Author: Prafull Goradia
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: May 29, 2009
URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/179279/Recall-what-Ambedkar-said.html
Which is better for Hindus, BR Ambedkar asked:
Should Muslims be without and against or should they be within and against?
He preferred without and against
The Taliban closing in on Islamabad is an
ominous portent. Evidently the mujahideen tried to cross the Indus in strength.
Could their eventual target be to cross the Ichhogil canal? If it were to
be so, what would be the inspiration reinforcing India's answer? The way Mohammad
Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone captured terrorist in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks,
is being tried like an ordinary criminal is an indication that the present
Government and its secular fundamentalism will not counter the threat. Normally,
a sovereign state would have treated Kasab as an enemy of the state, given
him a summary trial and executed him. With the Muslim League, a coalition
partner of the UPA, and Mr AR Antulay, a leading member of the Government,
the likes of the present Government could hardly be expected to move heaven
and earth in order to resist a Talibani invasion.
India must fall back on its own nationalist
ideology, that of Hindutva. Rather than recalling Veer Savarkar's definition,
it would be better to take the help of BR Ambedkar's version of the patriotic
ideology. For one, the acceptability of what Babasaheb wrote would be much
higher across the classes and castes of India. For another, what he wrote
was issue specific and not merely in the realm of concept.
His viewpoint was supported by Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, who while proposing the Pakistan Resolution at the Lahore session
of the Muslim League, had said how and why Hindus and Muslims could not co-exist
in the same country. Ambedkar's was not unilaterally a Hindu proposition which
was in his words: That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy
for communal peace is beyond doubt (Volume 8 Writings and Speeches, Government
of Maharashtra). Ambedkar not only endorsed the partition and an exchange
of populations but also analysed in detail the geopolitical, military and
financial implications of the separation. He admitted that India would have
no natural land frontier especially in the north. He, however, argued in his
book The Partition of India, which he wrote immediately after Jinnah's historic
Lahore Resolution of 1940, that the deficiency could be off-set by creating
fortifications which might be far more impregnable than natural barriers.
Coming to the armed forces, Babasaheb pointed
out that the fighting forces available for the defence of pre-partition India
mostly hailed from areas which were to become Pakistan. As things stood, Hindustan
could not be defended without the help of the Pakistani provinces. Recruitment
was based on the arbitrary theory that some communities were martial while
others did not have fighting qualities. Perhaps the inadvertent effect of
this excuse was that the Indian infantry was numerically dominated by Punjabi
Musalmans and Pathans. How far could Hindus depend upon these gate-keepers
to hold the gate and protect the freedom of India, was the question raised
by Ambedkar. He went on to say that if a Muslim country were to invade India,
would these gate-keepers stop the invaders or would they open the gate and
let them in?
Moreover, it was doubtful that a Regiment
of Musalmans would accept the authority of Hindu officers if placed under
them. Incidentally, in 1919, the Khilafat movement, led by the Ali Brothers,
had endorsed the Islamic viewpoint that a Muslim soldier would be justified
in not resisting a Muslim invader. This view was subsequently endorsed by
the Muslim League. Ambedkar concluded this problem lucidly: Hindus have a
difficult choice to make - to have a safe army or a safe border. If they desire
to have a ready-made safe border they would have to insist on Muslims remaining
a part of India. On the other hand, if the Muslims go out, India would at
least have a safe army. Which is better for the Hindus, he asked? Should the
Muslims be without and against or should they be within and against. He preferred
without and against.
The financial questions that Ambedkar raised
were equally important. He discovered that the dominantly Muslim provinces
contributed less than 14 per cent of the revenue to the Central exchequer
contrasted with 86 per cent by the dominantly Hindu areas. At the time 43
per cent of the total Central Government revenue was spent on the army which
comprised a dominant majority of Muslim soldiers. Babasaheb's conclusion was
that the Hindus were paying for employing Muslim soldiers. He called this
a paradox which fully justified the partition.
