Author: G Parthasarathy
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: February 8, 2007
The Manmohan Singh Government appears to believe
that separatists, armed, financed and trained across our borders, can be won
over by a policy of appeasement. This was evident in the approach to ULFA
in Assam, which was let off the hook by an ill-advised ceasefire when the
Army had its cadre on the run. There is a similar approach to the separatists
of the "moderate" All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Jammu &
Kashmir.
The All Parties Hurriyat Conference was established on March 10, 1993, with
Pakistani support, to give political content to a demoralised and failing
armed uprising in Jammu & Kashmir. The Hurriyat leadership supports Pakistan's
efforts to pursue its "unfinished agenda of Partition" in Jammu
& Kashmir. Its Constitution, adopted in March 1993, says the Hurriyat
is committed to a "peaceful struggle" to obtain the "right
to self-determination" under UN Resolutions for the people of Jammu &
Kashmir.
Members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
have remained close to terrorist groups that are members of the ISI-sponsored
United Jihad Council in Muzaffarabad. If Syed Ali Shah Geelani uses the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen to enforce his writ through terrorist violence, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
is familiar with Al Umar Mujahideen led by Mushtaq Zargar - a serial killer
released during the infamous Kandahar hijacking. The Hurriyat Conference is
derogatorily referred to as the "Hartal Conference" because, duly
backed by the guns of terrorists, it regularly calls for hartals and bandhs.
The Hurriyat, which describes itself the "sole"
and "authentic" voice of the aspirations of the people of Jammu
& Kashmir, has primarily served as the mouthpiece for the Pakistan Government
and as the political arm of the terrorists sponsored by ISI. Pakistan has
obtained an "Observer" status for the Hurriyat in the Organisation
of Islamic Conference, providing the Hurriyat leadership access to leaders
of Islamic countries. Knowing its limited electoral support and given the
disunity in its ranks, the Hurriyat has never contested elections.
Apologists of the Hurriyat claim that the
organisation split, with the Mirwaiz leading the "moderates" and
Geelani the "hardliners" because of differences over their responses
to Gen Pervez Musharraf's four-point proposal on Jammu & Kashmir. The
real reasons for the split, however, lie in developments in Pakistan when
Gen Musharraf and Amir of the Jamat-e-Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmed fell apart.
Geelani toed the line advocated by the Qazi, who opposed Gen Musharraf's proposals.
While the General has been the mentor of the "moderates" led by
the Mirwaiz, Geelani has chosen to regard the Qazi as his mentor. The main
"threat" that the Mirwaiz faces is from the cadre of the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad.
When Mirwaiz Farooq left for Islamabad, he
assumed pretensions of being the "bridge" between New Delhi and
Islamabad and also between people in Jammu & Kashmir on both sides of
the LoC. He echoed Gen Musharraf's proposals and let the cat out of the bag
by revealing that these proposals were for an "interim" and not
"final" resolution of the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. He was evidently
advised by Gen Musharraf to set the stage for a "ceasefire" in Jammu
& Kashmir by calling on the militants to end their armed struggle. Those
in Pakistan backing Qazi Hussain Ahmad's approach called Mirwaiz a "traitor"
and the "Hamid Karzai of Kashmir". Feeling the political heat, Pakistan's
Foreign Office distanced itself from the Mirwaiz, claiming that what he had
said constituted his personal views and not the views of the Pakistan Government.
Desperate to avoid the wrath of the jihadis
who could threaten his life, the Mirwaiz met Mushtaq Zargar - the one terrorist
leader on whom he could rely. This could not have happened without ISI facilitation,
as Pakistan has officially claimed that it is not aware of Zargar's whereabouts.
At this meeting, he also met "area commanders" of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba
and the Jaish-e-Mohammed - terrorist organisations banned internationally
under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Mirwaiz Farooq has remained ambiguous
about these meetings; he, however, did not deny they took place. Thus, despite
Gen Musharraf's protestations, it is obvious that the infrastructure of terrorism
is alive and kicking in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and that the ISI is
actively assisting these terrorist outfits.
The Hurriyat delegation met political leaders
in PoK, but avoided meeting with leaders from the Shia-dominated Northern
Areas as they would have spoken differently about the repression they face.
The Mirwaiz also assumed the role of organising meetings between political
leaders in Jammu & Kashmir and those in PoK, after his meeting with Sardar
Atique Ahmad Khan the "Prime Minister" of PoK. All such meetings
will inevitably be under the patronage of the Government of Pakistan and the
ISI. Gen Musharraf obviously wishes to use his protégés to play
the leading role in promoting an intra-Kashmiri dialogue, which can then proceed
on terms set by him. New Delhi seems to have given the impression that it
would not be averse to the All Parties Hurriyat Conference playing such a
role.
While the leaders of mainstream political
parties like the National Conference have watched from the sidelines, the
Hurriyat has assumed such airs of importance that it will not condescend to
meet anyone other than the Prime Minister. The Hurriyat has to be formally
told that before it seeks political level meetings, it should first seek to
interact with the Union Government's interlocutor for Jammu & Kashmir,
Mr NN Vohra. Second, it should be made clear to the Hurriyat that there can
be no high-level political contacts in New Delhi till it participates in the
roundtable discussion that has been initiated by the Prime Minister with a
wide cross-section of political and public opinion in Jammu & Kashmir.
New Delhi should also firmly inform the Hurriyat
leadership that it will not allow the separatists to assume any role in inviting
people like Sardar Atique Ahmad and other political leaders from PoK and the
Northern Areas across the LoC. This is a role that has to be played at an
appropriate time by the Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, in consultation
with political leaders in the State Assembly, with due clearance from the
Union Government.
Finally, there can be no question of any "ceasefire"
in Jammu & Kashmir till the infrastructure of terrorism across the LoC
is dismantled and militants who have crossed the border lay down their arms.
The nation paid a heavy price for the ill-advised "Ramzan Ceasefire"
in November 2000.
