Author: Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker
Publication: The New York Times
Date: March 16, 2008
American officials say that Pakistan's pledge to fight Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the restive tribal areas is being weakened by disagreements in the Pakistani military and security forces over what their priority should be.
The divisions have emerged as a source of growing frustration to the Bush administration, with officials saying the main disagreement in Pakistan is over whether to gear up a counterterrorism campaign against Islamic extremists or to try to shore up a conventional force focused on potential threats from India.
Senior Bush administration officials and American military commanders universally praise Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan's new army chief, for making the counterterrorism campaign his immediate priority.
But American officials in the Pentagon and State Department say other senior Pakistani officers and security officials are not yet willing to reduce a traditional commitment to fight a conventional land war with India, despite greatly reduced tensions now between the long-time adversaries.
American officials can offer specific examples to illustrate the disconnect between Pakistan's military requests and efforts by the United States to enlist Islamabad to combat terrorists and insurgents in the tribal areas.
An American officer said the Pentagon was surprised when, in negotiations on the counterterrorism effort, Pakistan requested an advanced air defense radar - even though Taliban and Qaeda fighters have no air forces.
"They want this kind of hardware, while we are suggesting training and different procedures," an American officer said. When American officials offered assistance in surveillance and reconnaissance, the Pakistanis requested Predators, the state-of-the-art remotely controlled aircraft that is in short supply even in the American military.
"We are suggesting radios and surveillance equipment - but not the kinds of hardware with long training timelines and lots of maintenance needs," the officer said. "We want them to want counterinsurgency stuff. They want to fight India."
It is not yet clear what policies will be embraced by the leaders of Pakistan's two main opposition parties that won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections last month.
"Doctrines are hard to change, and there's a lot of bureaucratic resistance to this approach," a senior State Department official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of diplomatic concerns, as some others interviewed for this article did. "There are still many Pakistani officers who are worried about where they stand with the Indians."
The official said that top State Department officials in Washington and at the United States Embassy in Islamabad did not view the divisions as an insurmountable obstacle; at the same time, these officials acknowledged the slow progress toward developing a comprehensive approach to fighting the militants.
Bush administration and military officials have expressed concerns that some of the $5 billion the United States has reimbursed Pakistan since 2001 for conducting military operations to fight terrorism has been diverted to help finance weapons systems better suited to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
In 2006, the United States signed arms transfer agreements with Pakistan for more than $3.5 billion in equipment, including 36 F-16 fighters and their bombs and missiles, as well as 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, Richard F. Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service said.
A parade of senior American military and intelligence officials has visited Pakistan in the past two months to offer help in fighting the militants.
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made an extraordinary effort to build a stronger relationship with Pakistan's military leadership, going to Islamabad twice in just over three weeks this year to meet with his counterparts.
In an interview after his most recent meetings in early March with General Kayani, the nation's most powerful officer, Admiral Mullen said the two had discussed the counterterrorism effort "at a very high level," the level of strategy and policy. The two officers did not discuss specific programs for training assistance or equipment, but Admiral Mullen left the clear impression that he believed General Kayani and his top advisers were committed to the counterterrorism effort in the tribal areas.