Concluding exclusive extracts from War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48 by former Indian ambassador to China and the EU, C Dasgupta
British generals in India and Pakistan maintained informal channels of communication on Kashmir developments. General Douglas Gracey’s telegram of 24 October finds a place in every account of the history of Kashmir; less well-known is the fact that he had informed (General Rob) Lockhart about preparations for the invasion even before October 24
Gracey had alerted Lockhart earlier in a telephone conversation that well-armed Pakistan tribesmen were massing in the Attock-Rawalpindi area and were provided with civilian transportation. Lockhart was well aware of his government’s concern over Pakistan-sponsored raids into Kashmir but he did not consider it necessary to press on the report to the Indian government since Kash mir was not a part of the Indian Union at that date.
Lockhart perceived no threat to India from the tribal movement since Kashmir was not at that time a part of Indian Union! At the end of December, Nehru came to learn about this telephone conversation; it led to Lockhart’s immediate resignation, less than five months after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief.
Northern offensive
India’s military plans in November 1948 envisaged offensives in the northern and Jammu sectors. The campaign does not seem to have aroused particular concern on the part of the British Commanders-in-Chief of the rival armies. (General Roy) Bucher set Gracey’s mind at ease by informing him that an advance to Skardu was not contemplated. An incident did occur, however, in what was essentially a side-show in the northern theatre, which caused great anxiety to the British. The way in which the British service chiefs in India and Pakistan dealt with the incident throws light on the contacts which they maintained with each other in order to contain the hostilities.
On 4 November, a Pakistan air force Dakota on a supply-dropping flight to Gilgit was attacked in the air by the Indian air force. (Lawrence) Grafftey-Smith cabled the CRO as well as his colleague in New Delhi about the incident, adding: ‘I am informed that AOC-in-C, India and Air Commander, Pakistan, have a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that Pakistan aircraft should not be attacked in the air, though liable to attack on the ground there, and it may well be that this attack was made without former’s sanction.’
Grafftey-Smith suggested that, if the attack was indeed unauthorised, a renewed assurance from Air Marshal Elmhirst that the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ would be enforced would be invaluable in restraining the Pakistanis from ‘provocation action’.
Grafftey-Smith feared that Pakistan would decide to provide a fighter escort for supply-dropping aircraft, rather than accept the alternative of suspending the air supply operations for Gilgit. India would view this as ‘commitment’ of the Pakistan Air Force in Kashmir, justifying Indian air attacks on airfields in Pakistan. Moreover, India would call for a ‘Stand Down’ of British officers.
The 4 November attack had been carried out under orders from Air Vice Marshal Mukerjee, who was officiating for Air Marshal Elmhirst during the latter’s absence on tour. Mukerjee informed Perry-Keene, the Pakistan airforce chief, that he had ordered the Indian airforce to shoot down ‘any unidentified aircraft’ operating over Jammu and Kashmir.
Confronted with a choice between suspending air supplies to Gilgit or providing fighter escorts and risking possible Indian attacks on airbases inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Cabinet decided on the latter. Gracey and Perry-Keene came straight from the Cabinet meeting to report the development to High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith, who pointed out that the decision would be ‘criminally foolish’ if it turned out that Elmhirst did not endorse Mukerjee orders.
Later in the day, the Secretary-General of the Pakistani government, Mohammad Ali, rang up the British High Commissioner to say that Pakistan would hold up the implementation of its decision for some days. On Elmhirst’s return to Delhi, Commissioner Nye took up the issue with him. Elmhirst stood by his Indian deputy.
A few days later, Elmhirst informed the British High Commissioner that he had an hour-long discussion on the subject with Nehru and had finally persuaded him to ignore Pakistani supply-dropping aircraft over Gilgit. Thus, acting in concert, the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi and the British officers in command of the airforces of India and Pakistan had succeeded in preventing an escalation of the air conflict.
The last round
In Mid-November, with the Indian army poised to raise the siege of Poonch town, panic spread in Pakistan. Karachi feared that India would focus her attention on a push right upto the border. The Pakistani government instructed its Commander-in-Chief to prevent such an advance at all costs. General Gracey decided to throw in all available forces, if necessary, including the fledgling Pakistani airforce. Pakistan had previously refrained from this course because it would inevitably draw a devastating response from the vastly superior RIAF. Grafftey-Smith also reported another sign of Pakistan’s desperation — plans for a counter-offensive. It was a posture which relied heavily on what British ‘assurances.’ This became a cause of anxiety for Grafftey-Smith who felt that it would be disastrous for Pakistan if her moves were based on an incorrect reading of British policy. If at the same time, London were to withdraw all British officers in accordance with the ‘Stand Down’ policy the effect on Pakistan would be devastating.
