Author: Sushant Sareen
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: January 10, 2008
Jinnah's moth-eaten dream is shattering along
Indus
Nearly half a dozen of my cousins who are officers
in the Army have quit in the last year", revealed a Pashtun journalist
friend. According to another Pashtun journalist, who has been reporting the
Islamist insurgency from ground-zero, there have been many desertions from the
paramilitary forces (the Frontier Corp and Tribal Levies). He spoke about a
friend of his who quit the tribal levies because he was warned by his father
that if he died fighting the Taliban, let alone getting a burial, even his body
will not be permitted to enter the village.
Already people in Islamabad and Lahore are talking about an exodus of people
from the areas affected by conflict. Tribal maliks and khans, businessmen and
local Government officials like district nazim and councilors are moving to
Peshawar, and in many cases settling their families in the cities of Punjab.
But uncertainty about the future is also affecting
those who are already living in cities of Punjab. A senior Pashtun bureaucrat
called a journalist friend and wondered what the future holds for Pashtuns,
especially those who are well integrated in Pakistani (read Punjabi) power structure.
The journalist, who is himself a Pashtun, later said that people like him who
have great associations and friendships in Punjab and have never felt alien
in Punjab will be worst affected if the conflict between the Pashtun Islamists
and the Pakistani state worsens. He feared that if and when the sentiment in
Punjab turns hostile to Pashtuns, people like him will be rejected (if not ejected)
by Punjab and will be misfits among fellow Pashtuns.
And it won't take much for the Punjabis to turn
hostile towards the Pashtuns. Journalist Imtiaz Alam thinks that a couple of
suicide attacks in Lahore will have Punjab baying for blood. For the moment,
however, unlike Islamabad, where the fear of terrorist strikes by Pashtun jihadis
and suicide bombers is palpable, in Lahore the war being waged in trans-Indus
Pakistan is still somewhat distant. This is so partly because until now, the
jihadis and Taliban have only targeted the security forces. Civilian casualties
in suicide bombings can by and large be classified as 'collateral damage'. But
the pattern of attacks could change as the fighting in NWFP and the tribal areas
worsens and the military offensive causes heavy collateral damage in both life
and property among Pashtuns.
Not surprisingly, many Punjabis are now openly
voicing the fear if the deteriorating situation in the Pashtun belt (NWFP and
the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan) is not arrested and reversed fast, the
frontier would be lost. And if the frontier is lost, then Baluchistan, too,
would break away from Pakistan.
Popular Urdu columnist Nazir Naji, who has received
death threats from the Islamist groups for writing against them, doesn't mince
his words in saying that Pakistan is heading for failure. Like many others in
Lahore and Islamabad, he invokes the Col Ralph Peters thesis about Pakistan
splitting vertically along the Indus.
The only saving grace about the situation that
Pakistan confronts in the Pashtun belt is that both the state and society has
got out of the denial mode and is recognising that the problem posed by the
forces of jihad is far worse than they ever imagined. The setbacks received
by the military have ended the cocky confidence that a crack of the whip or
a shot of cannon will be enough to restore order in the turbulent Pashtun belt.
The state machinery, so effective against unarmed and peaceful protestors like
the lawyers, journalists and political workers, has crumbled in the face of
battle-hardened and committed to their cause Taliban.
Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao has admitted
that the traditional instruments through which the state established its writ
-- tribal jirgas and lashkars, using the influence of powerful maliks, khans
and sardars -- no longer work. The social structures have been turned on their
head by the militant-mullah compact. He blames two things for this state of
affairs: First, the office of the political agent was devalued by the administrative
reforms ushered in by Mr Pervez Musharraf's local body system; second, and more
damaging was the inaction of the MMA Government in NWFP in taking timely and
effective counter measures against the jihadis. For instance, he says, the MMA
Government avoided using the Army against the jihadis in Swat even though the
troops were on the standby.
Mr Sherpao said that the federal Government
could not order Army action without the concurrence of the provincial Government
because, not only would it then have been accused of violating the principles
of federation, but the MMA would have also exploited the situation politically
by inciting the people against the federal Government, as indeed it did after
Army action was ordered in Swat.