In an apocryphal story that did the rounds after the 1965 Indo-Pak war, a group of Indian and Pakistani officers met at the border soon after the fighting had stopped. One Sikh officer asked his Pakistani counterparts with a grin: "Yar, we sardarjis are supposed to go mad at noon, but what happened to you guys?"
Thirty seven years later, the question is what has happened to everybody in the subcontinent? Or at least to everybody who matters in Islamabad and Delhi? Judging from the words and actions of the sorry cast of characters in the current shoddy drama being played out in and over Kashmir, the proverbial midday madness of the Sikhs is highly contagious. Consider the inflammatory words of George Fernandes, the Indian defence minister, when he spoke about his country being ready to survive a 'nuclear first' strike and then completely destroy Pakistan. For a responsible politician to utter such bellicose words at such a sensitive time is to betray not just his deep hostility, but his ignorance of the lingering and deadly effects of a nuclear holocaust. To him, an atom bomb is just a bigger conventional bomb.
Indeed, the chain of events, threats and counter-threats since the attack on the Indian parliament on December 11 seem oddly divorced from the realities of the 21st century. The attack itself was as reprehensible as it was amateurish. Mercifully, no Indian MP was killed or wounded. In the scale of casualties caused in South Asia by the terrorists of one ilk or another over the years, a dozen dead (including the terrorists) does not appear to justify talk of nuclear Armageddon. It is clear that the Indian government has seized upon this bloody incident as a justification to inflict serious diplomatic and possibly military damage on Pakistan.
But for its part, Pakistan has opened itself to the charge of sponsoring the Delhi attack through its decade-long policy of supporting the uprising in Indian Kashmir. Despite Islamabad's protestations that it has extended only 'diplomatic and moral' help to the freedom fighters, some Pakistan-based groups have reportedly been arming and training volunteers to take part in the Kashmir 'jihad'. In addition, a number of powerful underworld fugitives from Mumbai have also taken refuge in Karachi.
It has long been evident that Pakistan's ISI has been acting on its own shadowy agenda. While its activities in influencing the country's internal politics have even been revealed before the Supreme Court, its role in Afghanistan and Kashmir has long been shrouded in secrecy. Nevertheless, the existence of training camps run by radical Islamic groups supported by Pakistani intelligence agencies has been the subject of press reports in the past. Some religious parties have been openly collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for the Kashmir cause in major Pakistani cities for years. Even when the government tried to ban such activities, these groups openly flouted the decision.
In brief, the last twelve years or so have seen the evolution of a jihadi culture in Pakistan driven by events in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. Each has fuelled the other, with Pakistani religious groups providing support and sustenance to both the Taliban and the Kashmiri freedom movement. The extent of the involvement of Pakistani governments and intelligence agencies in these covert cross-border activities is a matter of surmise, but given their track-record, it should come as no surprise that they have exercised considerable control over both movements.
Our relationship with the Taliban has been consigned to the dustbin of history, thanks to American 'daisy-cutters' and other assorted munitions, but General Musharraf and many others in Pakistan have sought to draw a distinction between terrorists and 'freedom fighters'. While a very powerful legal argument can be built to justify the difference between the two, the fact is that in the post-September 11 scenario, such sophistry is just not acceptable to the only superpower in the world. The leaders of three countries plagued by 'terrorists' or 'freedom fighters' have all jumped on board the anti-terrorism train with great alacrity: thus, Putin, Sharon and Vajpayee have used the attacks on New York and Washington to deal their own armed opponents fearsome military and political blows.
Pakistan finds itself in a particularly difficult bind as it has committed itself to opposing terrorism while it is simultaneously supporting a freedom struggle. But Vajpayee has made Musharraf's task even more difficult by blaming Pakistanis for the attack in New Delhi without providing a shred of information. His demand suggests that he considers India to be in a win-win situation: without leaving his Pakistani counterpart any face-saving way out, he may well be precipitating a war nobody needs or wants.
While in New Delhi for a week in November, I met a number of politicians and journalists, and was struck by the fact that even the most liberal ones seemed convinced that there was no possibility of a settlement over Kashmir. The most they thought India could ever concede was the conversion of the Line of Control in Kashmir into the international boundary. I pointed out that this was hardly a concession, but they seemed totally wedded to the official Indian position in a way that is not true in Pakistan where a number of us have consistently questioned the government's policies over Kashmir and everything else.
Apart from wanting to bring the uprising in Kashmir under control, what else are the Indian aims? In a letter to the Guardian recently, a reader wrote: "India's war aim goes far beyond the 'short, conventional campaign' to topple General Musharraf envisaged by Peter Preston. The Indian plan is to drive into Pakistan with armour and infantry to the point that all north-south ground communication is cut. That achieved, India could declare a cease-fire and sit tight to await the disintegration of a sundered Pakistan, and thus fulfil the dream Hindu nationalists have held since the 1947 partition."
Had this letter appeared in a Pakistani newspaper, it would have been rightly dismissed as the rambling of a deluded jingoist. But the writer is Neville Maxwell, an eminent journalist and scholar, and author of "India's China War", a superb account of the 1962 Indo-Chinese war. I happen to disagree with Mr Maxwell's gloomy analysis simply because I don't think responsible Indians want a volatile, disintegrating Pakistan as a neighbour.
Ever since the crisis escalated
into a threatened nuclear exchange, I have been asked by friends in London
to explain why India and Pakistan are on the verge of such a catastrophe.
It is not easy to tell them about the contagious madness at noon.