 |
||
|
||
|
||
The White House & Pakistan :
Secrets Declassified Documents
1969-1974;
Oxford University Press; pages
659, Rs.725.
One thing can be said in favour of the US Government without any hesitation. By law it throws open its official documents to whoever cares to look into them even if that were to lead to considerable embarrassment to the current administration. And it was that which a Pakistani writer took full advantage of when he sought to look into the secret correspondence of the White House and the State Department with its embassy in Pakistan during the fateful years 1969 to 1974.
Fakir Syed Aijazuddin who had undertook this arduous task deserves congratulations. He has literally exposed America to its enemies, especially in India. The years 1969-74 were fateful ones. In that quiquennium, Pakistan lost its eastern province for a new state, Bangladesh, to be born. Aijazuddin had access to White House, State Department and National Security Council Files and has drawn freely on them. We now know how the United states manouvred to hold secret meetings with Chinese leader using the good offices of Pakistan way back in 1969. We know how Dr Kissinger cheated India and the world by pretending to look into South Asian affairs when his real aim was to fly, unnoticed, from Pakistan to Beijing. We learn that after his visit to Beijing, Kissinger tried to contain the damage by calling Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha, half an hour before President Nixon made the announcement of the visit, to convey a message to Delhi. The message was that President Nixon was going to establish relations with china and if India opposed the move, he would deem it an unfriendly act. Astounding is the sheer arrogance of that message explicitly stated, Kissinger went to Beijing fully advised in a Scope paper. This was at a time when the crisis in East Pakistan was brewing. Among other things the Scope Paper said :
* A war would not help the people of East Pakistan, West Pakistan or India. it would create a new drain on Asian capacity to build for the future.
* The Chinese would probably be pleased to see India weakened and possibly would be pleased to see radical elements come to the surface in East Pakistan.
* In the US opinion there would be nothing more tragic than the outbreak of a new India-Pakistan conflict. We not only do not wish to see an Indian-Pakistan war, we will take active steps to discourage one.
* It is not the policy of US to stir up anti-Chinese sentiment in India.
After meeting the Chinese officials, Kissinger went ga-ga over them. He described the atmosphere thus: "The Chinese treated the entire visit with elaborate correctness and courtesy. They were extremely touch on substance and ideological in approach, but their dealing were meticulous." What did the US expect as a result of Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing? In his report to Nixon, Kissinger wrote : "It will send enormous shock waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility.It will increase the already substantial hostility in India."
Chou showed no respect toward India which he often described as a "expansionist". The Chinese Prime Minister told Kissinger that China was giving military aid to Pakistan. "Because India is committing aggression." For it part Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance against India because in all military fields Pakistan is in a weaker po9sition that India. (but) the morale and fighting capacity of Pakistan is greater than India. India is one of the countries most heavily in debt and it is also well known that life of the Indian people is not easy., If such disturbance is created they will be the victims. Those who will suffer will also be the rulers of India." In subsequent months Chou was to prove himself wrong on all counts. Being the realist that he was Kissinger once told the US ambassador to Pakistan that in his estimate "there will some day be an independent Bangladesh." In August 1971 Nixon met with members of the Senior Review Group. He told them: ambassador who goes to India falls in love with India. Some have the same experience in Pakistan, though not as many because the Pakistanis are a different breed. The Pakistanis are straightforward and sometimes extremely stupid. The Indians are more devious, sometimes to smart that we fall for their line." Kissinger had another assessment of Pakistan. Thus, he told the Chinese Ambassador to France: "The Pakistan government is not very imaginative in psychology and in its political strategy. They do ten little things over ten weeks instead of all at once." At one point, Kissinger told the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations that the United States "will not recognise Bangladesh, will not negotiate with Bangladesh and we will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangladesh." That was on 10 December 1971.
Kissinger was later to eat his words. In due course President himself called on Chou En-lai in Beijing. Their conversation showed the antipathy of both towards India. At one point Chou accused Nehru7 of being "discourteous!" At another point, Chou described India as "a bottomless hole," (It made Nixon laugh). At a third place Chou said he believed Nehru was "thinking of a greater Indian empire including Malaysia, Ceylon and "probably Tibet" as well! And Nixon told Chou that America's "Indian decisions" were his and that, he Nixon, was the "hardliner on India" and Kissinger was only a "conspirator".
One has to read this book page by page to understand how the United States and Chine formulated their foreign policies , what both thought of Pakistan and India, how deviously they worked to gain their ends, and what went into their thinking. At one stage Chou asserted that "in case India invaded Pakistan, china would not be an idle spectator" and that "should India recklessly take such a step she will reap her own bitter fruit." Nothing of that kind happened. There is a moral here for all to learn. Ever take the public utterance of either the United States or China too seriously. What they say in public may not be what they truly believe in private.
The White House & Pakistan is
a most revealing book. On November 12, 1973 Kissinger met Mao Tse-tung.
Kissinger told Mao: "There is a sentimental love affair between western
intellectuals and India based on a complete misreading of the Indian philosophy
of life. Indian philosophy was never meant to have a practical application."
To which Mao's reply was: "It's just a bunch of empty words". So much for
Mao's understanding of India. Is it any wonder then that he behaved the
way he did? Nixon, Kissinger, Mao and Chou En-lai were all haters of India.
That India outwi8tted them all only shows who really is politically savvy.
|
||
|
||
|
||