Author: B. Raman
Publication: South Asia Analysis Group
Date: February 27, 2007
URL: http://www.saag.org/papers22/paper2153.html
After his official visits to Japan and Australia,
the US Vice-President, Dick Cheney, stopped over in Islamabad on February
26, 2007, for talks followed by a lunch with President Pervez Musharraf. His
plans to stop over in Islamabad were not announced in advance by the Pakistan
Foreign Office and the US State Department due to concerns over likely threats
to his security in the background of the recent incidents of suicide terrorism
or attempted suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory. Two of these attempts,
which were unsuccessful, were made in Islamabad itself. An official announcement
about his visit and his talks with Musharraf was made only after Cheney had
left Islamabad.
2. While the Pakistani authorities have not
made much headway in the investigation of these cases, they suspect that at
least some of these incidents were triggered off by a Pakistani air strike
on a madrasa in the Bajaur agency on October 30, 2006, in which 83 persons
were killed. This strike was reportedly made on the basis of information originating
from the US agencies that this madrasa was being used by Al Qaeda and the
Taliban to train their new recruits. The local tribal leaders have strongly
denied this and have been accusing the Musharraf regime of killing innocent
civilians at the behest of the US. This was followed by another controversial
Pakistani air strike in South Waziristan on January 16, 2007, in which the
Pakistani army claimed to have killed eight terrorists. As a result, anti-US
feelings are high in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, from where the
suicide terrorists are alleged to have come.
3. According to reliable Pakistani sources,
Dick Cheney's talks with Musharraf were partly Afghanistan related, partly
Al Qaeda related and partly Iraq related. They deny that the discussions covered
the current crisis on Iran also. They insist Iran was not raised by either
side. It is not yet known whether Cheney raised the long-pending US request
for handing over A. Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist, for interrogation regarding
his collusion with Iran and North Korea.
4. The Afghan-related discussions were about
the failure of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Army to locate
and arrest the leaders of the Taliban and the Hizbe Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar
operating from Pakistani territory, stop the recruitment and training of Taliban
cadres in camps operating in Pakistani territory and to prevent their infiltration
into Afghanistan for attacking the NATO forces. In fact, Gen. Musharraf has
been following a policy of calculated inaction against the Taliban leaders
and cadres operating from Pakistani territory ever since the US-led forces
went into action in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The US used to close its
eyes to it so long as he was co-operating against Al Qaeda. His co-operation
against Al Qaeda has declined since August last year.
5. The last instance of co-operation by Musharraf
against Al Qaeda was in the beginning of August last when the Pakistani agencies
arrested Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, UK, whom they projected as
close to Al Qaeda. It was reported that it was he who gave the information
about a plot of Al Qaeda to blow up a number of US-bound planes originating
from the UK. An announcement about the discovery of this plot and the arrest
of a number of Pakistani-origin residents of the UK in this connection was
made by the British Police on August 10, 2006. Since then, Musharraf has been
avoiding action on a British request for handing him over to them for interrogation.
Reliable sources in Pakistan say that he has made the handing-over of Rashid
Rauf conditional on the British arresting and handing over some Baloch nationalist
elements living in the UK. The British are reportedly not prepared to do this.
7. Since the so-called peace agreement signed
by him with the pro-Taliban tribal leaders of North Waziristan in September
last year, he has called off all ground-based operations in this area ----whether
directed against the local tribals, or against the Taliban or against the
remnants of Al Qaeda. He has been content with a promise made by the tribal
leaders that they would not allow the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements to infiltrate
into Afghanistan and attack the NATO forces. But even this commitment---of
a dubious nature--- has not been kept by them. They are now saying that their
commitment was that they would not allow these foreign elements to pose any
threat to Pakistani security forces and nationals in Pakistani territory.
They deny any commitment not to allow them to operate in Afghan territory.
8. Earlier, in March 2005, Musharraf had entered
into a similar peace agreement with the pro-Taliban tribal leaders of South
Waziristan and has now been negotiating a similar peace agreement with the
pro-Taliban tribal leaders of the Bajaur Agency. Taking advantage of the suspension
of the military operations in South and North Waziristan, Al Qaeda has set
up its own training camps there, which are different from those of the Taliban
already existing. In these training camps, not only Al Qaeda cadres meant
for operations against the NATO forces in Afghanistan, but also old cadres
and new recruits meant for operations in Somalia and elsewhere are reportedly
being trained by Arab, Chechen and Uzbeck instructors.
9. Al Qaeda has in recent months shot down
at least seven --- possibly eight --- US helicopters in Iraq. Initially, when
they sustained one or two losses, the Americans tended to believe that those
were random successes with small arms and ammunition. The repeated successes
of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the examination of the videos disseminated by it after
some of the strikes have brought out that these helicopters were brought down---despite
the expert evasive action taken by the specially trained US pilots--- by specially
trained terrorists of Al Qaeda with the help of surface-to-air missiles. The
techniques used by them were similar to the techniques taught by the US to
the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s for use against the Soviet helicopters.
These techniques had not been used by the Iraqi resistance fighters and Al
Qaeda terrorists against the US helicopters during the last three years. They
have started using them only during the last three or four months---indicating
the infiltration into Iraq of terrorists specially trained in anti-helicopter
warfare. The Pakistani sources say that the Americans seem to suspect that
these elements were trained in the Al Qaeda training camps in North Waziristan
and then infiltrated into Iraq.
10. Both Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban have
stepped up their anti-US propaganda and PSYWAR. While Al Qaeda had been showing
signs of sophistication even earlier for the last two years, the Neo Taliban
has recently been showing similar sophistication. Such sophisticated propaganda
material cannot be produced in the tribal areas of Afghanistan, where there
are no facilities for their production. All indicators are that the material
is being produced in Pakistani territory with the help of Pakistani experts
and disseminated from there. The Pakistani agencies have not taken action
to identify those involved in the production and dissemination of the propaganda
and PSYWAR material and neutralise them.
11. The Americans, who had been keeping their
eyes closed to the Pakistani collusion with the Neo Taliban in the past, are
no longer prepared to do so in view of the sharp increase in its activities
in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan last year and its threats of an even more
ferocious offensive starting from the forthcoming spring. Musharraf's repeated
suggestions for talks with the Neo Taliban and a peace agreement with it by
the Hamid Karzai Government similar to the two agreements signed by him with
the tribal leaders of Waziristan have convinced the junior and middle-level
NATO officers in Afghanistan that he is decreasingly acting as the front-line
ally in the war against terrorism and increasingly acting as the launderer
of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
12. The Pakistani sources say that during
his talks with Musharraf, Cheney said that while the Bush Administration still
stood by its long-term commitment to support Pakistan and the Musharraf regime,
this commitment is likely to become untenable if his security agencies continued
to avoid action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. He also drew his attention
to the concerns expressed in the Democrat-controlled Congress over the perceived
inaction of his Government against not only the Taliban, but also against
Al Qaeda.
13. The US has not yet come to a parting of
the ways with Musharraf. It still considers him a very good bet in Pakistan
and in its war against terrorism. But, it no longer considers him the best
bet and would not hesitate to consider other options if Musharraf continues
to drag his feet.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute
for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com)
