economic security."
Commenting on these statements in
the Security Council on 10 February 1964, Mahomedali Currim Chagla, then
the Education Minister of India, said that this showed that Kashmir was
not vital for human reasons; it was vital to Pakistan for its own reasons,
namely, its own security and its own defence. During the joint talks, as
revealed in an official publication, Pakistan had claimed Kashmir on similar
grounds. The delegates of Pakistan considered that their country should
have control of the watersheds and catchment areas of the rivers in Jammu
and Kashmir, because Pakistan could not otherwise store water for irrigation
or produce hydroelectric power. If such an argument were to be accepted,
every lower riparian could claim the watershed of a common river in the
territories of upper riparian States. Another no less strange argument
advanced by Pakistan delegates was that Kashmir was essential for the Security
of Pakistan, for without control of the State, Pakistan could not protect
its rail and road communications which passed through important centres
of population and ran parallel to the States' western border with Pakistan.
This meant, by implication, that any country could claim the territory
of its neighbours in the name of safeguarding its border roads and railways.
More evidence was forthcoming that
the aim of Pakistan was no other than possession of Kashmir. When, in 1964,
Shaikh Abdullah during his talks with President Mohammed Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi
proposed an independent Kashmir, the latter turned it down on the ground
inter alia that such a proposal would make the State a cockpit of international
intrigue. So far as India is concerned, under its Constitution de-accession
of the State can hardly be contemplated; the people of Kashmir settled
the matter by throwing in their lot with India and by ratifying the accession.
Pakistan opposed the suggestion made by Abdullah apparently because it
ruled out the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan.
For any plebiscite, the territorial
unity of the State was of capital importance and this vital fact was emphasized
by the Commission in its resolutions. In violation of those resolutions
and the Council's resolution of 17 January 1948, Pakistan began to break
up this unity. It accepted the accession of component territories of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, such as Hunza and Nagar. It extended its administration
to the northern areas of the State which were made part of its own territory
by its Constitution. It gifted away over 2,000 square miles of Indian territory
to appease expansionist China and to give a semblance of reasonableness
to China's spurious claims on Indian territory. Unilaterally and despite
opposition from India, it placed all the areas of Kashmir under its unlawful
control within the jurisdiction of Lahore Flight Information Range, instead
of leaving it, as had originally been agreed, under Delhi Flight Information
Range. It is now clear that this was done to prepare the ground for Pakistan's
military operations, including bombing in Kashmir by its Air Force planes,
in 1965.
The leaders of Pakistan in and outside
the Council have made much of offers of plebiscite made by Nehru and reiterated
by Gopalaswami Ayyangar- and Benegal Rau. They argue that India wriggled
out of its commitment to hold a plebiscite because of its fear that Kashmir
would not vote for India. Hence, they say, one excuse by India after another;
hence progressive "integration"' of the State under Article 370 of the
Constitution of India; hence dismissal, arrest, and detention of Shaikh
Abdullah. Assuming all this to be true for the sake of argument and assuming
every other conceivable motive which Pakistan can attribute to India for
preventing a plebiscite, was this not all the more reason why Pakistan
should have strained every nerve to expedite the holding of a plebiscite,
instead of spending all its time in building a rampart of insurmountable
difficulties? If Pakistan was serious about a plebiscite, it would have
taken advantage of numerous opportunities which India had offered of bringing
one about. Instead Pakistan dragged its feet, and seemed to be content
with accusations of "intransigence" against India, when all that it needed
to do was to pull its troops out of the State. A plebiscite would have
become inevitable as the basic condition stipulated and agreed to by the
parties would have been fulfilled. Having failed in this, Pakistan embarked
on the propagandist and futile course of either resisting or condemning
democratic changes in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from peoples aspirations,
which were both inescapable and irresistible.
Once people have political aspirations,
change, which Pakistan resisted, is inescapable. Unable to prevent political
changes in its own territory, the Government of Pakistan resisted every
popular change in Kashmir. As Chagla asked in the Council, did Pakistan
expect that while it continued its aggression, India would sit with folded
hands and do nothing whatever in Kashmir to improve the lot of the people?
