Author: Claude Arpi
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: December 10, 2002
URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/10spec1.htm
The suspense ended on the last day
of China's 16th Communist Party Congress in Beijing when the nine chosen
ones emerged in the Great Hall of the People. Hu Jintao, freshly appointed
general secretary of the party, was leading his eight comrades. China had
a new leadership. Hu's presence was not much of a surprise as the world
knew he had been groomed for years by his mentor and China's last emperor
Jiang Zemin. However, there was speculation about who Hu, the 'grey man
of the party,' really was.
Most international media repeated
that very little was known about China's new boss. However, one part of
his life is quite well documented: the period before he ascended to the
standing committee of the CCP's Politburo in 1992.
At that time, the 'core leader of
the Forth Generation' was for four years party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous
Region in Lhasa. It is interesting to have a closer look at the way Hu
used his post in Tibet as a stepping stone to reach the top rung of the
Middle Kingdom.
Hu always knew that to 'seek fame'
does not help to climb the party's ladder. That is probably why he never
liked to be in the limelight or give interviews to the foreign press. One
can closely follow his steps by his declaration either on Lhasa television
or through the official organs of the party.
Of his earlier years, we know little
except that one of his best friends was Zhang Hong, who later became Deng
Xiaoping's son-in-law. As a mechanical engineer, Hu was posted at different
sites throughout China, but in 1980, he was noticed by Song Ping, the party
boss in Gansu province and was rapidly promoted. He finally joined the
Young Cadre Course at the party school in Beijing in 1981. It was there
that he is supposed to have met Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP,
who became his first mentor.
The elder Hu was certainly one of
the most remarkable leaders of modern China and a great reformer. Remember
it is his funeral, after his sudden death during a meeting of the Politburo,
which triggered the Tiananmen student revolution.
One of the most remarkable facts
about the Elder Hu was that when he visited Tibet in 1980, he was so moved
by the suffering of the Tibetan people under Communist rule, that he decided
to address 5,000 officials assembled in Lhasa. He publicly admitted that
the party 'has let the Tibetan people down' and he added: 'the life of
the Tibetan people has not been notably improved' after the Chinese invasion
in 1950.
When the Elder Hu tried to introduce
reforms in China in the early eighties, he was violently opposed and criticized
by conservative forces within the party. During this period, it seems Hu
Jintao, who was first secretary of the Communist Youth League, defended
him.
However, by the mid-eighties, the
direction of the wind had begun to change in Beijing. This is when the
Younger Hu showed he was already a Grand Master.
With the balance of power slowly
shifting, the Elder Hu began losing to the most conservative elements led
by Li Peng and Qiao Shi, and the Younger Hu realigned himself dexterously.
The changes in the party were reflected
on the Tibetan question. After the Elder Hu's visit to Tibet in 1980, Beijing
had for a few years an open Tibet policy. The Dalai Lama was allowed to
send four fact finding delegations and two negotiating teams to Tibet and
China. Discussions were held on the Dalai Lama's future role in Tibet.
But in 1985, due to the changes in Beijing, the opening came to a sudden
halt and a visit to Tibet and China by the Tibetan leader was cancelled.
Sensing the wind, Hu Jintao began
leaning towards his new mentor Qiao Shi who was in charge of internal security
in the Chinese cabinet.
In Tibet, events took a turn for
the worse in September 1987 when some monks demonstrated in Lhasa against
Chinese rule. During these days, hundreds of visitors and media persons
were present in the Tibetan capital and the images of the repression which
followed were reported the world over. In the following months, incidents
continued to occur and several Tibetans lost their lives.
Beginning 1988, the Chinese leadership
became more and more nervous as they felt they were losing face in the
world's eyes. The monks, the very same people they were supposed to have
'liberated' from the clutches of the clergy, were now revolting against
the 'motherland.' But worse for Beijing: if the situation was allowed to
drift, China could follow the Soviet Union on the way to disintegration.
Something had to be done.
The first scapegoat was Wu Jinghua,
the Elder Hu's protégé who lost his job as party secretary
in Lhasa. Officially he had a heart attack during a meeting in June 1988
'due to a frigidly cold climate and the lack of oxygen, plus being overloaded
with work for a long time.' His mistake was that he had scrupulously implemented
the Elder Hu's policies towards Tibet.
In Beijing, Hu Yaobang was replaced
by Zhao Ziyang who would be purged after the Tiananmen Square events.
The strong men in the Politburo
were Li Peng and the Younger Hu's new mentor Qiao Shi who visited Tibet
in July 1988. It is probably at that time that it was decided to appoint
Hu Jiantao to replace Wu Jinghua as Tibet chief. It was to be the crucial
turn in Hu's career. He probably knew he had to show results in very short
time to repay the confidence placed in him by Qiao Shi. Hu knew he could
not afford to fail. Had not Qiao Shi threatened of 'merciless repression'
if the demonstrations were not immediately stopped?
The Younger Hu took over the rebellious
region on January 12, 1989.
A Hong Kong paper Kuang Chiao Ching
wrote at that time: 'If he can stabilize the situation in
Tibet that would, of course, be
the first step towards a rapid rise in Hu Jintao's political fortunes.
If he rules Tibet successfully, perhaps the question on everyone's mind
in the near future could be: Will Hu Jintao become a superstar on China's
political stage?'
