AS British Prime Minister Tony Blair prepares to exercise a ‘‘calming influence’’ in New Delhi and Islamabad, he would do well to reflect on the lessons to be drawn from the role played by Britain when clandestine warfare first made its appearance in Kashmir.
In 1947, when Pakistani tribesmen invaded Kashmir, Britain decided to adopt a pro-Pakistan tilt — not because of any merit in the case but strictly in pursuit of British global interests in the belief that this was essential for her Middle Eastern policy. Unfortunately for India, the British minister in charge of executing this policy, Philip J Noel Baker, had few scruples in exceeding his instructions.
As newly-researched material (recently declassified) in the just published new book, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48 (Sage) by this author reveals, Noel Baker decided to take a totally anti-India stand in the UN instead of leaning in its favour as instructed by his government. He deliberately misrepresented India’s position to his own government.
He was reprimanded by Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee in a remarkable Top Secret and Personal telegram. Attlee wrote: ‘‘I find it very hard to reconcile the view which you express as to the attitude of the Indian delegation with the representations I have received through the High Commissioner from India here. It appears to me that all the concessions are being asked from India while Pakistan concedes little or nothing.
The attitude still seems to be that it is India which is at fault whereas the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan.’’
Noel-Baker misled his government on the US position too. In 1947-48, Washington accepted (at the level of the Secretary of State George Marshall) the fact that Kashmir legally belonged to India by virtue of the Maharaja’s accession. In February 1948, the Americans informed Noel-Baker that they were disturbed by the implications of the resolution that he wanted to move in the UN which would have allowed Pakistan to deploy its troops in Kashmir.
When the British side argued that Kashmir was a ‘‘territory in dispute’’, the Americans disagreed, stating that they ‘‘found it difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession to India’’. Under pressure from Noel-Baker, the US finally agreed to float a draft resolution which would have permitted entry of Pakistani troops but only if India concurred. When his cabinet colleagues objected that India would never accept this, Noel-Baker chose to conceal his own hand in prompting the US move.
In November 1948, the acting leader of the US delegation in the Security Council, John Foster Dulles, complained to the State Department that the ‘‘present UK approach (to the) Kashmir problem appears extremely pro-GOP (Government of Pakistan) as against (the) middle ground we have sought to follow.’’
In 1947-48 Britain chose to ignore the implications of the clandestine war launched by Pakistan. This led to an increasing Pakistani appetite for such actions, resulting ultimately in the massive terrorist campaign unleashed by the ISI.
If Blair seriously wants to play a calming role in the sub-continent, he must do everything in his power to ensure that the terrorists are rooted out from Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied territory. If the terrorists are not brought to justice, India will be left with no other choice than to ‘‘bring justice’’ to them, to borrow President Bush’s felicitous phrase.
(C Dasgupta, one of India’s most
distinguished diplomats, was Ambassador to China and Brussels before retiring
recently)