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The history of the first armed conflict between Indian and Pakistan
could have been an entirely different story had the leadership of
this country been equipped with the necessary experience and
knowledge to provide higher political direction to their
commanders, says in expert.
Instead, while the Indian army fought and gained impressively, an
intervening military hierarchy still held by senior British
officers effectively neutralised the political leaders from
interacting with their commanders in the field, writes Sudhir S
Bloeria in The Battles of Zojila, 1948.
Bloeria, an LAS officer serving in Jammu and Kashmir and an ex-army
officer says, in the upshot, the political leadership became
amenable to the persuasions of the British officers and
consequently a parry to decisions which might not have been
entirely in the interest of the nation.
In the face of consistently open hostilities, Indian government
dealt with Pakistan at two contradictory levels - fighting a
limited a limited war and carrying on normally in other matters.
Money flowed into that country. So did defence materials, despite
an on-going war.
That the leadership faded to realise the strategic importance of
the northern sector is clear from the fact that no serious effort
was made to drive out the illegal Pakistani occupation from a vast
stretch of Skardu-Gilgit area and the tracts further north.
India's acceptance of cease-fire also is an indication of the
inability of the leadership to take advantage of a favourable
situation and rum it to national benefit. Pakistan had all along,
right from January 1948, refused to accept the resolutions of
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
Pakistan had also meanwhile enlarged, its area of operations,
wherever she could, like Gurez, Ladakh, and attempts to over tun
the Punch garrison, and so on. It only agreed to a cease-fire when
both military as well as domestic circumstances turned -
unfavourable, says the book.
The death of jinnah in September 1948 shook the political stability
of Pakistan. Whereas, in India the military situation in Jammu and
Kashmir improved during that period.
The breakthrough at Zojila and subsequent linkup with Leh was
closely followed by the breaking of the siege of Punch during
November 1948.
It was from that relative position of strength that India agreed to
accept the cease-fire, thus bailing Pakistan out of a difficult
situation.
It was not the armed forces of the country, says the book which did
not play their part effectively. It was in fact, the political and
the military leadership at the highest level which failed, says the
book.
It was not realised, says the book their extraordinary capabilities
nevertheless. the Britons still retained considerable if not
crucial, interests in the sub-continent.
The British paramountacy over the Jammu and Kashmir state was to
lapse on 15th August, 1947, with the announcement of the
Mountbatten plan on June 3, 1947, with this, the lease deed over
Gilgit also became redundant.
The arrangements for handing over the province back to the state
were finalised by the two governments. The state government
appointed Brig Ghansara Singh to be the governor of Gilgit.
He flew to Gilgit on July 30, accompanied by Major Gen H L Scott,
Chief of Staff of the J and K state force, and took over the
administration from Lt Col Bacon, the British Political Agent on
August 1 1947.
Maj Gen Scott on his return made a report to the Maharaja. He
informed the ruler that the British officer of the Gilgit Scouts
had decided to join Pakistan, says a new book. Thus the boundaries
of the state there were being protected by personnel whose
loyalties lay elsewhere, according to Bloeria.
However, no steps were taken by the authorities to remedy the
situation. Shorn of military and material support, efforts of the
governor to assert his authority and integrate Gilgit with the rest
of the state did not produce the desired results.
In fact, in view of the prevailing circumstances, these were doomed
to fad. The process of subversion had been set in motion even
before August 15, 1947.
Despite the fact that an impressive victory was secured by the
Indian troops in Zojila and beyond, Indian military commander's
handling of the operations in the northern sector was not without
flaws, says the book.
There were missed opportunities and inadequacy of proper
appreciation. The first mistake was made by Maj Gen Kalwant Singh
who, as the then GoC J&K Div, had refused to accept the
recommendations for the tactical withdrawal of Skardu garrison to
Kargil in March 1948.
Ultimately Skardu could not be saved and even Kargil and Dras fell
into enemy hands, which could have been avoided. Another
opportunity of keeping Skardu family in Indian hands was lost, when
the success in recapturing Gurez, at the end of June 1948, was not
exploited further.
While the raiders were on the run, following their defeat in the
Gurez sector, a rapid advance over the Burzil Pass towards Skardu
was possible. Such a course did require an additional force of
more than a battalion and its air maintenance for a week or ten
days.
These could be, and should have be n, arranged.
The unsuccessful attempts of the 77 Para Brigade to break - through
Zojila in the first half of September 1948 also constituted a major
failure in the operations in the northern sector. On the whole,
the performance of the Indian forces in the Himalayan region can he
described as a mixed one.
Some very tough battles were fought and significant victories were
achieved by units and sub-units involved in the operations launched
by 77 Para Brigade and those belonging to the Leh Garrision. For
this they all deserve credit and praise.
The end result in the entire northern sector in that, a large
portion of Skardu-Gilgit area was not recovered, and the
responsibility for that has to be shared by those at the helm of
affairs, says the book.
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