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Author: Ahmad Faruqui
Publication: Daily Times
Date: February 12, 2006
URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C12%5Cstory_12-2-2006_pg3_6
Why does the army do poorly on the battlefield, squandering individual acts of bravery and destroying lives? The generals have enmeshed themselves in civilian duties, the army chief doubles as the president and key corps commanders double as provincial governors. In the selection of general officers the army's culture values loyalty over military skill
The sight of medals gleaming on khaki tunics so overwhelmed Alice that, a little timidly, she asked the Cheshire cat: "Is this the world's best army?" With a grin, he replied, "No. In wonderland, soldiers are awarded a medal for every war they lose."
In reality, armies exist to win wars. This requires knowing when to fight a war and when not to fight one. Armies should have the means for deterring conflict and the means for prosecuting it if deterrence fails. When they do embark on war, they need to have clear and attainable objectives. They should be able to fight on short notice, conduct decisive operations and terminate conflict on favourable terms.
The Pakistani army aspires to a higher mission than most armies - protecting the national interest. This has led it to seize power from civilians four times since independence. It has also fought a dozen wars including insurgencies, insurrections and conventional wars. What have been the results?
In the first war, fought in 1947-48 in Kashmir, the objective was to wrest control of the state by inciting a rebellion among the Muslim population. The army used tribesmen to instigate the revolt. After some initial successes, they began to loot and plunder, forcing the army to initiate conventional infantry action. But it came too late. The war ended with only a third of the state joining Pakistan.
The second war took place in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. It was designed to test Indian military preparedness. Indian forces were outnumbered and retreated. The army misinterpreted this as the inability of the Indians to fight.
This emboldened the army to start its third war in Kashmir with a guerrilla incursion in August. When this failed to spark an uprising, the army uncoiled its fist in Chamb with the objective of capturing Akhnur and threatening the line of communication with Srinagar. This led to a full-scale war along the international border in September. The conflict exposed a lack of coordination between Pakistani armour and infantry forces, particularly in the Khem Karan sector. The war failed to achieve its objective and ultimately cost Field Marshal Ayub Khan the presidency.
The fourth war was fought in 1971. GHQ failed to quell a province-wide uprising in East Pakistan that was triggered by General Yahya Khan's refusal to hand over power to the party that had won the elections. Eight months into the civil war, a full-scale war broke out with India. It resulted in a quick and decisive defeat in the east, where victory was not expected.
Even in the west Pakistan lost 2,750 sq miles and gained a mere 50. The war exposed Pakistan's inability to coordinate its land, air and sea forces. Yahya Khan was forced out of office by the military and later blamed the defeat on the "treachery of the Indians".
The fifth and sixth wars were counter-insurgencies carried out in the mid-1970s in Balochistan and in the mid-1980s in Sindh. Both killed thousands of people, inflamed inter-provincial tensions and sullied the army's image as a national institution.
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a frontline state in the Cold War. The CIA used the ISI as a channel for funding and arming the mujahideen. The army successfully prosecuted an insurgency that ultimately drove out the Soviets in 1989. This was the seventh war and it achieved its military objective. But the war caused lasting damage to Pakistan's civil society.
The eighth war took place in 1984. India successfully occupied the disputed Siachen Glacier in Kashmir near the Chinese border. Pakistan's attempts to retake it failed.
The ninth war was an insurgency in the early 1980s in Indian Punjab. The Indian army crushed the Sikh separatists by storming their stronghold in the Golden Temple.
In 1989, there was an indigenous uprising in Kashmir, giving the army an opportunity to supply arms and ammunition to the militants. During the next decade, the army fought its 10th war by proxy, killing thousands in Kashmir. But it failed to alter the Line of Control by even an inch.
To internationalise the dispute, the army injected Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry disguised as guerrillas into Kashmir in the spring of 1999, triggering the 11th war. They quickly occupied several mountain peaks in Kargil. This tactical success came to naught as Pakistan was forced to withdraw under pressure from the US. No one came to Pakistan's support from either the Arab or the Muslim world. Not even China. The war was a colossal misadventure.
A crisis with India in 2002 nearly resulted in a major war involving a million troops, which would have been the 12th in history. Had hostilities broken out, the Pakistani army would not have lasted more than a week under a sustained Indian onslaught. The war was averted by pressure on both sides from Washington.
Continuing American pressure forced the army to give up the proxy war in Kashmir and stabilise relations with India. It re-oriented itself to fight counterinsurgencies. Initially, these took place in Waziristan. However, new ones have emerged in Balochistan. However, even when fighting ragtag forces, the Pakistani army has failed to achieve its objectives.
While compiling a below-average scorecard, the army has tripled in size since 1965, when it was a force of 170,000 organised into seven divisions and one corps. Now it is a force of 550,000 organised into 22 divisions and nine corps. It is bigger than the American army and the seventh largest in the world.
So why does the army do poorly on the battlefield, squandering individual acts of bravery and destroying lives? The generals have enmeshed themselves in civilian duties, the army chief doubles as the president and key corps commanders double as provincial governors. In the selection of general officers, the army's culture values loyalty over military skill. And there are many in the population who suspect that the army represents the interests of only the majority province.
Improvements will only occur once the writ of a civilian government has been restored over the army. Such a government would benchmark the army's performance against the world's best and institute changes, such as firing incompetent generals, updating its war-fighting doctrine and instituting new training programmes. It will "right-size" the army and establish accountability in military spending. In due course of time, soldiers will return to soldiering and earn medals for winning wars, not losing them.
Dr Ahmad Faruqui is director of research at the American Institute of International Studies and can be reached at Faruqui@pacbell.net
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