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My enemy's enemy is a friend. A friend of my enemy is also an enemy. Such simple propositions have a ring of truth but are not always helpful in the making of foreign policy. As it embarks on a risky peace process with Pakistan, India has been bold enough to stand these maxims on their head. New Delhi is consciously reaching out to the friends of Pakistan who could, hopefully, induce some political moderation in Islamabad.
That will of course bring howls of protest in the country about ''internationalising'' the Kashmir dispute. India will indeed reject all proposals for either a third party role in Kashmir or its ''internationalisation''. But New Delhi has been smart enough to recognise that the United States, China and Saudi Arabia - three long-standing partners of Pakistan - could be crucial in persuading Islamabad to see the light of reason in finding a ''lasting solution'' to the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.
In the past there was a good reason for India to avoid even a semblance of international intervention in the Kashmir dispute: the United States, China and the conservative Islamic world were all seen as tilted in favour of Pakistan. But India now finds it can mobilise the very same forces to encourage Pakistan to adopt a reasonable approach to the resolution of the problem.
Recall the Kargil confrontation, in which all three friends of Pakistan played a crucial role in forcing Islamabad to restore the status quo ante. The U.S. applied relentless pressure on Pakistan to pull its forces from across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector.
Despite the trips to Beijing during the crisis by Gen. Musharraf and the then Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Beijing refused to bail out Islamabad. Like the U.S., China too called on Pakistan to respect the Line of Control.
The Saudis persuaded Mr. Sharif to end the confrontation quickly and played a key role in moderating resolutions on Kargil introduced by Pakistan at the Organisation of Islamic Conference. The Saudis were present in Washington on July 4, 1999 to hold Mr. Sharif's hand when he signed the ''surrender document'' with President Clinton.
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During the Cold War, India could only complain about the tilt of U.S., China and sections of the Islamic world towards Pakistan. New Delhi's emerging relationships with the three traditional allies of Pakistan should have considerable value in ending the vexatious conflict over Kashmir.
Sceptics will wonder why the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia would want to extend political favours for India. All three have their own interests in advocating restraint and moderation to Pakistan. They are concerned about a failing state in Pakistan and the rise of extremist forces there that are beginning to destabilise the region.
The U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, has already cautioned Pakistan that ''borders cannot be redrawn in blood''. The U.S. has also signalled that ''self- determination'' does not mean breaking up multi-ethnic states. China, which backed Pakistan's position on self- determination for Kashmiris in the mid-1960s has over the years moved towards a neutral position.
The Saudis have become very cautious in extending support to separatist demands of Islamic minorities around the world.
After having raised hopes about prying Kashmir away from India, the leadership in Pakistan will have a hard time selling any reasonable solution on the issue to its public opinion. Gen. Musharraf, much like Mr. Sharif at the end of Kargil confrontation, will need some political cover to come to terms with the realities on Kashmir.
The U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia are best positioned to provide that cover, and probably offer a package of economic incentives for the military in Pakistan to stop supporting jihad. The next few weeks should reveal the kind of a role the three key states will play in promoting the peace process in Kashmir.
Once the Republicans take charge in Washington, there should be some indications on their approach to Indo-Pak. tensions and Kashmir. Mr. Li Peng who leads the national legislature in Beijing and ranks number two in the Chinese Communist hierarchy will be in India next week.
He could give some hints on how China looks at the incipient peace process in the Subcontinent. The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, heads to Saudi Arabia later this month in what is widely being seen as a new political engagement of the desert kingdom.
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India and the United States will inaugurate this week the Asian Centre for Democratic Governance, that was agreed when President Clinton to came to India last March. The initiative, however, is a non-governmental one, with the Confederation of Indian Industry and the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy taking the lead.
While conspiracy theorists might read larger geopolitical motives behind the move, the Centre is unlikely to be little more than a clearing house for exchanging democratic experiences among the Asian nations.
India, which is in the middle of a new political engagement with the military rulers of Myanmar and now all set to deal with the generals in Pakistan is hardly in a mood for launching a crusade for democracy in Asia. The United States, for all its rhetoric on promoting democracy in Asia has always placed the pursuit of its national interests above the ideological interest in promoting democracy. Nothing better illustrates this than the American approach to Chinese communists.
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Now to the diplomatic lexicon. The other day, at the height of the anti-India agitation in Nepal, we were told that a senior official in the foreign office summoned the charge d' affaires of the Embassy of Nepal and handed over a ''note verbale'' that expressed concern over the threat to life and property of Indian citizens.
A ''note verbale''? It is an unsigned, but initialed, diplomatic communication between a host government and an ambassador. It is written in third person to accurately convey pleasant or unpleasant sentiments of one government to another. It is one of the many kinds of Notes that diplomats and foreign offices trade in. Will Rogers, an American humorist at the turn of the 20th century once said ''Diplomats write Notes, because they would not have the nerve to tell the same thing to each other's face''.
That certainly is not true of the
senior official in the foreign office who handed over the ''note verbale''
to the Nepalese diplomat. She has a reputation for plain speaking and never
known to have pulled her punches.
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