A plebiscite is only a machinery for ascertaining the wishes of a people.
There is nothing sacrosanct about it. There are other methods which are
equally efficient. The possibility of a plebiscite was envisaged because
at that time no elections had been held in Kashmir. The whole picture changed
after Kashmir had three general elections with universal adult franchise,
and at all the three elections a party was returned to power which had
finally and emphatically supported Kashmir's integration with India. Tribal
invasion from Pakistan, invasion by the Pakistan regular army, consolidation
of its military position in Pakistan-held Kashmir, military aid, agreement
with the U.S., participation in military pacts, collusion with China against
India, continuous threats of jehad or holy war-these could only consign
the proposal for a plebiscite to oblivion. All the weapons in Pakistan's
armoury, including subversion and sabotage, organized crossing of the cease-fire
line by trained civilians and the creation and maintenance of tension along
the cease-fire line, were used against India. Holding the key to a plebiscite,
Pakistan refused to use it, preferring to let it rust. The first step,
namely, the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, had to be taken by Pakistan
and India did nothing to prevent it. At every meeting of the Council, the
Indian representatives complained that Pakistan had not honoured its unconditional
commitment-withdrawal of Pakistan troops-without which the resolution of
13 August could not be geared into action. It was not until 1957 that India's
attitude changed, the moral duty which India had towards the people of
Kashmir having been discharged meanwhile.
When, at the instance of Pakistan,
the issue came up again in the Security Council in 1964, the context had
changed. Krishna Menon, in spite of serious and continuous violations by
Pakistan of Part I of the resolution of 13 August, had not made it clear
in the Council that India was no longer bound by the UNCIP resolutions,
except the cease-fire agreement of 27 July 1949. At one stage he said that
if Pakistan vacated the aggression, India would then consider what was
to be done with the resolution. The agreement between Pakistan and the
Republic of China on the boundary of Kashmir with Sinkiang completely changed
the position of the parties. By choosing to line up with China which had
invaded India and seized Indian territory in Kashmir and by claiming, as
its Foreign Minister Bhutto did, that the defence of Pakistan involved
the security of the largest State in Asia, Pakistan's professions of seeking
friendly relations with India and harbouring no aggressive designs against
its territory sounded insincere. Besides, there was no doubt that Pakistan
was not interested in the realities of the situation, but only in exploiting
every tension in India.
The objectives of Pakistan and China
vis-a-vis India were similar and their methods of achieving them identical.
Both assumed that India was breaking up socially, politically, economically,
and ideologically, and that it was only a matter of time before they could
satisfy their territorial lust to their heart's - content. Their press
and radio propaganda against India was planned, coordinated, and conducted
on identical lines. Both installed powerful transmitters for broadcast
to the border areas of India. Pakistan constantly probed the cease-fire
line and the number of incidents in its vicinity began to rise rapidly
from month to month. The theft of a holy relic from a mosque in Srinagar
which led to popular demonstrations against the local government was worked
up in Pakistan newspapers, broadcasts, and official statements, and presented
as a grave crisis which demanded immediate attention.
And although, with the recovery
of the relic, conditions returned rapidly to normal in Srinagar, Pakistan
propaganda showed no diminution in its virulence.
In these circumstances, Chagla took
the plunge and told the Council that the resolutions of the Commission
had lapsed and that on no account would India agree to hold a plebiscite.
This was necessary in the interest of peace and progress of the people
of India and Pakistan and above all in the interest of the people of Jammu
and Kashmir. "Pakistan talks glibly of a plebiscite Does it realize what
its consequences will be?" asked Chagla.
In the place of peace and quiet,
we may have bloodshed. If the theft of the sacred relic could be exploited
to produce riots 1,500 miles away [in East Pakistan], the stirring of communal
passions on a large and massive scale may lead to serious communal riots
all over India and Pakistan and to migrations. The only people who would
suffer are not the politicians in Pakistan who preach a holy war but millions
of innocent people who are not interested in politics and who want to be
left in peace to carry on their normal avocations. So, if we are thinking
only in terms of maintenance of peace, respect for human beings, then we
should think a thousand times before we would disturb a situation which
has existed since India became independent.
