Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: July 26, 2002
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=17090411
No US secretary of state has visited
the subcontinent with his credibility so badly bruised as Colin Powell
will be doing this time around. In his Asia Society speech, he talked of
General Musharraf's assurances that he would permanently and visibly stop
cross-border terrorism and dismantle its infrastructure. A few days later
the general tells Newsweek that he had informed president Bush that nothing
was happening on the Line of Control and that was all.
The declared objective of operation
'Enduring Freedom' was to eliminate the al-Qaeda leadership and the Taliban.
Ten months later, the leaderships of both are safe and sound and regrouping
in Pakistan even as the general proclaims himself an ally of US in the
war against terrorism. The US vice-president and the FBI director assert
that further terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the US are certain. How do
they reconcile this with the fact that the leadership of al-Qaeda is operating
within Pakistan in the full knowledge of Islamabad? The US media has commented
extensively on the poor performance of the general, his isolation within
the country, his compromises with the jehadis to keep himself in power
and the linkages between the al-Qaeda and Taliban and middle-level officers
in the Pakistani army and the Inter Services Intelligence wing.
The US appears to have painted itself
into a corner as it did with Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the '80s, the Shah
of Iran in the '60s and '70s, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in the '50s
and Chiang Kai Sheik of China in the forties. Washington kept quiet when
Saddam Hussein's aircraft bombed a US ship causing scores of casualties
and when he used a weapon of mass destruction (poison gas) against Iran
because at that time, its uni-dimensional goal was that of humiliating
Iran. The present US behaviour in respect of Pakistan is of a piece with
those precedents.
None of others could do what General
Musharraf has done to provide a safe haven to sworn enemies of the US and
yet extract from Washington economic benefits for this.
The general also succeeded in compelling
the US administration to look the other way when he indulged in nuclear
sabre-rattling just as it did when Saddam Hussein used the poison gas.
Even British foreign secretary Jack Straw protested that Pakistan's nuclear
strategy was unacceptable. Someday Mr Powell might explain the circumstances
in which the world's leading champion against proliferation and which spends
billions of dollars on counter-proliferation chose to remain silent during
this brazen display of nuclear roguish behaviour. Then came the travel
advisory through which the sole super-power displayed its helplessness
to discipline a state like Pakistan. After this, it should not be surprising
if Japan and Iran which are situated close to nuclear rogue states like
North Korea and Pakistan conclude that they have to acquire nuclear weapons
for themselves.
The more time the leaders of al-Qaeda
and Taliban get to consolidate within the safety of Pakistan, the higher
the chances of their being able to merge with the local populace. In addition,
those in the Pakistani ISI and army who are sympathetic to them will become
increasingly confident that they will be able to manage the situation without
Washington being able to close in on the terrorist leadership. Chiang Kai
Sheik, Ngo Dinh Diem, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein all blackmailed
the US in the same way the general is doing now. Each argued that since
Washington had no choice but to depend upon them, their sins of commission
and omission should be overlooked in the interest of the greater goal.
America's strategy of the ends justifying the means did not work in any
of the previous cases.
The mistake is not in attempting
to use General Musharraf as much as possible in the war against terrorism
but in allowing him to gain the upper hand in the bargain and blackmail
the US. General Musharraf finds it advantageous to permit al-Qaeda and
the jehadis to function in his country since without that threat looming
large, Washington will have no use for him. It is in the general's interest
to see that there are no rivals who could offer help to the US and that
he becomes as indispensable as he can.
Saddam Hussein overplayed his hand
when he thought he could get away with grabbing Kuwait. In General Musharraf's
case, he cannot be certain of what al-Qaeda and the Taliban will do next
and whether or not that action could compel the US to change its mind about
his value as an ally.
India has to seek clear answers
from Mr Powell on Washington's assessment of the ongoing battle against
terrorism with Pakistan as its epicentre. It must also raise the issue
that al-Qaeda and Taliban are safely ensconced in that country with General
Musharraf running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. India has
no alternative but to safeguard its security against terrorism emanating
from Pakistan. It is in Washington's interest if it were to establish its
credibility by explaining to the Indian leadership how it proposes not
to become a victim of General Musharraf's wiles as it did of Saddam Hussein
and other 'allies' in the past.