The High Commissioner therefore sought direct confirmation of Whitehall’s position: I feel it is vital that I should know whether there are any ground for Pakistan GHQ’s assumptions and whether there have been any developments on lines suggested in UK Government’s ‘stand-down’ policy. If these rumours are totally without foundation and ‘stand-down’ policy remains unchanged, I shall have to try to find a way of wearing Pakistan Government that this is the case... Pakistan Government have already denuded their defensive front in West Punjab of the key brigade without which they will be in no position to effectively resist Indian attack from East Punjab and they are planning a counter-offensive in Kashmir in reply to present Indian offensive there. Both these moves are almost certainly based on supposed assurance from UK Government...
Grafftey-Smith now provided an indication of the identities of the recipient as well as the source of the ‘hints’ and ‘assurances’. These were received, he said, by Major-General Cawthorn from a ‘member of the Cabinet.’
The High Commissioner had raised an awkward question. As is common in such cases, the source of the ‘hints’ and ‘informal’ assurances had omitted to bring his initiative on the official record. The obvious suspect was Noel-Baker. It was to him that Cawthorn had conveyed Liaquat’s proposal for an alliance. Noel-Baker had led the UK delegation in the discussions on Kashmir in the Security Council. As Commonwealth Secretary, he had a major say in interpreting a ‘Stand Down’ order.
The Commonwealth Relations Office replied with a well-formulated evasion. ‘We still cannot trace (the) basis for these rumours and believe them to be quite unfounded.’’ cabled Patrick, the Deputy Secretary. ‘It is difficult to pursue the matter without knowing which Minister is alleged to have spoken to Cawthorn.’ And, since it was a simple matter for Grafftey-Smith to ascertain this, Patrick cautioned, ‘But we appreciate the difficulty in obtaining this!’ There is nothing on file to indicate that Patrick had consulted Noel-Baker.
Cable wars
Even as officials engaged in this exchange of cables, the British government signalled the position it would take in the event of a major Indian offensive. The UK again took recourse to delaying military supplies urgently required by India. In mid-December, Nehru complained to Krishna Menon about British prevarication and instructed him to seek a clear answer as to whether the promised supplies would be sent. If not, Nehru intended to ‘make other arrangements’— presumably to explore the possibility of sourcing defence requirements from the United States.
Bucher now set himself a twofold task to restrict Indian offensive action to the extent possible and to reassure the Pakistani army about India’s intentions. Spurred on by Nye, he lost no opportunity to impress upon the Indian government the limitations of its army and the need to adopt a strictly defensive posture.
Nye reported on 22 November that he was ‘arranging to be fed into’ Nehru from professional sources that the morale of Indian troops in Kashmir had begun to deteriorate.
Bucher attended an inter-dominion conference of Defence Secretaries and Officer in Karachi on 26 and 27 November and took the opportunity to hold private discussions with the Pakistani Commander-in-chief, General Gracey, and Chief of Staff, General McCary. Bucher had considerable success in reassuring Gracey. In Grafftey-Smith’s words: ... it is clear that confidential exchanges between him (General Gracey) and General Bucher during recent defence discussions here have useful cleared the air and very-considerably relieved tension, at least on top level. But situation in Poonch area remains precarious because of risk that India commander on the spot may edge forward here and there...
2. Both C-in-C were agreed on essential necessity of localising effect of Indian advance on Poonch, and Gracey has no doubt of Bucher’s good intentions in this respect. He is less sure whether General Cariappa is firmly under Bucher’s control...’
Operation Venus
In early December the Indian army launched some local initiatives in the Poonch-Mendhar area. By 15 December, the Indian army dominated the main road from Mendhar to Kotli. Though these were only local actions, they triggered off Pakistani fears about a major Indian offensive. Liaquat sent a telegram to Attlee (on 8 December) alleging that Indian forces are making preparations for a further offensive. He called for an urgent Security Council decision to send military observers to the state and sought Attlee’s assistance to ‘avert the tragedy that is looming ahead.’
Pakistan’s military dispositions were described by the CK High Commission in Karachi, as follows:
For the first time Pakistan forces ... are so placed that they can deliver a blow ... against Indian lines of communication in Kashmir, splitting Indian Army and endangering the safety of a large part of it.
The planned counter-offensive, codenamed ‘Operation Venus’ envisaged a major artillery attack on the Indian line of communications in the Naoshera area. On 12 and 13 December, the Indian airforce bombed the Pakistani position at Palak, which lay behind Kotli. Pakistan responded on 14 December by launching ‘Operation Venus’. The bridge at Beri Pattan was badly damaged. Prime Minister Nehru, in a message to Attlee, hinted at a possible counter-attack.
In later years Bucher was to claim that his initial reaction to the Pakistani attack was to assemble armoured units and send them to the border. If so, he quickly composed himself, regaining sight of his primary responsibility as a British officer to prevent a full-scale inter-dominion war.
— Concluded
(War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48
by C. Dasgupta, Sage Publications, 239 pages, Rs 440)