Introduction: In bailing out Pakistan’s newspeak president, don’t take the heat off its military govt, says former PM Bhutto
The rebirth of General Musharraf from Godfather of Taliban and Terrorism to Man of Moderation was externally driven. It was midwifed through the ministrations of Tony Blair and Colin Powell to save South Asia from war. Now Pakistan has two Musharrafs. The pre-2002 Musharraf whose plane landed safely to the throne of power piloted by hardline generals. The 2002 Musharraf, without apology for bringing Pakistan near a war it least wanted, adopted peaceful coexistence principles that his opponents proclaimed all along.
Pakistan's political leaders insisted Musharraf distance Islamabad from the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. He ignored sound advice until New Delhi, London and Washington rapped the regime on the knuckles. Then General Musharraf announced on television his newfound opposition to militias and militants. He criticised the concept of a theocratic state, the right of private militias to conduct politics from the soil of Pakistan as well as force as an instrument of foreign policy with India. However, the apparatus that General Musharraf set in place when hardline Generals brought him into power continued in place.
General Musharraf needs to dwell on the principles of a society that can breed a violence-free generation. Such a challenge can be difficult for a regime which has gone from one crisis to another. Hardly had the noise of guns thundering on the Afghan border died down then arose the thunder of guns between Indo-Pak troops. In jumping from crisis to crisis, Musharraf is fulfilling the legacy that history dons military dictators with. War is always historically avoided under Pakistan's democratic leaders.
Surprisingly, General Musharraf talked about the rise of “a state within a state” in Pakistan. Political forces use that phrase to describe military intelligence agencies. Civilian leaders call them a state within a state. The reason is that civilians lack the constitutional power to promote,' demote, hire, fire or court martial military officers. As Army Chief, Musharraf enjoys these powers here can hardly be a “state within a state” under him.
The Mujahideen did not come out of thin air. They were children blessed by the establishment. When parents devour children to escape retribution there is public revulsion, even if a child got out of hand. There is great sympathy with Kashmiri people in Pakistan even if there is criticism of infiltration of non-Kashmiris. The establishment sent the Mujahideen to die in the icy cold of Kargil, in Afghanistan. Perhaps a word of apology is due to those used and abused at the altar of policy.
The danger of a war with India is hopefully averted but still far from over. Other challenges knock on the door, including the rise of ethnicity that the Afghan war brings to the mountain passes of Pakistan. A pro-India government replaces a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul signalling a possible revival of Pakhtoon nationalism in the provinces of Balochistan and the Frontier, borne to thousands of bitter Pakhtoon Afghans and disgruntled tribes.
General Musharraf had opportunities to build peace. One such opportunity was Agra. There he was pictured at the Taj Mahal and his old home rather than with an agreement in his hand. Another opportunity came and went when India and Pakistan joined the war against terrorism.
The West accepts Musharraf for his
post-September 11 and January 2002 policies. The Pakistanis see his pre-September
11 and pre-January 2002 policies and the sufferings inflicted as a consequence.
Generals expect the West and India to reward them by allowing their continuation
in office given their promise to crackdown on militants. The West and India
could oblige them. It would be at the cost of the Pakistani nation. (The
News)