Thus plebiscite which India had
offered time and again to Pakistan and for which Pakistan had no appetite
was buried seventeen years after it was first suggested.
PAKISTAN-CHINA COLLUSION
For the first time the significance
and implications of the Sino-Pakistan collusion, which had completely changed
the Indo-Pakistan picture, were explained , in some detail, and the threat
which this development posed to the security of India in general and to
Kashmir in particular.
We have been witnessing with amusement
and also with a certain amount of disgust, the greatest tight-rope act
ever seen in international affairs. Pakistan has achieved this extra-ordinary
skill by keeping one foot in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and
the Central Treaty Organization and the other in the Chinese camp. She
is getting closer and closer into Chinese embrace, and the latest incident
of this touching affection between the two countries is what happened in
Djakarta, when Pakistan, China, and a few other countries "ganged up"-I
am sorry about using the expression, but it is the only way to describe
what has happened- "ganged up" to deny the Soviet Union a place in the
Asian world and refused Malaysia admittance to the next Asian-African conference
as an Asian country, although Malaysia has an undoubted right to it. Pakistan
tells the United States that it is an ally and wants arms in order to fight
communism. It tells China that if China attacks India, "Pakistan will stab
India in the back. Pakistan preaches democracy to us and asks us to hold
a plebiscite in Kashmir, but it does not permit even a vestige of democracy
in its own territory. It has suppressed the democratic movement in East
Pakistan. It has refused the principle of self-determination which it professes
to consider so sacred to Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan. I must emphasize
a fact that the representative of Pakistan has conveniently over looked
namely, that in the context of what has recently happened there, Kashmir
is vital to India not only for recovering the territory which China has
unlawfully occupied, but also for resisting future aggression by China.
The defence of Ladakh, which is in the north-east of Kashmir, against the
continuing menace of China is impossible except through Kashmir.
Chagla's statements in the Council
are a major landmark in the history of the issue. On a reduced and therefore
easily comprehensible scale, he presented the Indian case with a refreshing
and unequivocal clarity and precision. For the first time the basic conditions,
without which no talks with Pakistan would be possible or fruitful, were
indicated.
I want Pakistan to accept certain
basic positions which India takes up and it will always take up. One is
that Kashmir is an integral part of India; that is a basic position. The
second is that no country can be a party to giving up part of itself, that
no country can agree to the self-determination of a part of the country.
It would break up India, and if this dangerous principle were to be applied
to other parts of the world, it would break up Africa, it would break up
many parts of Asia, and it would break up many parts of the Middle East.
Both the conditions were to become
major planks of India's policy. Chagla's forthright exposition had its
effect. A striking feature of the debates in 1964 is the casualness with
which members mentioned plebiscite, if they referred to it at all. Even
the representative of Pakistan, Bhutto, appeared to have lost much of his
zest for it. His emphasis was mostly on the right of self-determination,
whatever that might mean. Plebiscite was already dead, but Bhutto repudiated
it by putting an impossible interpretation on the UNCIP resolutions, namely,
that Pakistan's obligation to withdraw its armed forces from Kashmir was
conditional. He knew that no one would accept such a blatant perversion
of the resolutions, but it did indicate that Pakistan was determined to
continue with its aggression and that therefore plebiscite was no longer
a practical proposition. He also went back on statements made by his predecessors,
namely, that Pakistan was committed to the withdrawal of its troops.
Bhutto's emphasis on the right of
self-determination was misplaced. He had no answer to the questions which
Chagla put to him.
