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Introduction: Musharraf’s declarations to combat militancy are yet to pass the test of sincerity
For the second time during General Pervez Musharraf’s tenure as Pakistan’s chief of army staff, his men confront their Indian counterparts over a potentially nuclear conflict. The first confrontation took place in spring 1999. Then Kashmiri militants seized the Kargil heights in the disputed Siachin area triggering a near war.
This time round, Kashmiri militants attempted bombing the Indian Parliament. The attack on Parliament was staged after the war against terror began last September. Then the United States demanded of the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Similarly, India demands of Pakistan the handing over of 20 militants.
Once again Islamabad’s military regime is caught between a rock and a hard place. In a bid to defuse an all out war, General Musharraf publicly admitted a policy reappraisal this January. A leader who presided over the rise of private militias and militants since he seized power three years back, came on television to declare a war against theocratic politics.
In his effort to prevent war, the general did two things. First, he announced an internal crackdown on some militant groups. Second, he dealt with external affairs devolving on India-Pakistan relations.
The promise to crack down on internal militants was described as ‘historic’ and ‘path-breaking’. It could turn out to be neither. The general announced the reversal of an ill-conceived policy adopted by his military predecessor, General Zia-ul-Haq. It was a policy his regime continued since seizing power in 1999. Its abandonment did not come when the war against terror began last September. It came under an Indian and US ultimatum following the Indian Parliament attack and the threat by India to sort out the militants on its own.
In the extreme example, it is akin to Mullah Omar appearing on television, following the allied bombardment, to repudiate theocracy in exchange for avoiding conflict — and continuing in power. There was little talk about responsibility or accountability of actions for past policies that brought the country to the difficult pass. The result is cynicism as well as the continued threat of war. The troops continue to face each other even as diplomats rush between capitals to avert it.
The reversal of policy came across as the combination of heavy Anglo-American-Indian pressure in the post-September 11 environment. It didn’t come when the Pakistani democratic forces asked the military regime to distance itself from militant groups. Instead those forces were, and continue to be, ignored and persecuted.
The conclusion by leading democrats, therefore, is that, in the absence of the foreign pressure, the military regime will continue backing militancy and theocracy. The fear is that it could return to backing it once the world temperature cools. After all, the unilateral withdrawal from Kargil in 1999 failed to halt the re-eruption of tension in December 2002.
In overtly repudiating theocracy, the military regime took measures, literally, from the manifesto and agenda of the democratic forces. But it faltered in aping the democratic forces. It continued to single them out for persecution. More tellingly, it insisted on relying on the same federal, provincial and institutional set-ups that are the architecture on which the theocratic structure was built.
This disconnection between stated policy and the governmental edifice raises questions regarding the declarations the general made under the gun held to his head of an India-Pakistan conflagration. What happens when the gun is lifted is yet to be seen.
The declarations of combating militancy and the crackdown against militants are yet to pass the test of sincerity. Not one head has rolled for past policies presently repudiated. Moreover, madrasas can be passed from one favoured group to another. Supporters can also defect from one banished group to a non-banished one.
The real test for the military regime comes in ridding the theocratic structure set in place since 1999 which permitted the flourishing of militias and militants at the expense of the political process and representative political leaders. The declarations of conversion from theocrat to moderate are cosmetic until the prerequisites of a democratic culture are met. The entire civil structure is groaning under the weight of military supervision.
The overt declarations by the Musharraf regime, irrespective of its covert intentions, mark the amazing victory of the ideas of the democratic forces. It is a watershed in the history of Pakistan when the policies of the establishment are publicly repudiated as wrong by the establishment itself. Those policies are non-sustainable in the new world climate of the 21st century.
During the Cold War, the Pakistani establishment patronised the religious parties. They promoted them in the world community as the anti-Soviet, anti-atheistic force to counter communism. The establishment supported the Muslim brotherhood with dictatorship while democrats were marginalised.
But from the ashes of the murder of democracy in 1977 with the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rose the sun of democracy in 1988. Its rays brought forth the rebirth of the plant of freedom and free market. The democratic order born that year demonstrated that democracy and development go hand in hand. The high growths, high revenues, high investments achieved under democracy remained unmatched under ‘controlled democracy’ as well as outright dictatorship.
Moreover, the remarkable rise of the democratic polity coincided with the rise of women leaders in the Muslim world. This rise demonstrated that Muslim masses wanted to join the rest of the world community in overcoming prejudice and building a society where each individual could prosper on the basis of equality. The democratic period provided the comparatively most stable regional security environment.
It also proclaimed the birth of a philosophy that challenged the notion that stability could be based on the pillars of tyranny. The crackdown against militants in Afghanistan heralds the approach of a new era. That new era is now forcing itself on Islamabad, irrespective of whether the rulers are ready for it or not.
The parameters of the new era are built on the edifice and philosophy of democratic principles. Pakistan is the second largest Muslim country. Its democratisation impacts on the larger Muslim world where questions are being asked about solutions that can breed an environment conducive to a diverse world united by common goals.
Given the larger battle in the Muslim world, a military regime with generals bedecked in brass simply sends the wrong messages. The message of a military dictatorship is one the Muslim youth increasingly repudiate as the digital revolution shatters old patterns.
The democrats stoically faced the theocrats in upholding the banner of freedom and human rights during past decades. In its defiance, the democratic forces laid the culture that enables Pakistan today — should it will — to make a retreat from theocracy. That option was not open to Afghanistan when the Taliban crushed all rivals. Change there came through brute force.
Change in Pakistan can come through peaceful means if the Pakistani establishment sincerely abandons theocracy for democracy. It is still reluctant to do so. Such reluctance could suddenly evaporate as it did in the case of the Taliban embrace and the apparent theocratic retreat.
For Washington, London and New Delhi, active players in the present regional environment, negotiating with the elected representatives of the people builds a more enduring edifice of regional security. It brings people together on a common platform.
(The writer is a former Prime Minister
of Pakistan)
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