Author: KPS gill
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 27, 2004
When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
visited Jammu & Kashmir on November 17, he announced a Rs 24,000 crore
"package" for various developmental projects in the State. Since he was
visiting another "trouble torn" region-the Northeast, specifically Guwahati
(Assam) and Imphal (Manipur)-almost immediately thereafter (on November
20th-22nd), great expectations of comparable largesse had been generated
there as well. The expectation was at least partially fulfilled-though
there was disappointment at the relatively trifling "package" of Rs 326
crore sanctioned for Assam. Manipur fared much better, with an allocation
of Rs 2,777.68 crore-a comparatively colossal sum, particularly in view
of the much smaller size of the State. There are, moreover, several indications
that further announcements of Central munificence towards the Northeast
will follow in the months to come.
Implicit in these allocations is
the current Government's "response strategy" to terrorism-its articulation
of its "political" solution to the strife in these various regions. This
was underlined further by the Prime Minister's exhortations to the "youth"
at these various venues to "shun violence" and not to resort to the "use
of the gun", as well as his "open invitation" for talks to any group to
resolve "outstanding problems".
All this, significantly, is articulated
with an air of originality and freshness, as if to suggest that these are
new and unique "initiatives" abruptly conceived of in a radical breach
with the past. They are, in fact, some of the most tired and unproductive
cliches in the book. The truth is, Central financial allocations to the
various areas of strife in the Northeast-and to J&K-have always been
extraordinarily liberal, and, on a per capita basis, well above the average
for the rest of the country. Since Mr Deve Gowda's announcement of a "package"
of Rs 6,100 crore for the Northeast, furthermore, it has become the fashion
for successive Prime Minister's to make grand announcements of astronomical
sums on their tours to these disturbed regions as a declaration of their
intent to secure a 'political solution' to the ongoing insurgencies and
terrorist movements there.
Significantly, all these areas of
strife are among the Special Category States, and all "Central assistance"
is received by them in the form of 90 per cent grants, and just 10 per
cent as loans, as against the norm of 30 per cent grant and 70 per cent
loan for other States. Central allocations under these and other very liberal
provisions, moreover, are largely "non-lapseable"-in other words, if they
are not utilised in the year of allocation, they do not lapse, but are
cumulatively carried over into the next year. The truth is-and this is
well known to anyone who has worked in or studied the region honestly -there
is simply no dearth of funds in the Northeast for any productive plan or
programme. The problem is, and always has been, implementation.
Despite the many thousands of crore
allocated to the Northeast in the past -and expended by the State Governments
in the region in various "development projects"-the real developmental
impact has been negligible. An overwhelming proportion of these monies
have been misappropriated into private coffers within the region, and a
significant share has also been transported back to Delhi "in suitcases".
The intended beneficiaries have seen little or nothing in terms of measurable
development.
And yet the fiction persists: that
pouring more and more money into a region of strife and mis-governance
will, magically, rid the areas of violence and insurgency. In fact, this
flow of funds primarily "rewards" the corrupt and at least partially feeds
the insurgencies. All prominent insurgent groups have established systems
by which they corner a cut in virtually all components of Government expenditure,
either by direct "taxation" (extortion), or by a collusive mechanism in
which Government officials, politicians and proxy "contractors" are involved,
through which they corner most major contracts for "public works" and the
delivery of various "developmental services".
I recall, at the very height of
the troubles in Punjab, some senior officials had gone to the Centre with
the proposal of a liberal "economic package" for the State to help "solve"
the terrorist problem there. The then Union Home Secretary, CG Somaiah,
had made a very perceptive remark at that time, saying that all these "packages"
only enthused bureaucrats, not the people of the State.
The people of States afflicted by
violence and widespread disorders can be enthused only when they actually
see projects being completed and when benefits begin to accrue directly
to them. The "packages" of the past have failed to secure these ends, and
the reason for this demands our immediate and un-deluded attention.
The areas of disorder-be it in the
Northeast or in J&K, or indeed, in the widening regions of Left Wing
extremist strife-are, in fact, also areas of the most extraordinarily incompetent
and corrupt governance. Administrative ineptitude has been compounded manifold,
moreover, by the structures of intimidation and violence in wide regions,
which make it impossible for the administration to "deliver" public goods
and services, even where the desire exists. Simply put, the extension network
at village and block levels has, in large measure, withdrawn into the districts,
and very little of the resources allocated for programmes at these levels
can actually be expended there.
Instead, "paper projects" are drawn
up at the district levels, the monies are "spent", and a false account
of "works executed" is created. Major projects in the power, construction
and irrigations sectors, with allocations of many hundred of crores, are
often held to ransom by the insurgents, resulting in extraordinary delays,
often over decades, and consequent and repeated "cost escalation"-at least
part of which accrues to "private interests". Over time, the bureaucracy's
and political leadership's vested interest in this structure of sham "developmental
projects" becomes so entrenched that, even when violence recedes, this
structure of institutional fraud is not dismantled.
This is not to argue that the financial
flows to the Northeast-or to other areas of violence-must be diminished.
Rather, we must separate the issue of economic development-which is a necessary
and independent objective of governance, both at the State and Central
level-from that of widespread violence and breakdown of law and order.
The fiction that generous financial allocations can "resolve" the insurgencies
of these regions must be abandoned, and a direct effort must be made to
address the violence and lawlessness itself. Absent a restoration of the
integrity and effectiveness of the state's enforcement agencies, and of
the justice system, an effective infrastructure for the delivery of other
public goods and services -including development-cannot be sustained.
On the developmental front, moreover,
the utilisation of funds will have to be closely monitored, with detailed
social and economic audits confirming that the monies allocated are actually
being utilised for their intended purposes, and that benefits are, in fact,
accruing to the target population. No such social and economic audits are
currently carried out, and even the annual accounting exercise by the Comptroller
and Auditor General, which routinely finds glaring irregularities in the
utilisation of funds in these regions, attracts no noticeable penalties
against the errant officials, agencies or governments.
Unless law and order is restored
and an immensely greater measure of accountability imposed on Governments
in these regions, the many "packages" allocated by the Centre will simply
continue to be poured into the bottomless pit of deception, greed, irresponsibility
and fraud into which thousands of crores have already disappeared. Worse,
the impression will be perpetuated that violence, lawlessness and terrorism
will, in fact, continue to be rewarded.