Did Pakistan permit the people of
the princely States in Pakistan to exercise the right of self-determination
after the ruler acceded to Pakistan? As disclosed in the West Pakistan
High Court a few years earlier, the accession of Bahawalpur had been forced
on the ruler of that State. The Khan of Kalat revolted against accession
and was arrested and detained in 1958. In neither case was the principle
of self-determination applied. When Pakistan purchased the territory of
Gwadur from the Sultan of Muscat, what happened to its solicitous regard
for the people's right to self-determination ? No opportunity was given
to the people of Gwadur- to say whether they wished to be bought like chattel.
Was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan
prepared to concede the right of self-determination to the Pakhtoons, the
Baluchis, or to East Pakistan whose people, as a matter of common knowledge,
racially, ethnically, and linguistically, are different from the people
of the rest of Pakistan?
Chagla said that it was futile for
the representative of Pakistan to talk of the principles of the Charter
and of a scrupulous discharge of international commitments, when his country
had flagrantly violated the Charter and had perpetrated aggression upon
another country in which she persisted. It was equally obvious that Pakistan
had failed to discharge its international commitments by not complying
with the directives given by the Council to Pakistan to withdraw its troops
from two-fifths of Kashmir. Pakistan had failed to realize that the significance
of its treaty with China, by which it had given over two thousand square
miles of Kashmir, was not its territorial aspect nor the arithmetical calculation
by which Pakistan claimed to have made a net gain, but the fact that Pakistan
had no common border with China and had negotiated with regard to a territory
to which internationally it had no claim. Pakistan stood self-condemned
of aggression, because in no view of the case was the territory part of
Pakistan. It was not correct to say that the treaty was provisional. As
far as Pakistan was concerned, it was bound because the treaty provided
that if Kashmir came to Pakistan, Pakistan would be committed to the agreement
it had made with China.
Chagla drew pointed attention to
the policies of the theocratic State of Pakistan. He said:
When I said that the representative
of Pakistan has learnt nothing, I meant that he still believes that we
are living in the mediaeval age and not in modern times. One of the most
serious problems that is facing us and which the Security Council will
be discussing very soon is racial apartheid. But there is an equally serious
problem, equally vicious and evil, and that is religious apartheid. In
principle there is no difference between the two. Both discriminate between
man and man and do not respect human dignity. Pakistan was founded on the
principle of religious apartheid, and that principle is still observed
today, the most eloquent testimony to which is the fact that no less than
300,000 members of the minority communities from East Pakistan have sought
refuge in India since the beginning of this year. They have fled from persecution
and insecurity of the worst type, involving their lives and property and
even the honour of their women.
CONSENSUS
All this tended to make the position
somewhat fluid. The familiar pattern in the Council of a restricted discussion
on the UNCIP resolutions and the ways and means of implementing them began
to crack up under the realization that the passage of time and change of
circumstances could no longer be ignored. Members talked about the responsibility
of the Council, but had to admit at the same time that no solution could
be imposed on the parties, which would have to seek it by negotiation.
Even Adlai Stevenson of the U.S.A. felt that what was needed was a fresh
attempt "in the light of today's realities." The problem of minorities,
the secular and democratic character of Indian society, the danger of inciting
religious passions, and the importance of a calm and friendly atmosphere
for the resolution of Indo-Pakistan differences, inclined the members of
the Council to view the relations between India and Pakistan as a whole,
and to emphasize their interdependence and common ties of history and culture-facts
which were not to the liking of leaders in Pakistan. Kashmir was no longer
the dominant theme, but Indo-Pakistan problems and relations. Some members
still talked about the resolutions and the need for third party assistance,
if the parties agreed to it or asked for it, but the past bullying tactics
and truculence of the Council were not so much in evidence. Chagla opposed
all suggestions for a resolution or mediations.
The Kashmir question will not be
solved by interminable discussions and debates in the Council. It will
be solved only when Pakistan realizes that Kashmir is not a political shuttlecock
in the game of anti-Indian politics which she has for the time being adopted.
The Kashmir question will be solved when Pakistan realizes that India wishes
her well and has no designs on her independence and that, in the prosperity
of the two countries, lies the prosperity of the whole subcontinent. In
this prosperity, the people of Kashmir must have a share as an integral
part of India. India has always stood, and stands, for a just solution,
a peaceful solution, an early solution to the Kashmir question. It is Pakistan
which has blocked the way to such a solution. There cannot be a just solution
in international affairs if aggression is either condoned or rewarded.