On January 19, Hu had a meeting
with the People's Liberation Army. During his speech, he spoke about the
'the CCP Central Committee's new instructions on work in Tibet.' Referring
to the PLA's role: indeed it was a bad omen for Tibetans, especially after
Hu told the army: 'We must strengthen control of monasteries and temples.'
A week later a Beijing newspaper
Zhongguo Xinwen She published an interview with Hu in which he described
his two main tasks in Tibet: 'To safeguard the unification of the motherland,
adopt a clear-cut stand to oppose separatism, and stabilize the situation
in Tibet,' and then: 'to continue to carry out economic construction, make
redoubled efforts to develop the commodity economy.' This would later be
known as Hu's strategy of 'grasping with both hands.'
From that day, events moved very
fast.
On January 23, Hu visited the Tashilhunpo
monastery in Shigatse. He was accompanied by the Panchen Lama, the second
highest ranking Tibetan Lama after the Dalai Lama. The official occasion
was the consecration of a stupa containing the mortal remains of one of
the previous Panchen Lamas. To everyone's surprise, during the function,
the Panchen Lama denounced the Communist Party's role in Tibet: 'although
there had been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development
had cost more dearly than its achievements. This mistake must never be
repeated.'
Four days later, he passed away
in mysterious circumstances. Though Tibetans believed he was murdered,
it has never been proven. It is said the Panchen Lama had a serious quarrel
with Qiao Shi just before he left for Tibet. Whether this was true or not,
the stage was cleared for 'merciless repression.'
When a demonstration erupted on
March 5, the People's Armed Police quickly took control of the situation.
Chinese journalist Tang Daxian, who had connections in the party and witnessed
some of the events, later wrote in London's The Observer that many events
were stage managed by the PAP. Beijing had ordered repression. His information
was that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans were massacred around the Central
Cathedral in Lhasa.
The next day, Hu declared that 'the
PAP following the instructions of the Central Committee (read Qiao Shi)
had maintained the unity of the Motherland. the majority of Tibetans who
had joined the disturbance. must be made to feel guilty and promise they
would never do so again.'
Martial law was clamped on March
8. The tragic events in Lhasa seem to have been a rehearsal for an even
more important episode: the student rebellion on Tiananmen Square three
months later.
Hu Jintao told Xinhua news agency
a few days after the events: 'We should maintain vigilance against possible
activity by the handful of separatists and strike them with relentless
blows. We should mete out more severe punishment to those who would start
troublemaking after the declaration of martial law.' His ruthless implementation
of his bosses' orders and the subsequent replay of Lhasa events at Tiananmen
Square proved he was a leader who could be relied upon. When, after the
massacre at the Square, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang, he remembered
this.
Hu was to stay on for four more
years in Tibet, though the job was done in three months. Hu never liked
Tibet. He once told a journalist he 'disliked Tibet's altitude, climate
and lack of culture.' During the following months and years, he began shuttling
between Lhasa and Beijing where the real power was. There was a common
joke about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: 'Where is Hu?' The answer was: 'Hu
is in Beijing Hospital.' He had to officially report sick each time he
was going to Beijing!
In the following months, Hu further
stabilized the situation by targeting Tibetan cadres 'harbouring separatist
thoughts.' He believed the main 'evil' was religion, and particularly the
monasteries which were 'using feudal and superstitious beliefs to swindle
and harm people,' thereby delaying the 'socialist spiritual civilization'
heralded by Jiang Zemin.
On April 30, 1990, martial law was
finally lifted. Hu used his remaining years as party secretary to completely
reverse the Elder Hu's policies. Instead of providing support to the Tibetans
to safeguard their culture, the Younger Hu tried to assimilate it into
Han culture. While the Elder Hu wanted the Tibetans to be autonomous and
take their future into their own hands, he created schemes to bring in
more Han officials and colonizers to the Roof of the World, further destroying
Tibetan uniqueness.
During a visit to Tibet in 1990,
Jiang Zemin echoed Hu's views: 'It is necessary to strengthen education
in patriotism and socialism in the light of conditions in China and Tibet,
so as to make the students know from childhood that Tibet is an inalienable
sacred part of the big family of the motherland, and that there will be
no socialist new Tibet if there is no CCP.'
It appears that during Jiang Zemin's
visit to Tibet, a close relationship was established between the general
secretary and his future protégé.
There is no doubt that the events
of the three first months in Tibet earned Hu the admiration of many in
Beijing. While the Chinese empire was on the verge of disintegrating and
could have followed the example of the Soviet Union, his firm handling
of the situation and obedience to party orders were rewarded in 1992 by
a seat on the standing committee. It was the next step towards the summit.
It is probably true that in 1989
Hu saved China which could have plunged into the 'chaos' so feared by the
Chinese emperors. Had Tibet been lost, no doubt other provinces such as
Xinjiang would have followed in quick succession.
Now that the Younger Hu has reached
the top, will he continue to 'grasp China with two hands' and tighten security
to economically develop China? In many ways, China faces more serious problems
now than 1989: unemployment, wild capitalism, corruption, regional aspirations,
pollution, food problems are some of the issues the Younger Hu will have
to tackle. For this, will he use force as his party elders had instructed
him to do in Tibet, or will he choose the path of the Elder Hu, open up
the system and ultimately give more power to the people, with all the risks
it implies?
Only the future will tell, but he
will certainly need more than two hands to grasp the future of the People's
Republic.
