Author: T S R Subramanian
Publication: The New Indian Express
Date: January 3, 2011
URL: http://expressbuzz.com/opinion/op-ed/intriguing-spectrum-letters/236531.html
At least one national newspaper recently published
the transcript, purportedly complete, of the exchange of correspondence between
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the then telecom minister A Raja, in the
period November-December 2007. This was the time when critical decisions relating
to the controversial 2G Spectrum were taken.
It is interesting to note that the first missive
was fired by A Raja on November 2, 2007. Raja's letter crossed the PM's own
letter to him of the same date. The PM had raised a number of concerns relating
to the proposed allotment of 2G Spectrum with two clear injunctions: no 'short
cuts' and that no decision may be taken without 'our' (PMs) concurrence. The
PM's letter to Raja also suggests the auction method and the direction to
ensure 'fairness and transparency'. The telecom minister was either clairvoyant
to expect such a letter from the PM, or had advance intimation - either way
this shows that both Raja and the PM were aware of the potential for controversy.
Though his first letter does not appear to be a direct response to the PM,
Raja refers to issues of policy vs procedure (conveniently forgetting that
many times these are intertwined and embedded in each other). Significantly
the minister adds that the 'decision' already had been taken for the September
25 cut-off. The law ministry's advice, presumably contrary to this decision,
has been termed 'out of context' by Raja. It appears fairly clear that Raja's
letter was to preempt the possibility of his decision being altered; in North
Indian court parlance, it would be called a peshbandi letter, to indirectly
bring the PM into the picture as an ex post facto participant, of the decision
already taken.
The third letter of that day (November 2)
was Raja's formal reply to the PM, clearly indicating the high level of preparedness
and awareness of the issues being addressed. While this letter contains a
large number of technical statements, its main thrust appears to be to provide
a self-certification by the telecom minister about the transparency and openness
being followed by his ministry, that they are 'honestly' aimed at the development
of the telecom sector. It is curious to note here that the telecom minister,
while addressing the PM, refers to 'my' decisions - implying that all issues
in this regard are exclusively in the province of the telecom ministry: none
need to intrude into his decision-making sphere, including the prime minister!
It is also noteworthy that usually inter-ministerial correspondence is at
official level - the flurry of letters at political executive level is rare,
and clearly indicates high level of concern, awareness of issues and that
the decisions were driven directly at ministerial level.
There is then a short hiatus in the samwada.
The next missive from A Raja to the PM is dated December 26, 2007. While the
substantive decisions were taken before November 2007, it is in public record
that the then telecom secretary refused to endorse these decisions and play
ball. Presumably, by December end these issues had been sorted out by those
in power. Raja's letter also refers to his discussions on the subject with
the external affairs minister and the solicitor general - it will be of interest
to know if the summary of these discussions were indeed recorded and will
be made public.
The sum and substance of this December 26
letter is basically to 'inform' the PM that the decision has been taken, and
that it will be announced shortly; implying that the PM has no business to
meddle in these decision-making processes. The formal reply of the prime minister
to the telecom minister dated January 3, 2008 confirms that he accepts the
position and has nothing further to say. In effect, the PM concedes that everything
had been sorted out elsewhere. Raja's letter of December 26 ends with 'this
is for your information' - astonishing language from a minister addressing
his Cabinet chief who had asked earlier that no decision be taken without
his prior concurrence. The conclusion in these five words is not only insolent
in tone; it is also the unkindest cut of all - one that could have felled
at one stroke Caesar along with Calpurnia.
The exchange of letters raises interesting
questions of the inter-relations between Cabinet colleagues and issues relating
to collective Cabinet responsibility. Was the decision taken a telecom ministry
decision or a government of India decision? If the latter, will the full Cabinet
stand by it, as is the requirement in any Cabinet form of government? If indeed
it turns out that the telecom ministry's decisions were highly coloured, and
if the actual magnitude of the scam is anywhere close to the estimates made
by the CAG will it still continue to be a telecom ministry decision, or one
of the government of India? The other relevant question relates to whether
the PM knew in advance of the decisions of the telecom ministry, and he implicitly
concurred with them; or he was not privy to the decision. Either way the implications
are appalling. If the PM or PMO did not know of the details, then the correspondence
published is a mockery of inter-ministerial dialogue. If the PM indeed knew,
the presumption is that he acquiesced - implying full responsibility.
There is an obscure provision in the conduct
of government business that the PM is notionally the minister for all departments,
and the cabinet secretary is the secretary to all departments. I recall at
least two occasions when I called for the relevant files from the department
concerned, wrote my own note contradicting that of the minister concerned,
and the then PM approved my line of thinking, overruling the minister concerned.
One can speculate as to why such a practice was not resorted to, if the minister
remained intractable or intransigent. One would normally have expected the
PM to reply to the December 26 letter of the telecom minister, demanding that
the matter be brought up before a Group of Ministers or the Cabinet itself.
Disturbing questions are natural as to whether the failure to take appropriate
action was through ignorance or deliberate.
It is well recorded that from the Indira Gandhi
regime onwards, the functioning of the basic parliamentary institutions has
been substantially altered; decision-making powers have been moving slowly
but inexorably to the PM and the PMO. The popular perception has been that
India indirectly, without due deliberation or formal acquiescence of the people,
has moved from a parliamentary democracy system to a presidential system,
with the prime minister exercising undue powers. Suddenly, we see the spectacle
of the situation being completely reversed - much as towards the end of the
Mughal period when the local satraps dared to challenge the central leadership.
Is this the much talked about 'coalition dharma'? Who has codified it? There
is no reference to it in Walter Bagehot or Ivor Jennings. In any case, no
coalition dharma can dilute the concept of the collective responsibility of
the Cabinet in a parliamentary system
- About the author: T S R Subramanian is former
Cabinet Secretary, Government of India
