India’s diplomatic initiatives and military build-up may have forced General Pervez Musharraf to declare that he will compel the Pakistani society to mend its uncivilised ways. It may have also prompted him to act against the two major terror merchants in the Valley - Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. But will that change the situation in Jammu and Kashmir?
Highly unlikely. If the estimate of the security agencies are any indication, there will not be any let up on the jehadi terror in the border state. This assessment stems from one key finding - the Lashkar and Jaish have already floated shell companies. According to information collected by the agencies, the assets of the Lashkar and Jaish - jehadis and their funds - have already been transferred to smaller outfits like Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Umar, Al-Barq and Tehriq-ul-Mujahideen.
The re-badging of jehadis came to light three days ago. The fears that Pakistan's compliance with the Indian and US pressure would force the jehadis to change name were reinforced when Jameel Ahmed, spokesman of the Jamait-ul-mujahideen, claimed responsibility for the attack on an army facility in Kupwara. His bluff was soon called when security forces discovered that the two terrorists killed in the attack were Pakistanis. No just that. They were carrying rifles which had the Lashkar mark.
Security forces say the fact that the Lashkar got the smaller outfit to own up the terror attack dearly indicate a change in strategy. The front offices will be managed by smaller outfits and have local participation. As a matter of fact, defence minister George Fernandes who was in Srinagar, was told about this new strategy of the jehadis - get indigenous groups to claim responsibility for the attacks carried out by Paki terrorists.
The earlier assessment was that Hizbul Mujahideen, which has around 1,800 active jehadis in its fold, could become the vehicle of terror after General Pervez Musharraf's action on Lashkar and Jaish. This is now being ruled out as the Pakistani jehadis, who are on deputation in the Valley, resent the command structure of Hizbul and its ideological leanings. While the Dcobandis from Pakistan cannot accept the Barelvi outlook of Hizbul, the latter's local strongman Majib Dar is not exactly happy with his Pakistan bosses and their Kashmir strategy.
Security agencies do not see any
immediate change on the ground as Pakistan's jehad has created an alternative
state apparatus in the outfits that are engaged in killing civilians and
security personnel in the Valley.