Author: Ayaz Amir
Publication: Dawn
Date: March 26, 2004
It was supposed to be Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
no less, Osama bin Laden's deputy, finally trapped by the trusted Pakistan
army in the wilds of South Waziristan. President Musharraf himself triggered
this feverish line of speculation when he told CNN's Aaron Brown (one of
the best anchors in the business) that the fierce resistance being put
up by suspected Al Qaeda fighters suggested they were protecting a "high-value
target".
The hype, alas, did not last. It
gave way to embarrassment when the 'militants', far from surrendering,
inflicted heavy casualties on first the Frontier Constabulary and then
the regular army.
To add insult to injury, instead
of yielding any "high-value target" the so-called militants captured over
a dozen militiamen or soldiers whose whereabouts are still unknown.
Don't blame the army for being coy
on the subject of casualties. Press reports put the number of militia and
army dead at 60, the injured at 45, and "missing" at 24. The 'militant'
dead: 11. 'Collateral damage': over two dozen civilians, including women
and children, caught in the crossfire.
This is a first-rate fiasco whichever
way you look at it. If this were Iraq and if even half as many Americans
had died, the White House would be shaken and George Bush would be scurrying
for cover.
This being Pakistan where life is
relatively cheap, you just look the other way. And you talk tough. The
Rommel in overall command of this operation, the Peshawar Corps Commander,
Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, vowed to flush out and eliminate the 'militants'
as the Wana action got underway.
He continues to sound tough even
with this botched operation behind him. Incidentally, Lt Gen Safdar's name
was first on the list of military personnel who received awards on March
23, Republic Day.
The army says it discovered a long
tunnel beneath one of the mud fortresses where the 'militants' were holed
up, the suggestion being that that's how they got away. The wheel thus
comes full circle, high- value target turning to high-value fiction.
Aaron Brown had pressed the military
spokesman, Major General Shaukat Sultan, on this point. Was there any way
the 'militants' could get away? No they couldn't, the army had it all worked
out. Well, well, he couldn't have known about the tunnel, could he?
If the Peshawar Corps HQs had read
its tribal history it would have preferred prudence to misplaced bragging.
The British learnt to their cost not to mess around with the frontier tribes.
In return for nominal allegiance, they allowed them full internal autonomy.
This system served the British well for a hundred years. It has served
us well since 1947.
There have been no Pakistanis more
loyal to Pakistan than the tribal people. Remember they helped get us the
bit of Kashmir we have. They went in first, the army followed later.
Now under American pressure these
time-tested arrangements are coming under strain. The Americans couldn't
care less what happens to us or to the fabric of our society. They want
quick trophies to nail to the wall, so that they can declare some sort
of victory in their war against anything that smells or looks like Al Qaeda.
The Americans couldn't have cared
less about Afghanistan in the 1980s. All they wanted was to give the Russians
a bloody nose and avenge the memory of Vietnam. That accomplished they
just walked away, leaving the Afghans to their misery.
In pursuit of the Viet Cong the
Americans entered Kampuchea (then Cambodia) in 1968, setting off a chain
reaction leading to the destruction of that once peaceful and easygoing
country. Kampuchea has yet to recover from those wounds.
What do the Americans care what
happens to Pakistan as long as their purpose is served in the tribal areas?
They are paying us for services rendered: about $600 million a year, half
in so-called economic aid, half in military aid, most of the military aid
being used to beef up the Pakistan army for duty along the Pak-Afghan border.
Smart, isn't it, the Americans giving
us just enough to better serve their interests? Like giving a sentry a
better rifle to perform better sentry duty. And we call this aid.
But since they are paying us something,
they think they are within their rights to order us about. Reinforcing
this monumental self-belief is the spectacle of the Pakistani leadership
taking obvious pleasure in being ordered about.
Should we fight the Americans? Who's
saying that? Should we confront them? Don't be silly. But how does it follow
from this that Pakistan should be getting up every morning and proving
to the rest of the world that it stands in the front rank of all banana
republics?
We did this in the 1950s when we
became part of America's global system of alliances against communism.
We did this in the sixties when we played the crucial role in America's
opening to China.
We did this in the eighties when
casting prudence aside we became the CIA's cat's paw in Afghanistan. We
did this after September 11 when we became the launching pad for America's
war on Afghanistan. Masochism aside, why do we do this?
Now Colin Powell tells us Pakistan
should soon be getting 'non-Nato ally' status. For this kindness many thanks.
Don't we know the list of America's non-Nato allies? Israel, Jordan, Egypt,
the Philippines, etc, etc? Do we want to be part of this distinguished
company?
It can be argued that after September
11 the Americans, out for revenge and blood, left us with little choice.
In his testimony before the presidential commission on terrorism, Colin
Powell has said as much. The Pakistanis, he said, were given a clear choice
and 48 hours to make up their minds. Pervez Musharraf made his "historic
and strategic" decision, Powell's words, on September 14.
Fine. All this is history, water
under the bridge. We've done the Americans enough service in Afghanistan.
There's no pistol pointing at our head now. We can afford to draw breath,
weigh our options, do the sensible thing.
We don't have to be stampeded into
stupid actions enraging the Pakistani people and imperilling our future.
At least for now, we can afford to speak to the Americans on equal terms.
It's the Bush White House in election
trouble, not the Musharraf presidency (not least because presidencies here
have other ways of going around elections). If anything, between now and
the US presidential election, Pakistan's importance to the Bush White House
is greater than the other way round.
And who are these 'militants' of
Wana, in any case? The foreigners amongst them, Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs,
are the leftovers of the Afghan jihad. They and the CIA fought on the same
side then, against the Soviets. They became an embarrassment only later.
But with nowhere to go many of them
settled in the tribal areas, marrying locally and intermingling with the
tribes. Does that make them Al Qaeda fighters, loyalists to Osama bin Laden,
protectors of "high- value targets"?
Perhaps, yes. But if that's the
case, what's the Pakistan army been doing these past two years since September
11? Shouldn't it have gone after these elements much before and without
American prodding?
But let's not be fooled. The Wana
operation reeks of other things: American pressure, American indifference
to our plight and supreme Pakistani incompetence.
And consider what we are reaping
in the aftermath: bomb attacks and ambushes beyond Wana. Even rockets fired
at Peshawar itself. Which doesn't mean the tribal areas are rising in revolt.
But it does mean new dangers. Don't we have enough of them already?
Tailpiece: Haji Abdul Haque of Adil
Manzil, Tauheed Commercial Area, DHA, Karachi, asks: "Whenever our soldiers
die in action we call them 'shaheed'. In the ongoing Wana operation being
carried out at the behest of the United States, Pathan Frontier Constabulary
soldiers are pitted in ferocious battles against fellow Pathans.
Whatever the case, all combatants
are Muslims. Has our high command decided which of the killed combatants
will be called 'shaheed'? The Muslim frontier constabulary pathan soldiers
fighting for the US or the Muslim pathans fighting against the US? Will
our great COAS Gen Musharraf kindly explain?"
