Introduction: Can’t the Pakistani troops stop movement of terrorists?
Pakistan's new set of proposals are, as its spokesman stated, a “sum-up and re-affirmation” of its earlier positions. However, considering the gravity of the situation and the need to roll back terrorism well in time for our electoral processes to remain on track, it is important that the proposals are given serious attention. But Pakistan could hardly be serious about its own proposal for strengthening of UN Military Observers Group. The redundancy of the group has been in evidence since the ceasefire line was converted into a line of control by a mutual agreement at Simla three decades ago where the UN had no role. In reality, it is time the Observer Group was wound up and at least some money saved for the cash-strapped UN. If Pakistan wants its proposals to be taken seriously for any future dialogue and negotiations it also must work on the basis that it cannot continue to interfere in India’s internal affairs by asking for any other organisation to “monitor” developments inside India.
The most important of Pakistan’s proposals is the one concerning troop withdrawal from the borders by mutual agreement in a time-bound, phased manner by both sides. This would start a process of dialogue between the two countries, although not at the summit level. This by itself would be a welcome direction. But it ignores the basic reality as to why the military forces are deployed on the borders to start with? India was not responding to a direct military threat. But the raison d’etre of the military posture has been the escalation of terrorism on October 1 and December 13 after Pakistan agreed to co-operate in the global war against international terrorism. That is why General Musharraf’s January 12 speech was seen as positive even though it did not go far enough and still promised support to separatism in Kashmir. If Pakistan is sincere in rolling back cross-border terrorism by ensuring that Pakistan territory would not be used for terrorist acts outside Pakistan, as its president promised, then it must demonstrate actions that support this change.
It is reasonable to assume that
Pakistan today would have upwards of 18 divisions worth of military forces,
besides the paramilitary forces, deployed on its borders with India and
kept on high alert now for more than a month. Empirical data, however,
indicates that infiltration across the borders into J&K is significantly
higher this last month than the same period in previous years. This hardly
justifies even the beginning of building confidence in changes in Pakistan’s
policy on terrorism rationalised and legitimised, especially within its
army, as a strategic doctrine for two decades. On the other hand, US Secretary
of Defence had stated that Pakistan’s 7-9 battalions were playing a vital
role in controlling exfiltration of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters from
Afghanistan into Pakistan. Surely if one division of the Pakistan army
was critical in stopping infiltration across Pakistan’s western border
as varied and nearly as long as the eastern one, 18 divisions should be
performing a far more effective function. The results no doubt may take
time to show. And that is why Pakistan itself ought to define the role
of its deployed military forces especially now that it asserts that it
would not be the first to initiate military action.