There can be no just solution of the Kashmir question if Pakistan does
not vacate her aggression and while the Pakistan army still keeps two-fifths
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in her unlawful possession."
The Soviet representative reaffirmed
the position of its government on Kashmir, as he had done in 1957 and 1962.
The Soviet Union's position of principle
on the substance of the Kashmir problem has already been stated more than
once by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev. As is well known,
our position is that the question of the ownership of Kashmir has already
been solved by the people of Kashmir themselves. He questioned Bhutto's
statement that there existed no truce agreement between India and Pakistan
and that "even a cease-fire between them could in present conditions be
considered obsolete."
The Security Council gave up the
idea of considering a draft resolution and devoted more time to a consensus.
Even this eluded its members. As the representative of France who was President
for the month told the Council, despite every effort the members had been
unable to reach complete agreement, and it was not possible to reach unanimity
on one of the important points under discussion. The Foreign Minister of
Pakistan gave vent to his disenchantment.
We asked for prompt and tangible
assistance from the Security Council in the effort toward an early settlement,
and it was our expectation that the Security Council would be a positive
and material factor in the situation. We had hoped that the Council would
finally lay down the framework within which contacts between India and
Pakistan should be carried on for a solution of the problem of Jammu and
Kashmir. We would also have liked a definite role to be assigned to the
Secretary-General to enable him to facilitate the progress and to ensure
a fruitful result of these contacts.
For the first time the Security
Council did not oblige Pakistan. Also for the first time the Council adjourned
not only without adopting any resolution but also without a consensus.
The Council had exhausted its utility. Its partiality, its condonation
of aggression, and its contradictory resolution had ground its own activities,
so as the Kashmir issue was concerned, to a halt. For eighteen years it
had grappled with wrong issues and advocated wrong remedies. The original
complaint of India against aggression by Pakistan had led to nothing. On
the other hand, the party that had denied any hand in the invasion of Indian
territory ended up by entrenching itself firmly in the territory it had
seized by aggression. The position was worse than what it was on 1st January
1948.
Chagla could not help drawing attention
to the mess which the Council had made of India's original complaint, permit
me to say in all frankness that our government and people have a grievance
to the effect that during the years the Kashmir question has been before
the Security Council, most members of the Council have turned a blind eye
to the patent fact of Pakistan's aggression. It is that attitude, together
with the indulgence that Pakistan's allies have shown it in the Council,
that has been the greatest obstacle to the solution of this question which
has bedevilled relations between ourselves and our neighbour ... members
have made this suggestion or that, but the vital question brought before
the Security Council has remained unanswered. Our people expect an answer
from the Council. So long as it is not answered, the Council will be unable
to grapple with the basic elements of the Kashmir situation. My delegation
hopes that even at this late hour the members of the Council will give
careful thought to the matter and give an answer to these questions which
I now pose;
(i) How is it that Pakistan occupies
two- fifths of Kashmir and by what right?
(2) Has it any legal right to be
in the possession and control of any part of Kashmir territory's?
(3) Has it any right to negotiate
and give away any part of Kashmir to China, which it has admittedly done...
?
(4) What steps should the Council
take to make Pakistan vacate its aggression ?
None of the questions was answered
by the Council. To have answered them would have meant self-condemnation.
Such was the culmination of Noel
Baker's advice to the Council in 1948, advice which led it away from facts,
away from the Charter, away from the rule of law, away from justice. Whether
the Council succeeded in satisfying the tribesmen from Pakistan, which
Noel Baker and Warren Austin so passionately desired, is known best to
the Council or to the tribesmen. However, it is on the record that the
Council never uttered one word of condemnation of the tribal invasion of
India from Pakistan. This was the Council's way of ending war, not extending
it. As a matter of fact, the only success it ever achieved was in its extension.
