Author: Daniel Pipes
Publication: New York Post
Date: March 25, 2003
URL: http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/71719.htm
"How did the enemy get into our
camp?"
That's what Bart Womack, a command
sergeant major of the elite 101st Airborne Division, asked himself as a
grenade rolled past him after 1 a.m. on Sunday at an American camp in Kuwait.
The attacker worked methodically,
destroying an electricity generator, throwing grenades into Womack's tent
and the two other command tents, then shooting tents. One soldier died
and 15 sustained injuries.
The enemy in this case appears to
be not what one might expect - an Iraqi soldier or a Kuwaiti Islamist.
The only suspect in custody is Hasan Karim Akbar, 31, a sergeant in the
101st Airborne Division.
If Akbar were responsible for the
rampage, what might be his motivation? First reports suggest that, as a
devout African-American convert to Islam, he identifies with the Iraqi
enemy against his fellow soldiers.
The Los Angeles Times quotes him
stating, after he was apprehended, "You guys are coming into our countries,
and you're going to rape our women and kill our children."
NBC found that he "was opposed to
the killing of Muslims and opposed to the war in Iraq." Reuters quotes
one source saying, "He's a Muslim, and it seems he was just against the
war," while another told the news agency that the violence was "politically
motivated."
There is evidence to suggest that
Akbar expected to get in trouble even before he arrived in Kuwait. His
former stepfather quotes him saying that Akbar "did not want to fight in
this war, he didn't want to go over there." A neighbor explains why: "America
shouldn't be going," Akbar told him; he judged it not "right" to attack
Iraq. And his mother quotes him: "Mama, when I get over there I have the
feeling they are going to arrest me just because of the name that I have
carried."
This incident raises two issues.
First, the U.S. government's initial
response indicates that, once again, it is ascribing violence by an American
Muslim to purely personal causes. Here's its take on prior homicides:
* "A prescription drug for or consistent
with depression" to explain why El Sayyid A. Nosair in 1990 shot Rabbi
Meir Kahane.
* "Road rage" to explain why Rashid
Baz in 1994 shot a Hassidic boy on the Brooklyn Bridge.
* "Many, many enemies in his mind"
to explain why Ali Hasan Abu Kamal in 1997 shot a tourist on the Empire
State Building's observation deck.
* "A work dispute" as why Hesham
Mohamed Ali Hadayet in 2002 shot two people at the El Al counter of Los
Angeles International Airport.
Akbar in 2003? U.S. Army spokespersons
talk variously about an "attitude problem," a desire for "retribution"
and "resentment."
The chief chaplain at Akbar's Fort
Campbell, Ky., home base announces (completely without evidence) that the
incident is "not an expression of faith."
No one yet knows Akbar's motives,
but ignoring that it fits into a sustained pattern of political violence
by American Muslims amounts to willful self-deception. When will officialdom
acknowledge what is staring it in the face?
Its avoidance of reality has real
consequences, increasing the dangers Americans face. "This country's officials
are in a state of denial and confusion that is almost as frightening as
the terrorism they are supposed to be fighting," observes Dennis Prager,
only slightly exaggerating.
Second, the Akbar incident points
to the suspect allegiance of some Muslims in government. The case of Gamal
Abdel- Hafiz recently surfaced: an FBI agent whose colleagues say he twice
refused to record conversations with suspected financiers of militant Islamic
terrorism ("A Muslim does not record another Muslim"). Other cases are
under investigation.
All of which reinforces what I wrote
in January: "There is no escaping the unfortunate fact that Muslim government
employees in law enforcement, the military and the diplomatic corps need
to be watched for connections to terrorism, as do Muslim chaplains in prisons
and the armed forces. Muslim visitors and immigrants must undergo additional
background checks. Mosques require a scrutiny beyond that applied to churches
and temples."
As Sgt. Womack noted, the enemy
has already managed to "get into our camp." Do we have the will to stop
him before he strikes again?
